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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner, 
V. Civil No. 114500103 DA 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
DEPOSITION OF GEORGE SANDUSKY 
TAKEN: April 11, 2013 
12:23 p.m. to 3:02 p.m. 
LOCATION: ALPINE COURT REPORTING 
3507 North University Avenue 
Suite 175 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Reported by: DONNA M. WARD, RPR 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Provo, Utah, April 11, 2013, 12:23 p.m. 
GEORGE SANDUSKY 
was duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. George, have you got -- have you got the 
report from the expert for the evaluation on the 10 lots 
Page 4 
9 as well as the Foo house? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. I have the report from the 10 lots. I do not 
have the report from the house or the lot that's in front 
of the church. 
Q. Do you have a sense as to when that might be 
completed? 
A. Do I know when? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I'd say within the next couple of weeks I 
would say. 
Q. Okay. I'm going to refer you to Exhibit 24, 
which is on yours -- as far as you're concerned, it's Tab 
63 and it is titled the separation agreement. 
A. Okay. Hang on just a second. I don't want 
to disturb this. Okay, I have 24 out. 
Q. You have 24 and that's one that is titled 
separation agreement? 
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A. 
Q. 
No. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Okay. Look at -- I think look at the tab 
number that I sent you, Tab No. 63, because that's the 
separation agreement. 
A. Sixty-three. It's 63. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Did you find it? 
I have a Tab 61 and I have a Tab 64. 
No. I know you have a 63 because we talked 
Page 5 
about that in detail at the first part of the deposition. 
A. Okay, so that's in the other stack that we 
went through? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. 
MS. SHAFFER: What are we looking for? 
MR. MORKEN: It's the separation agreement. 
Liz, can you hear me? 
MS. SHAFFER: Pretty good. 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. It's Exhibit 24, it's the 
19 separation agreement, but as far as --
I 20 
I . . 
I ' ' 
11m 
II 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE WITNESS: The numbers on the bottom are 00703 
and 1343? 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
I have it. 
Okay. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Liz, do you have it? 
MS. SHAFFER: Yeah. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. I'm going to refer you to 
Which one are we going on, sir? 
Q. I'm going to refer you to exhibit -- Bates 
stamp No. 708. No, I'm sorry, 709, and it's Article 8 
and it's titled "Warranty as to Financial Statements." 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Okay. Now --
709, right, it says Article 8? 
Yes. The title of that is "Warranty as to 
Financial Statements." Are you looking at that page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You see the first sentence there? 
reads: "Each party has furnished to the other various 
financial statements and information reflecting the 
It 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 party's financial condition as of March 1st, 2010." You 
19 see that first sentence? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Okay. Did I read that accurately? 
It says: "Each party has furnished to the 
other various financial statements and information 
24 reflecting the party's financial condition as of March 
25 1st, 2010 • II 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Page 7 
Okay. Now, is that a true statement? 
As far as I'm concerned it is. 
Okay. Do you have --
I don't know. I didn't ask for her financial 
Did you give to her various financial 
7 statements? 
8 A. I didn't need to give to her, sir. They were 
9 all in the desk. There were available for her to look at 
10 
11 
12 
13 
anytime she wanted to and they were easy to pull up. 
Q. Did you prepare 
A. They're easy to find. 
Q. Did you prepare for her any financial 
14 statements? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
A. I sat down with her; I don't know when it 
was, but she made three or four pages of notes of 
everything that was owned and where everything was. 
Q. Okay. What you're saying is that she made 
19 notes? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
of notes. 
Q. 
Yes, I sat down with her and she made a bunch 
So is it accurate to say that you never gave 
to her any financial statements that you prepared? 
A. No. No, sir, it's not accurate to say that. 
All those things were available to her. They were in the 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Page 8 
desk. They were common things around the house she could 
2 look at anytime, and I'm sure she did glance at them. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay, so it's clear though you never made a 
financial statement; is that correct? 
A. That's not correct. 
Q. 
A. 
through it. 
Q. 
A. 
Where is the financial statement? 
It's in the separation agreement. We went 
Is it in the separation agreement? 
We went through it, when we went through the 
financials, we went through the separation agreement. I 
explained to her where the money was and where it had 
gone. 
717. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I'm going to refer you to Bates stamp No. 
717. Okay. 
Okay. Do you see where it says "Financial 
Information Worksheet? 
A. 
Q. 
No, 717 to me is a notary signature. 
Yes. Do you see that notary signature and it 
says -- and it's blank as far as any signatures, but it 
says: "The party named above as the party preparing the 
financial information worksheet." Do you see that? 
A. It says: "The party named above as the party 
preparing the financial information worksheet, who 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
acknowledged that he or she did sign the foregoing 
instrument and that the same is of his or her free act 
and deed." Yes. 
Q. Yeah. Did you prepare a financial 
information worksheet? 
A. 
Q. 
No, she did. 
No, the question is: Did you? The question 
is: Did you? 
Page 9 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to object as to the form of 
the question as to what you mean by the financial 
information worksheet. I think he's testified as to what 
his understanding of it was and what they did 
sufficiently. 
14 BY MR. MORKEN: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. Fine. Can you answer the question? Did you 
prepare a financial information worksheet? 
A. All of the financials were there and 
available. I filled out the original sheet that came in 
19 pencil. You showed that to me last time. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay, so neither you or Kylee signed this, 
this statement, that refers to a financial information 
worksheet; is that correct? 
A. I don't know. 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. What financial worksheet are you talking 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
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about? 
MR. MORKEN: I'm talking about the notary clause 
that refers to a financial information worksheet. 
MS. SHAFFER: Which financial information 
worksheet? 
MR. MORKEN: It's Bates stamp No. 717. 
Q. Did a notary or did you sign anything 
pertaining to a financial information worksheet? 
MS. SHAFFER: I don't understand the question, 
Paul. 
MR. MORKEN: Well, I'd like him to answer the 
question. If he doesn't understand it, I'll restate it. 
I 13 THE WITNESS: Would you ask the question again? 
I ' ' ' 
I ' . 
I 
ITul 
II 
I . ' 
14 Hang on just a second. I got a trash truck coming by. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Okay, you're asking me if I signed a financial 
worksheet. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
A financial information worksheet. 
I signed -- I don't understand your question. 
I signed the documents after we prepared them. I did 
21 them in pencil. I was -- I couldn't finish them. I went 
22 to the bathroom. I was sick. She typed them all out, 
23 filled them in. 
24 
25 
Q. So is it accurate to say that no notary 
signed what is what you prepared and sent to me as 
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Bates stamp 717, is it accurate that no notary signed 
that page; is that accurate? 
A. I don't know. 
MS. SHAFFER: Are you asking about -- you're asking 
that particular page that's blank, are you asking if ever 
it was signed by a notary? 
MR. MORKEN: Well, this is the only thing that you 
produced, so you're the ones who -- Mr. Sandusky produced 
it, so I'm assuming he's in a position to testify as to 
whether or not any notary signed the document he 
produced. 
I 13 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Notary -- this notary was 
signed -- this was all signed. I have it right here, 
I " . 
I. . 
. 
I " . 
14 Document 13. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MR. MORKEN: I'm talking about the Bates stamp 717. 
MS. SHAFFER: Well --
THE WITNESS: I don't know. 
MS. SHAFFER: Yeah, I don't understand what you're 
19 asking him. The document is not signed, 717. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. That's correct. Are you aware, George, that 
any document, 717, having to do with financial 
information worksheet was signed by a notary? 
A. 
Q • 
No, I'm not aware of anything. 
Okay. In your response --
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MS. SHAFFER: The noise I'm getting, is there 
Page 12 
2 something going on outside? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
THE WITNESS: It's just a big dumpster guy that's 
getting trash across the street. 
MS. SHAFFER: Oh. 
THE WITNESS: I'm hoping he'll be done in just a 
second. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: I shut some windows. It doesn't do 
any good. 
MR. MORKEN: George and Liz, can you hear me? Can 
you both hear me now? 
I 13 MS. SHAFFER: Yes. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
fl 
Ii 
I 
I 
14 BY MR. MORKEN: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. Okay. George, in your response to 
Interrogatory No. 3, the Interrogatory No. 3 says: "If 
you claim any premarital or separate property interest in 
any asset that you currently own or in which you have an 
19 ownership interest or that you have a severable or a 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
traceable premarital or separate property interest in any 
marital asset, list and fully describe each such asset." 
MS. SHAFFER: Can you tell us what exhibit that is? 
MR. MORKEN: That's not an exhibit. That's his 
interrogatory responses. 
MS. SHAFFER: Does he have a copy of it? 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
MR. MORKEN: I don't know. 
Q. Do you have a copy of your responses? 
MS. SHAFFER: What? 
Page 13 
MR. MORKEN: I'm asking George if he has a copy of 
his responses. I don't know if he has a copy or not. 
MS. SHAFFER: I don't know if he does. I don't 
think he does. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Well, all right. What I'm going to do is 
read your response and then I'm not going to ask you as 
to whether or not whether or not the -- I'm going to 
ask as to whether or not it's an accurate statement as 
you hear me read it. Okay? 
MS. SHAFFER: Hang on one second. I want to get my 
copy so I can follow along with you. 
MR. MORKEN: All right. 
MS. SHAFFER: What number? Three? 
MR. MORKEN: Three. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. Look at Page 5 there, Liz. 
Q. There is the last couple of paragraphs that 
you write in your response, this is what you say: "2007 
received balance of funds on sale of Lyman house" 
A. 
25 garbled. 
Excuse me. Excuse me, sir, you're completely 
I'm not able to understand. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Are you, Elizabeth? 
MS. SHAFFER: No, I can't either. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Can you hear me now? 
Much better. Much better . 
Q. "2007 received balance of funds on sale of 
Page 14 
Lyman house of one and-a-half million dollars and moved 
to Park City, Utah. March 1st, 2010, assets of 
approximately $1,200,000. I took original $400,000 from 
the duplex in Ventura, split the $800,000 with Kylee, 
paying her $24,000 per year for her life or until 
remarried." Okay. Now, is that, as far as you're 
concerned, an accurate statement? 
A. 
Q. 
In general, yes. 
All right, so was it your intent to take 
$400,000 and treat that as your separate property, take 
the balance of the $800,000 and you keep $400,000 and she 
gets $400,000? 
A. That was the intent of the settlement offer, 
yes. 
Q. That was the intent. Okay. Was that the 
intent -- is that how --
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it was. 
Is that how we're to interpret the separation 
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Yes. 
Okay, so she was to get $400,000 as property; 
is that correct? 
A. If you read the separation agreement, it says 
she had 400,000 or six percent interest, which is 24,000, 
$2,000 a month. She asked me. She didn't know what to 
do and I said: "You better take the payments because 
you'll just spend the cash." And I said: "You won't be 
able to find a place to make six percent." And she asked 
about the Maui loan. She said: "Well, why don't I just 
do the Maui loan?" And I said: "Great. What are you 
going to do if the Maui doesn't pay?" She said: "Oh, 
yeah, you're right. 
that all came from. 
I can't do that." So that's where 
Q. Okay. I just want to make sure I'm clear as 
to what your intent was. So the intent was for you to 
keep $400,000 from the Ventura property and then to 
equally divide the balance of the $800,000 where she 
would get $400,000 and you would get the $400,000, that's 
the intent of the separation agreement; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
That's exactly what it was. 
Okay. Now, all right, going to Exhibit 24. 
I'm sorry, I didn't hear you, sir. 
Going to Exhibit 24 or your Tab No. 63, the 
separation agreement. I 
·. •···· --~ ·=·,~-.,.,., - J 
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A. 
Q. 
Okay. 703. 
Yeah, now look at Bates No. 706. 
A. 706. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Okay. 
Page 16 
Q. Now, under Paragraph F, okay, do you see that 
Paragraph F? 
A. Right. 
Q. It says: "All home furnishings, computers, 
TVs, jewelry, Honda 2007 Civic, checking and savings 
accounts and 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
constituted? 
A. 
Q. 
401K." Do you see that? 
Yes. 
Did that constitute a value of $400,000? 
Absolutely not. 
Absolutely not? 
No. 
How much approximately do you think that 
Probably somewhere around 70 or $80,000. 
70 to 80,000, okay, and so assume for a 
minute it's $80,000, that would leave a balance of 
$320,000; correct? 
A. Yeah, but that's not how I figured it. I 
24 gave her that and I was going to give her an additional 
I . . 
I . . 
25 $400,000. 
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So you were going to give her an additional 
Page 17 
2 $400,000? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Plus those things, yes, sir. 
Okay, and that's for property; right? 
Pardon me? 
Q. You're talking about this is different than 
the $400,000 property that you're referring to? 
A . 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Yes, those are all her personal things that I 
would say are her personal stuff. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And the checking and savings was the accounts 
14 that were in her name as the primary, even though I was 
15 
16 
17 
18 
on her accounts at the credit union, that's always been 
her account, the money that was in there, whatever else 
she has, the Honda Civic, the jewelry, the computer, the 
TVs, other than the big screen TV, which I bought, she 
19 said I could have that, and I took and gave it to my 
20 
21 
22 
23 
sister and my nieces and nephews, and I walked I left 
that house with my clothes, a few tools out of the garage 
and the Honda Ridge Line. 
Q. Okay, so the $400,000 was supposed to be in 
24 addition to that; correct? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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Okay. Now, I want you to look at Bates stamp I 
I 
2 No. 711, same exhibit, Paragraph G. You see it, 
' 
' 
' 
I ' ' 
ffitl 
II 
I 
I 
Em 
II 
I ' ' 
I ' ' 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
I 20 
I 
I ' 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Paragraph G? 
Yes. A. 
Q. All right. I want you to -- the title of 
that paragraph is "Transfers of Property Incident to 
Divorce." Are you looking at the same paragraph that I 
am? 
A. Okay. I'm on Paragraph G, it says "Transfers 
of Property Incident to Divorce." 
Q. Okay. Now, I want you to read that and tell 
me if you had read that at the time you signed the 
separation agreement. 
A. Well, I glanced at it. I still don't 
understand what it says. 
Q. You still don't understand what it says, is 
that what you're saying? 
A. No, not entirely. It's confusing to me. 
Q. It's confusing. Did you read Section 1041 of 
the Internal Revenue Code that is referred in that 
paragraph? 
A. I sure didn't. 1041 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, no, I didn't. 
Q. So you still don't know what that means; is 
that right? 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Well, let's back up a minute, sir. At the 
Page 19 
2 time, the only property that was owned was the lots in my 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
own name in Hawaii. That's the only property that was 
owned by us. 
Q. George, that's not the question. I'm asking 
you just a very simple question, and I don't want to 
repeat what you've already said, but is it accurate to 
say that at the time you signed that, and even now as you 
read it, you do not understand that paragraph? 
A. No, and I've never read Section 1041 of the 
Internal Revenue Code either. 
Q. Okay. Now, the same paragraph but Roman 
numeral three, you see where it says that the purpose of 
this agreement is for the transfer of property hereunder 
to be tax free, do you see that? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Okay. Do you understand what that means? 
I believe -- I can guess. Would you like me 
19 to guess and tell you what I think it means? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. Sure. 
A. It means if the property is held in the 
marriage and it goes to one or the other, there isn't a 
tax consequence of a capital gain. That's what I 
24 believe. 
25 Q. Okay. All right. 
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Such as there is no gain if the properties 
Page 20 
2 are held jointly and one person gets it and it's 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
appreciated in value, there is no tax consequence. 
Q. Okay. Where in this agreement does it say 
she gets, in addition to the property in Paragraph 2F, 
that you're going to give her $400,000? 
A. That's the last page of the agreement and 
it's not in this one. 
Q. It's not in this one? 
A. No, wait a minute. There it is there, 
Article 4. 
Q. Article 4. Oh, that's spousal support. 
That's not property. 
A. Right, and at any time in the last -- it's in 
the back of the addendum signed by both of us, and at any 
time either person can terminate the $2,000 a month 
spousal support with me paying her $400,000. 
Q. 
A. 
Yeah. 
You got that, Elizabeth? 
MS. SHAFFER: Yeah, you're referring to 714, the 
addendum 714; right? 
MR. MORKEN: No, he's referring to Bates Stamp No. 
798, that's Article 4. 
THE WITNESS: 714, that's it. 
MR. MORKEN: It's Article 4, titled "Spousal 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
MS. SHAFFER: He's talking about 714 too. 
Page 21 
THE WITNESS: 714, that's what I was talking about. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Yes, I'll get that George, I'll get to 
that in a minute. I'm looking at Bates stamp 798 right 
now, Article 4, spousal support. Now, your prior 
testimony is that you said that the $400,000 that she got 
was intended to be a property division? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
Are you changing your --
It's a division of the marriage. 
Are you changing your 
There is a settlement offer between her and I 
of the termination of our marriage. 
Q. Yah, you said those were assets and property 
and you got $400,000 from separate property and then you 
19 got the remaining $800,000 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. No. No. No. No. Just a second, I'll 
explain it to you. Okay? The amount of money that was 
in play after all the -- we went through the properties 
and everything else, was 1.2 million and change. Okay? 
I told her I would give her -- I would keep the $400,000 
that I kept in the marriage, which I'm going back from 
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signing off on the Ventura properties, and that we'd 
split the 800 400/400. I would keep the land that was in 
my own name. She said she wanted nothing to do with it. 
And, by the way, Mike Anderson, he remembers several 
times she told him that she wanted nothing to do with it. 
I would pay for his college and she could have the 
400,000 or $2,000 a month in the form of alimony. The 
reason for the form of alimony was so I could write it 
off my taxes, because to make that money, I had to pay 
taxes on that money, and she -- and that was what was 
agreed upon, and we talked about this, and she's the one 
that filled it out. I filled it out in pencil and she 
filled it out. 
Q. You see the last sentence of Article 4, the 
second paragraph? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
The last sentence on Article 4. 
Do you understand what that means? 
Do I understand what that means? 
Yes. 
I think I do. 
Q. It says: "The provisions for the support 
maintenance and alimony of Kylee are independent of any 
division or agreement for division of property between 
24 the parties and shall not for any purpose be deemed to be 
25 part of or merged in or integrated with the property 
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settlement of the parties." Now, you signed that and you 
2 understand what that means? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. Well, it sounds like I don't understand it. 
Q. Now, I'm going to refer to Bates stamp 714, 
same exhibit, same tab number, 63, and that's titled 
"Addendum." 
A. Right. 
MS. SHAFFER: Are you on 714? 
MR. MORKEN: Yes. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. It says at any time either one of the parties 
may terminate the monthly alimony payments. Okay? Now, 
14 that's referring to alimony payments of $2,000 with a 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
lump sum cash payment of $400,000 and this will be 
effective March 1st, 2010. Now, so what your 
understanding is that for that matter she could go ahead 
and ask for $400,000 in alimony lump sum today; is that 
correct? 
A. According to the separation agreement, yeah, 
she was always offered that. 
Q. Okay, and so you would come up then in terms 
of alimony a lump sum amount of alimony of $400,000; 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
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Okay, and that would be in addition to any 
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2 property settlement? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Just answer the question. It simply says 
this is having to do with alimony. 
MS. SHAFFER: No, it says he can terminate alimony 
payments. 
MR. MORKEN: Yes, but it says the $2,000 with a 
lump sum cash payment of $400,000. 
MS. SHAFFER: Right. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. So you can terminate the alimony payments 
with a lump sum of $400,000, that is your understanding; 
correct? 
MS. SHAFFER: Well, he testified before --
MR. MORKEN: No, I want just his testimony, Liz. I 
19 don't want it from you. 
I 20 MS. SHAFFER: Well, it's fine, but I don't want you 
to confuse his testimony and misstate his testimony in 
your questioning, you know, his explanation 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. MORKEN: Well, then I'll 
MS. SHAFFER: Let me explain it. 
MR. MORKEN: Liz -- Liz, I don't want you to answer 
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the question, so I'll rephrase the statement. 
MS. SHAFFER: No, I'm not. I'm just objecting to 
the form of your question to the extent that it misstates 
his prior testimony. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Okay. I'm referring to Bates 706, same 
7 Exhibit 24. George, I'm going to refer you to Paragraph 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
D and Paragraph E. 
that? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
D and E? 
I'm sorry, Bates stamp 706. Do you have 
Yes, I do. 
And Paragraph D, as in dog. Okay. It says 
14 "Transfer of Marital Property from Husband to Wife," and 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
its says: "Husband transfers to wife as her sole and 
separate property all interest in the following marital 
property." Is that the way it reads? 
A. Okay. Are we under F, sir? 
D. Q. 
A. You're broken up. I'm not trying to be rude. 
I'm trying to understand the question. 
Q. That's all right, George. I'm referring to 
Paragraph D, as in dog. 
A. Okay. D, okay. Transfer of marital property 
from husband to wife. 
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Q. "Husband transfers to wife as her sole and 
separate property all interest in the following marital 
property." Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Page 26 
Q. Now, in that paragraph, it's blank. There's 
no property listed; correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay, so, and then Paragraph E, as in 
elephant, transfer 
A. Right. 
Q. 
A. 
How does that read? 
It says: "Transfer of marital property from 
wife to husband." There was no property transferred. 
Q. So -- okay, so there is nothing -- neither 
paragraph identifies any marital property; is that 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
That's correct. 
So no property, no marital property was 
19 transferred; is that correct? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
A . I'm not sure what you mean by marital 
property. Are you talking about real estate property? 
Are you talking about blankets? Are talking about tools? 
Are you talking about cars? What are you talking about? 
Q. So you don't know what it means? Is it fair 
25 to say you don't know what marital property means? 
~====~=-,,-·,-·~-•=·- ••tt-·~·-•~==-==· ··•,~~~=-•=,-.~,~--,,-,,~=~,•-~~ ··,~==•~ •u~-=r~---,~~- •=c ·• ==>~,-~J 
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MS. SHAFFER: What do you mean in your question? I 
2 think it's only fair. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Is it fair, George, that you do not know what 
marital property means? 
MS. SHAFFER: What was the question? 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Is it fair to say you do not know what 
marital property means? 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. That isn't what he said. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Just answer the question. 
MS. SHAFFER: He was asking you to explain your 
question. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. George, answer the question. Is it fair to 
say 
Repeat the question, please. A. 
Q . Is it fair to say you do not know the 
definition of marital property? 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I wouldn't say yes or no to that, 
sir. 
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BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. You don't know? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. You don't know? What is the definition of 
marital property? 
Page 28 
A. Anything that's acquired during the marriage 
7 could be marital property; anything acquired during the 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
marriage could be separate property. 
Q. What would define marital property? 
A. I'm not sure what that means. Does that mean 
her underwear, her socks? 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: I'm asking you. 
MS. SHAFFER: Are you talking about between them or 
what defines marital property in general or between them 
or what are you talking about, Paul? Objection to the 
form of the question. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. All right. George, your testimony was that 
no marital property was transferred; right? According to 
Paragraph D and E, no marital property was transferred or 
called the separate property of another party; correct? 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. His answer to your question was there was a 
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blank after D and E that you asked him about and he 
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2 confirmed that was the case on the property settlement 
3 
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agreement. That is the question. You know, Paul, so be 
fair. You ask him a question and then you recharacterize 
it kind of in a cross-examination type way. It isn't 
really fair. So all I'm saying is just be fair in your 
questions here. And I'm objecting to the form of that 
question. It's not cross-examination. It's discovery. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Okay. Can you answer the question? 
A. I don't think I can. 
MS. SHAFFER: What is the question? 
THE WITNESS: I'm totally confused, sir. 
MS. SHAFFER: What is the question? 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Is there anything in the document that shows 
that -- is there anything that states that any asset here 
is marital property in this separation agreement? 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Just answer the question. 
A. Anything that is marital property? 
Q. Is there anything in this agreement, 
separat:=:::~ t.:~-~:~t1-~.:~s -a~~ _a__J 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
marital property? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't know. 
Well, do you want to look? 
A. I don't think we -- we just separated the 
properties and the assets, the cars, the furniture, 
everything else. I don't think we ever identified 
marital property as far as I can remember. 
Page 30 
Q. Okay. I'm going to refer you to Paragraph F, 
Fas in Frank, same page. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You see this is separate property of wife. 
It says checking and savings accounts? 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
Now, does that mean all checking and savings 
accounts held by either, by both of you? 
A. 
you, sir. 
Q. 
anything 
A. 
Okay. All -- I'm going to explain that to 
No, I don't want an explanation. Is there 
I'm going to answer the question if you'll 
let me answer the question. 
MS. SHAFFER: What is the question, Paul? 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Here is the question: Is there anything in 
that paragraph that identifies an account? 
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MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to -- let me just object to 
2 the form of the question. Also, that the question is --
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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14 
15 
16 
17 
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the record should reflect that the question is part of 
Article 3, talking about property and property division, 
and there are also some additional information prior to 
each one of those subparagraphs that might explain what 
you're trying to get at in this, Paul. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Can you answer the question? 
A. Repeat the question, please. 
Q. Does this identify or differentiate at all 
between checking and savings accounts? I'm talking about 
Paragraph F. 
A. Does it specifically identify? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, because the whole time during our 
marriage, sir, we had separate accounts. She did not go 
into my accounts. I did not go into her accounts. 
Q. So it does not --
A. It was separate accounts. 
Q. It's accurate to say -- so it's accurate to 
say that nothing in this agreement identifies what 
accounts; is that correct? 
A. Well --
MS. SHAFFER: What accounts are you talking about? 
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MR. MORKEN: Liz, we're talking about Paragraph F. 
MS. SHAFFER: F? 
MR. MORKEN: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: It says right in here, it says Honda 
Ridge Line truck, checking and savings accounts. It 
should have me as the primary on the checking and savings 
accounts. She knew exactly what checking and savings 
accounts those were and the retirement/pension account, 
that's what it says there. The reason it wasn't -- the 
reason it wasn't listed in there is because they were 
separate accounts. Just like your wallet is separate 
than your wife's purse. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
It doesn't identify it though, does it? 
No. I know whose they were. She knows whose 
they were. It was common knowledge whose they were. 
Q. Going to Paragraph G, as in girl or George, 
this has to do with your checking account, this has to do 
with some additional checking and savings accounts. Is 
there anything that identifies or separates out the 
checking and savings accounts in Paragraph G? 
A. No, that's all it says is checking and 
savings accounts. 
Q. Okay. In terms of Paragraph G, the 
retirement/pension, is there anything that identifies the 
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difference between separate property and marital property 
having to do with your pension? 
A. Well, this is what it says, sir: "Honda, 
Ridge Line 2007 truck, checking and savings accounts and 
retirement/pension." That's all it said. 
Q. You earned -- part of your pension was earned 
before the marriage; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Part of the pension that was earned was 
earned after the marriage; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay, so is there anything in here that 
differentiates in terms of your pension between the 
pension that was earned before the marriage and the 
pension that was earned after the marriage? 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question. Subparagraph G starts out separate 
property of husband. 
MR. MORKEN: Yes, it does say that. 
Q. Okay. Answer the question. 
A. Okay. I'll answer the question. The reason 
that's not addressed, sir, is because when Kylee asked me 
to marry her, she said: "I will never touch your 
24 pension. I'll sign any prenuptial agreement you want me 
25 to sign." And I said: "I trust you. I'll always take 
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care of you. Don't worry, things will be fine." And 
that's the way it started and that's the way the marriage 
started. 
Q. Off the record. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Back on the record. George, I'm going to 
keep referring back to Tab 63, that's the separation 
agreement, which is Exhibit 24. 
A. Okay . 
Q. Okay. Do you see anything that -- do you see 
anything in the separation agreement that identifies the 
joint bank account at the Home Savings? 
A. Do I see anything that identifies the Home 
Savings bank account? 
Q. 
A. 
Q . 
Yeah, the joint bank account. 
No, I don't. 
You admit that was a joint bank account; 
19 correct? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. No. 
Q. That wasn't held in both of your names? 
A. Both of our names could have been on it. We 
had different types of CDs in that account. One was in 
24 her name only; one was in my name only; one was joint; 
25 one was my son's, Micah. Those were all ways to take the 
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Q. Okay. Were any of those accounts identified 
in the separation agreement? 
A. 
Q. 
None of those accounts are identified. 
You had a joint -- you have a joint or had a 
joint account at Vanguard; correct? 
A. She was on the account at Vanguard, that's 
correct, with joint rights of survivorship. 
Q. Right. Do you see that identified anywhere 
in the separation agreement? 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
And Account No. 551555, the joint account at 
the Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union, do you see 
14 that identified anywhere in the separation agreement? 
15 A. I don't see any bank accounts in the 
16 separation agreement. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Can you all still hear me? 
I'm getting nothing. 
Yeah, can you hear me now? 
MS. SHAFFER: I don't hear you either. 
MR. MORKEN: Can you hear me now? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Do you see the -- the Smart Car was bought in 
2008; correct? 
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A. 
yes. 
Q . 
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Smart Car, yes, sometime around that time, 
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Do you see that identified in the separation 
agreement? 
A. No. 
Q. The tractor was bought in June of 2010; is 
that correct? 
know. 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. 
A. 
Do you remember --
I mean, that sounds right, June. I don't 
MS. SHAFFER: What year? 2010? 
MR. MORKEN: June 2010. 
Q. That was bought with proceeds from the joint 
account; is that correct? 
A. No. You're calling it a joint account. 
because her name is on it, you're calling it a joint 
account. Those accounts have already been separated. 
Just 
She had her chance to take the $400,000 or the $2,000 a 
month, so the accounts have been separated. They were my 
accounts, and her accounts were her accounts. So when 
you're saying joint account, I'm not going to agree with 
that, no. 
Q. I'm not asking you whether -- I 
A. 551555 account, yes, probably taken from the 
=~=-~~-~-~~-,,~·-~=,==~~~~~-~---=~~~ .... ~ ·•,~·······.,,=·-==-~~-=~J 
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That was taken from that account; correct? 
You have the records. You're asking me, I 
Page 37 
4 don't know. I don't have the record. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. Is the tractor identified in the separation 
agreement? 
A. No. We bought it in June 2010. 
Q. The scooter was bought in June 2010; right? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
scooter? 
What scooter? 
Did you own a scooter? 
Do I own a scooter? 
No, did you in June of 2010 acquire a 
A. I don't know. I probably did. You have the 
record. I'm not sure I did. 
Q. Was that acquired through funds that were in 
the joint account? 
A. That was acquired probably from Account 
19 551555. That's not a joint account. That's my separate 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
account according to the separation agreement. 
Q. At that time, is it your understanding that 
if you had died, that the monies in that account would 
have gone to Kylee? 
Yes, that is. 
I 25 
A. 
Q. And vice-versa, if she had died, the monies 
I 
I 
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in that account would have gone to you; is that correct? 
A. If she had died, the money was already in the 
account and I was in charge of that account, so if she 
died, nothing would have changed. I would have still had 
my money in that account. 
Q. Okay, and that's because it was a joint 
7 account with the rights of survivorship; is that correct? 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. 
Q. 
Her name is on the account. 
Okay. Did you receive a tax return in 2009? 
I'm sorry, a refund in 2009 on your federal and state 
taxes? 
A. I'm sure I received a tax return. I have no 
idea what it was. I'd have to look it up on my tax 
14 return. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. Do you know what happened to the proceeds of 
that refund? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. Do you know what happened to the proceeds, or 
19 in terms of the refund, do you know what happened to the 
20 
21 
22 
23 
refund? 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question. I don't think we've established that there 
was, in fact, a refund at this point. Do you have some 
24 documentation? 
25 BY MR. MORKEN: 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
I . . 
I 
I 
I 
I . 
I 
I . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
mirl 
II 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. 
A. 
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A. 
George Sandusky 
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I'm going to refer you to Tab No. 81. 
81? 
Yes, 81. 
Okay. 
MS. SHAFFER: Is this regarding the 2009 taxes? 
MR. MORKEN: Yes. 
Page 39 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 25 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. All right. I'm going to refer you to Bates 
stamp 309, so that would be the third page in that tab. 
Do you have Bates stamp 309? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Do you see there on February 24th, 2010, 
there was a Utah tax refund of $2,297? Do you see that? 
A. Utah tax is $2,297, correct. 
Q. You see the federal tax refund? 
A. Yes, $8,855. 
Q. That was received -- the transfer date was 
February 26, 2010; correct? 
A. Okay. All right. 
Q. Okay, so now, so that was -- it's accurate to 
say those were your tax refunds for 2009; correct? 
A. Yeah, but I don't remember if we filed 
24 jointly or separately. Did we file jointly? 
25 Q. That's not my question. All right, so once 
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received, what did you do with the money? 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. The money that went in there? 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
spent. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Well, it's either still in there or it's 
All right, and you put into -- it was in your 
account is that your account that you shared with your 
sister, Liz Chambers? 
A. I put it in my separate account, that's been 
a separate account forever, and my sister is on that 
14 account with me. Now, if you call my sister, she's on 
15 that account, but she won't call it her account. She'll 
16 call it my account, and she's on there in case something 
17 happens to me. 
18 Q. All right, so you -- now, those were tax 
19 refunds for the year 2009; correct? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. That's what it looks like to me. 
Q. Do you see any mention of the 2009 tax refund 
in the separation agreement? 
A. No, the separation agreement was made 
24 February 10th I believe or 8th or something and this 
25 happened the 24th or 26th. 
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Q. Yes, and the separation agreement says it was 
effective March 1st, 2010; is that correct? 
A. Okay. Yes, that's what it says. 
Q. So it's effective March 1st, 2010. It does 
not mention either of these refunds; is that correct? 
A. It was never addressed. I don't think it's 
7 ever been addressed, no. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
Are we done with 83, so I don't mess them up? 
Yes. 
A. I'm trying to keep them organized. 
MR. MORKEN: Liz, right now I'm identifying Bates 
stamp No. 309 as Exhibit 25. 
14 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 26 was marked for identification.) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. I'm going to refer you to Tab 89. 
Wait a minute. I was in Tab 25 and now you 
want me to go to 89? Put Tab 25 away. 
Q. 
Tab 89. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
You were in Tab 81. Now I'm putting you into 
Tab 89? 
Yes. 
I have just lost my videotape. There, it's 
24 back. Okay, 89. Okay. 
25 Q. I'm referring to Bates stamp No. 233. 
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George Sandusky 
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I can't hear you. 
Bates stamp No. 233. 
233, correct. 
Q. Is it accurate that -- okay. Right down 
Page 42 
there where it says April 14th, 2011, it says withdraw of 
tax return, $34,715. Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. This is in 2011; right? 
Q. Yes. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
April 14th, 2011. Do you see that? 
Yes, I do. 
Is that your 2010 tax return refund? 
A. I think it is. 
Q. And did you put that into the account that 
you have with your sister, Liz? 
A. Well, it says here, if you add those two 
things, it says ACH deposit State of Hawaii tax refund, 
so that's on 03/30 and 03/25, so on 03/30 and 03/25, I 
got those returns from the state and from the federal 
government, and then I don't know exactly what that's 
for, but it looks like it has something to do with taxes, 
yes. 
Q. So the one from the State of Hawaii tax 
24 refund is $10,035; correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 Q . And the one from the Federal Treasury is 
2 $24,680? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, that was for 2010; correct? 
That's your refund for 2010? 
A. Yeah, 2010. I got the refund in March for 
2010. 
Q. Is there anything in your separation 
agreement that identifies a tax refund for 2010? 
A. No, I have already testified there is no 
agreement in there about the tax refunds. 
Q. For 2010; correct? 
A. There is no agreement in there about tax 
14 refunds or anything. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. Right. Okay. All right. 
Liz, that's Exhibit No. 26, Bates stamp 233. 
MS. SHAFFER: Just the one page? 
MR. MORKEN: I'm sorry, no, 212 and 233. 
MS. SHAFFER: 212? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's the front page of the 
Hawaii Community Federal Credit Union. 
MR. MORKEN: Exactly. So it's 212 and 233. That's 
Exhibit No. 26. 
24 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 27 was marked for identification.) 
25 BY MR. MORKEN: 
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Okay. I'll refer you to Tab No. 99. 
I'm putting 81 back; right? 
Yes. 
99. 
99. Okay? Are you ready? 
Yeah. 
Okay. I'm going to refer you to Bates stamp 
1326. Do you see that? 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
You see the $40,000 there right in the 
middle, it's February 17th, 2011? Do you see that 
$40,000? 
A. Okay. You're still broken up. Sorry, I have 
14 that sheet in front of me. It's 1326 at the bottom. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. Yes, and you see where the date February 
17th, and that's 2011, there is an amount there that 
says -- well, I guess it's February 23rd, $40,000. 
you see that? 
Do 
A. Right, and the next page you gave me a copy 
of the check made out to Liz Chambers. 
for? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Now, what was that $40,000 to Liz Chambers 
I don't know. 
Okay. That's taken out of that account 
25 number that has your name and Kylee's name on it; 
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correct? The account number is 551555; is that correct? 
A. I don't see the account number on this sheet. 
Yes, it is. It says 551555. 
MS. SHAFFER: Object to the form of the question 
too because the document does not have Kylee's name on 
it. 
MR. MORKEN: Well, yes, it does. We're talking 
about Check No. 640 and it has George Sandusky and Kylee 
Sandusky. 
Q. Do you see that, George? 
MS. SHAFFER: Oh, I'm sorry. I was talking about 
No. 1326. 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. You're correct, it doesn't say 
14 it on that number. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. But the check -- okay, so the $40,000 is 
taken out of that particular account and given to Liz 
Chambers; correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, Liz Chambers. 
You don't know what the $40,000 -- why you 
gave her $40,000? 
A. 
Q. 
A . 
I have an idea why I sent that down there. 
But you don't know for sure? 
No. 
MR. MORKEN: Liz, what I'm marking as Exhibit 27 
would be a Bates stamp 1326, as well as that check, 640, 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
I 18 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
No. 640. Okay? 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Tab 104. 
Tab No. 104. 
1-0 what? 
You can put away Tab 89. You're looking at 
A. All right. 
Q. I'm going to ask you a question on Bates 
stamp 197. You see where --
A. Okay. Hold on a second. I opened up this 
tab and the first number on the bottom is 1327, 1328 is 
the next one. Which one did you want me to look at? 
Q. Bates stamp 197. 
MS. SHAFFER: 197 is my first document, so they 
might be mixed up, the pages. 
Page 46 
THE WITNESS: I got a 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 
208, 209. I have no 197. I have 326, 327, 325, 321, 
19 324. I don't have that. I have a 202, 203, 204, 205, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
206, 207, 208. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Now, your attorney has 197, so I'm not quite 
sure why you don't. 
A. Well, maybe it's forward to that. I'll look. 
MS. SHAFFER: What was the last tab we were on? 
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THE WITNESS: 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. No, 197. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
1197? 
A. Okay. I have a 1197 in the tab in front of 
me. 
Page 47 
Q. No, this is 197. It's for a statement period 
of January 1st, 2011, to January 31st, 2011. 
MS. SHAFFER: How -- oh, I see 1197. 
THE WITNESS: And the next tab has -- oh, here's 
0095, 96, 97. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. No, 
987? 
it's 197. All right. I'm not going to 
waste time on that. Let me ask you just a question 
14 because it references on your statement January 14th, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2011, this is what it says: NSF, slash, Sandusky, slash, 
Cowen. Who is Cowen? 
A. I have no idea. Cowen -- the only Cowen -- I 
don't I don't know. The only Cowen is a kid that 
played basketball. I haven't seen him since we were a 
freshman. I haven't seen him forever. I don't know a 
Cowen. Not that I know of. 
Q. All right. I'm going to look at 209, Bates 
stamp No. 209, same 
A. Hang on a second, I'm getting it. Okay, 209. 
Okay. I have 209 now. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Okay. Now, were those transfers, the share 
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2 withdrawals, are those transfers to Liz? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. I don't know. It says 4,781.22. It could 
have been into another account I opened with my son, 
Micah, or it could be to Liz. I don't know. 
Q. Look at Tab No. 93. Don't put away 
put away the tab for 104. Just keep that there. 
A. 
Q. 
I just want to keep it organized. 
Just hold on to 104. 
MS. SHAFFER: Where are we going? 
MR. MORKEN: Tab No. 93. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
don't 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 28 was marked for identification.) 
14 BY MR. MORKEN: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. Okay. Now, that Tab No. 93, Bates stamp 217, 
that's the account that you have with Liz, correct, your 
sister? 
A. I opened an account with -- yeah, and that 
19 was in March of 2000, yeah, okay. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Q. Okay. 
MS. SHAFFER: What Bates stamp, I'm sorry? 
MR. MORKEN: 217. 217. 
Q. Okay. Now, you see there, George, where it 
says July 5th, 2011, a share deposit of $4,937? 
25 A. What number are you on? ll 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
page. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
209. 
Q. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
217, Bates No. 217. 
Okay. It's in the back here. Two nine 
You see the share deposit of $4,937? 
Well, I haven't found 217, yet. It's the 
Yeah, it says account deposit $4,937.70. 
And 70 cents; correct? 
Correct. 
Okay. Now, look at Bates stamp 209. 
209. 
209 is your Tab No. 104. 
Well, it's in the other tab, okay. Okay, I 
Okay. Now, if you add those amounts -- if 
Page 49 
14 you add those three amounts, $4,781.22, $141.62 and the 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
$14.86, that comes to $4,937.70; correct? 
A. Looks like I closed that account and put it 
into the other account, doesn't it? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Right. 
Okay. 
So that's your testimony is that you're 
taking that amount out of Account No. 551555 and putting 
it into an account with Liz; correct? 
A. No, I'm putting it into Account No. 593643 as I 
my sister is on that account with me. My sister would ! 
-~-.J never claim any ownership to that money. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Q. Okay. I just want to make sure I'm clear. 
You put -- you took it out of that first account --
A. I closed the account that she took $90,000 
out and put it in a joint account with my sister. That 
looks exactly what I did. I told you that before. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
Page 50 
Liz, Bates stamp 217 and Bates stamp 209, those --
that's combined Exhibit 28. 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm sorry, what was it again? 
THE WITNESS: 217. I think he said 209. 
MR. MORKEN: Bates stamp 217 and 209, that's 
combined into Exhibit 28. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
14 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 29 was marked for identification.) 
15 
16 
17 
18 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Now, George, if you can refer to Tab No. 111. 
A. Okay. I'm sorry, you've broken up. What tab 
was that out of? I forgot already. What did this 207 
19 and 209 come out of? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
is out 
Q. 
of 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
One of them is out of Tab 89; the other one 
Tab 104. 
104. 
104 
All 
Now, 
We'll put this back in 104. 
and 89. 
right. 
I'm going to refer you to Tab 
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right. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
111. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
That is your financial declaration. 
Hang on a second. All right. 107, all 
MR. MORKEN: Liz, I'm making that, his whole 
financial declaration, Exhibit 29. Liz, that goes from 
Bates stamp No. 988 to 998. 
Page 51 
Q. All right. George, I'm going to refer you to 
Bates stamp No. 994. 
A. 994? 
Q. Yeah. By the way, before I do that, is 
Exhibit 29 your financial declaration? Is this your 
financial declaration? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, it is. 
All right. Is that -- okay. All the way 
through, it's all in handwriting. Is that your 
handwriting? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes, it is. 
All right. Referring to Bates stamp No. 994. 
That's the page I'm on. 
Q. All right. Where it says other and it says 
Liz Chambers $90,000, do you see that? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Liz Chambers, yes. 
What is that? 
I see that. 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
-
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
Ii 
I 
I 
I 
!I 
IJ 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
1 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
MS. SHAFFER: What page? I'm sorry, I'm not 
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2 following. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
THE WITNESS: 994. 
MR. MORKEN: 994. 
Q. All right. Down below it also says $100,000 
given to Liz. Do you see that? 
A. It also says down below that, it says --
yeah, I see that. 
Q. It says A and B; is that correct? 
A. A and B. 
Q. Well, all right --
A. I can't. I don't -- looks like somebody 
else's -- somebody wrote an account number in. That 
14 doesn't look like my handwriting. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Where it says Liz Chambers LAFCU, is that 
your handwriting? 
90,000? 
Is that your handwriting where it says 
A. Yes. 
Q. Down below that is that your handwriting 
where it says given to Liz 100,000? 
A. 
Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Yeah. 
All right, so that's a total of 190,000; 
Yes. 
Q. When did you give her $190,000? 
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A • 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
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I'm not getting any sound. 
When did you give her $190,000? 
I don't know. You saw a $40,000 check. That 
would probably be part of it. 
Q. Are any of those amounts that we've listed 
that goes to Liz or Liz's account, are any of them in the 
separation agreement? 
A. That money -- those were given after the 
separation agreement. 
Q. You said just a little while ago you don't 
remember when you gave it to her. 
A. Well, I gave it to her after the separation 
agreement. You just showed me a check for $40,000. What 
14 was the date on that? That was March 2011, wasn't it? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. 
$90,000? 
I don't know. Is that included in the 
A. It says from pension and accident. I got 
$42,000 from getting hit on the motorcycle and I also put 
19 all my pension money into her accounts. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. So we don't know if 90,000 includes that 
40,000 or if those are two separate ones or do we? 
A. I don't know. They're intermixed. I'm not 
sure where they went. 
Q. How do you know -- so you don't know whether 
or not the $40,000 is included in the $90,000 or not, do 
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you? 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
A. No, I think it is included. I'm not sure. 
Q. But you don't know. Okay, and the 
$100,000 
MS. SHAFFER: Let him finish. I'm sorry, George. 
THE WITNESS: She has $100,000 of my money in her 
account right now. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Well, according to this, it's 190,000. 
I'm not sure if I did that or I moved it 
back, but it's not there now. 
Q. Okay, but at the time that you did the 
financial declaration, it was 190,000; correct? 
A. If I did it, I'm not sure if it was or not, 
correct. 
Q. You signed this financial declaration 
Page 54 
November 4th, 2011; correct? That's on Bates stamp No. 
997. Let me refer to Bates stamp No. 997. Did you sign 
19 this financial declaration November 4th, 2011? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
November 4, 2011, correct. 
Is that accurate, you signed it? 
November 4th, 2011. 
Why did you put -- why did you have those 
24 sums of $190,000 in an account with Liz? 
25 A. Well, she was my sister. It was an account 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Page 55 
with my sister. It was separate property. Keep it away 
2 from Kylee. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q. You wanted to keep it away from Kylee? 
A. Yes, that's why I closed the account, yes, 
551555. 
Q. All right. I'm going to ask you a separate 
question: Why did you put the $190,000 into the account 
with Liz? 
A. I told you to keep it away from Kylee. In 
case something happens to me, she'll make sure it goes to 
Micah. 
Q. Okay. When you reported your assets in the 
financial application for financial aid for Micah, did 
14 you include a report of the $190,000? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MS. SHAFFER: Objection to the form of the 
question. I don't know that it's been established first 
of all that there was ever any financial applications 
filed. 
19 BY MR. MORKEN: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Answer the question, please. 
A. I'd have to see the financial application 
before I could answer that, sir. I filled out two of 
those and I can't remember exactly what's on them. 
Q. Okay. Is it possible you did not list the 
$190,000 on those applications? 
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up. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
A. You're broken up. You're completely broken 
I can't hear a word. 
MR. MORKEN: Can you hear me now? 
MS. SHAFFER: Yeah. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Is it possible that you did not list the 
$190,000 on those applications? 
Page 56 
A. It's very possible that the $190,000 was not 
in that account. The $90,000 came out and she had the 
$100,000. I don't know when I took the $90,000 out and 
transferred it over to my account. I don't know when I 
did that. It's very possible there wasn't $190,000 when 
14 I filled out the application. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Is it possible that it's not listed in the 
application? 
A. It's possible. 
Q. So, but would you have had $190,000 
somewhere. Is it possible then that that $190,000 was 
not listed in the applications? 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm going to object to the form of 
the question too. I think you're -- are you including 
well, I am going to object to the form of the question. 
of me, 
THE WITNESS: Unless I have the statements in front 
it's possible. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
MR. MORKEN: Off the record. 
(Whereupon a discussion was held off record.} 
MR. MORKEN: Liz, back on the record. His 
financial declaration from 988 to 998 is Exhibit 29. 
Okay? 
MS. SHAFFER: 990? 
MR. MORKEN: 988 to 998. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. Exhibit 29? 
MR. MORKEN: Exhibit 29. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Okay. George, did you make -- are you 
familiar with the Witgrove Kanaloa or Kanaloa? 
A. I'm familiar with a you're broken up. 
Page 57 
Q. I'm going to start, I'm going to ask you some 
questions about what I understand are called hard money 
loans, so when I say hard money loan, you know exactly 
what I mean; correct? 
A. Well, I don't know if we have the same exact 
knowledge of hard money loan. Hard money loan is a real 
estate loan that I made to somebody who has property, 
that's what I called a hard money loan. Hard money loan 
is a hard money loan. 
Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to refer to the 
Wittgrove Kanaloa, and that's spelled K-a-n-a-1-o-a. You 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
remember that hard money loan? 
A. Yes, some aspects of it. 
Q. Do you remember how much that was? 
Page 58 
A. I think it was 300 or three and a quarter or 
350. Am I right? You have the information right in 
front of you. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall if that was recorded 
some time around April 29th, 2009? 
A. I don't recall the dates. 
Q. It was before the separation agreement; 
correct? 
A. I don't remember when the dates are. If you 
can show me material, I can make sure on the date. 
Q. Do you recall having hard money loans before 
the separation agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which ones do you recall having before the 
separation agreement? 
A. There was a loan made to I believe Wittgrove 
and there was another loan, Kanaloa, that overlapped and 
there was also a loan on vacant land, Alii Drive, Jack 
Rose I think was his name. 
Q. Do you recall how much the vacant land, the 
24 loan was, how much that was? 
25 A. Those were structured by a loan officer that 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
approached me, that's how I got in the hard loan money 
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2 business, and she explained to me that the loans were for 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
I believe $450,000, but they were discounted if paid in a 
year, so that note was 450 but I discounted it, I gave 
them less money than 450 and he gave back 450 in a year. 
Q. So he paid you back 450? 
A. I don't know if he paid the full amount or 
when he paid it off, but that was the way it was 
constructed. In a year, the interest rate would come out 
to 450, so you'd take four percent off of 450 and I 
believe I gave him $394,000. I mean, all things can be 
had. 
I 13 Q. 
A. 
Did you produce those documents? 
~ . . 
n 
-1 
~ . . 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Those -- all those documents are gone. I 
don't have any of those documents. 
Q. We lost you there. What did you say? 
A. I don't have those documents. Those 
documents have been thrown away. 
Q. They've been throw away. When did you throw 
them away? 
A. A long time ago. 
Q. So they weren't available at the time of the 
separation agreement? 
A. No, I'm not sure. No. 
Q. You don't know? 
I 
I 
i 
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A. No. 
MS. SHAFFER: 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
I want just to clarify too for the 
Page 60 
record that it is my understanding that they weren't 
available during this request for discovery. They have 
not been -- my understanding is they haven't been thrown 
away since discovery request. 
THE WITNESS: I've sent every paperwork I have in 
this house. 
MS. SHAFFER: I want to clear up that we -- you 
know, we somehow destroyed documents. 
THE WITNESS: I have a list of those things. I 
think that's part of the things, when we were going 
through the separation agreement, when she made notes 
14 about where it went and how much money is available, I 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
have that list somewhere. She showed it to me. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Okay. When did -- what was the name of the 
person that was involved with the vacant land? Who 
borrowed the money on the vacant land? 
A. I think his name is Jack Rose. 
Q. Jack Rose? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you recall when you were paid back that 
money, the $450,000? 
A. No. No. 
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A. 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
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You have no recollection? 
Well, I mean, he paid it back when we were --
when I was here. It was probably after 2007 and it was 
prior to 2010. 
Q. Okay, so it was prior to when the separation 
agreement was signed, is that what you're saying? 
A. Yes, I am, but I can explain that if you'd 
listen for a minute, sir. The money went out and came 
back. Okay? It was a loan. It came in one lump sum. 
It went out of the account and it came back into the 
account. That was never addressed. I mean, it went out 
and it came back in. 
Q. Okay. Is that also what happened with the 
14 Wittgrove and the Kanaloa hard money loan? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. I believe Wittgrove, because of the shakiness 
of those loans, I was nervous and the Wittgrove loan they 
made payments every month. 
Q. All right, and did they -- were they making 
payments after the separation agreement? 
A. I'm not sure when. I'm not sure. I'm 
guessing if I say they paid right at the same time as the 
separation agreement. 
Q. That's a guess? 
A. 
Q. 
I'm pretty sure -- that is a guess. 
Okay. When you say there's some overlap on 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
the Kanaloa, what is the relationship between the 
Page 62 
2 Wittgrove and Kanaloa hard money? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. I didn't hear the last part. 
Q. What is the relationship between the 
Wittgrove and Kanaloa hard money loan? 
A. The Wittgrove and the Kanaloa hard money 
loan? 
Q. Yes, the Wittgrove and Kanaloa. 
A. Okay. Kanaloa is the name of the condo 
association. 
Q. Okay, so that's the same thing, so Wittgrove 
and Kanaloa is the same thing; is that right? 
A. Two loans at Kanaloa before Wittgrove. The 
14 guy, I can't remember his name. The loan was structured 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
the same way. Loaned him money, he paid me back in a 
year. When he called just before the year was up, it was 
discounted. I think I loaned him 350 or three 
and-a-quarter, somewhere in there, and he would pay me 
back, and I thought he was a real estate guy in town and 
I checked his references and credit and he said he'd pay 
me back in a year, and after it was about nine or ten 
months, he said: "Yeah, I don't have the money. I'm 
going to sell the unit." And I said: "Great, sell the 
24 unit." And then just before he came up to me -- and I 
I 25 believe Wittgrove said we need a loan too, and I said: 
I 
I 
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"It's 12 percent, I'll do the loan." They said: "We 
Page 63 
2 won't pay 12. We'll pay 10." And I said: "Well, you 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
know, it's supply and demand and I don't need to do a 
loan at 10, I'm getting 12." And then so the other guy 
came back to me and said: "If you don't help me sell 
this thing, I can't pay you back." And I said: "That's 
fine, call them back and I'll do less money." I think it 
was 300 or three-and-a-quarter. I think it was 300 for 
Wittgrove. I forget the guy's name. You must have it 
there. 
Q. Were you fully paid? Were you fully paid 
then? 
A. Yeah, that money went out and it all came 
back. 
Q. And it all came back before the separation 
agreement? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. You don't see it mentioned in the 
separation agreement; correct? 
A. No, none of that is mentioned in the 
separation agreement. I'm not sure where they were at 
that time. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay. 
Wait, no. It says right here, it says money 
owed to parties, hard money loan from Mednick 325, right 
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there. It says right in the separation agreement Page 
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2 994. 
3 Q. Yeah, the money loaned from Mednick, that's a 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
separate hard money loan; correct? 
A. Yes, Mednick. That's not my -- no, that's a 
different one. That's not Wittgrove. That's the one in 
Maui. 
Q. Let me go to the next step. Is there hard 
money loan with Bishop and Kanaloa? 
A. Bishop. Yeah, that's one. Bishop was the 
first one and the other people were next. 
Q. Okay. Now, does this refresh your memory 
that it was bought out by Wittgrove on May 16, 2010? 
A. Yeah, probably they sent -- I don't know 
about the date, but what happened is the only way for me 
to get my money was to redo a loan with the next people 
and I got some of the cash I believe. 
Q. Do you see any of that, any hard money loan 
19 in terms of Bishop and Kanaloa, do you see any of that in 
I, 20 the separation agreement? 
21 
22 
A. 
Q. 
No. 
All right. The Maui/Mednick, when was that 
23 hard money loan entered into? 
24 A. Oh, I believe there was -- there was J 
25 negotiation going on right at the same time of the 
"-.;=~-==~~===·-~-~-=======~=-~-~=-~~=~-=~-~~-~---=··.=-~=~==-===========·=-=- . 
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separation agreement. I'd have to look it up and have to 
2 see the numbers to see that. Right around that time. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Q . Okay. Now, does the money that you made the 
loan with, does that come out of that account, that 
551555? 
A. I don't know. It came out of one of the 
accounts somewhere. 
Q. All right. Do you see that listed on the 
separation agreement? 
A. No. 
MS. SHAFFER: Excuse me. What listed? What 
listed? 
MR. MORKEN: The hard money loan that's referenced 
14 as Maui/Mednick. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. SHAFFER: He has mentioned one of them. 
THE WITNESS: Mednick is on -- on my 
interrogatories or whatever, my declaration. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. That's on your financial declaration. That's 
not in the separation agreement; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
No. 
It's not? 
No. 
Is that correct? 
Yes. 
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What is the status of that loan now 
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2 currently? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
The Mednick loan? 
Yes. 
The Mednick loan went into default in 
September 2012 and it took until November of -- no, 2011 
it went into default. It took until November 2012 to get 
it through the courts and foreclosed upon it, and then 
December 10th, I went over there and the unit was 
stripped. I have redone the unit, fixed it all up. 
been on the market for about 90 days and I have it in 
escrow at this time. 
It's in escrow at this time? 
Yes. 
What are the terms of the sale? 
$400,000 cash. 
$400,000 cash? 
Right. 
It's 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. Was there any payment or a deposit on that 
contract? 
A. Well, I mean, there is an open escrow with 
$10,000. I don't have the money. It's in escrow. 
Q. They made a $10,000 deposit and then the 
balance is due when? Well, let me ask you, I don't want 
to assume something: Did they make a deposit of $10,000? 
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A. Okay. They made an earnest money check. 
goes into the escrow account. Okay? When it closes, 
they owe another $390,000 in the escrow account. It's 
due to close May 16th. 
Page 67 
It 
Q. Okay. Now, when you receive that $390,000, 
will that be clear money or is there any kind of 
mortgage, anything that you owe on that? 
A. There is no mortgage on the property. There 
is a commissions from the real estate agents of six 
percent and there will be closing costs. 
Q. So approximately how much do you estimate 
receiving net at closing? 
A. Why is my phone ringing here? Okay. 370 to 
14 375. 370 is probably accurate. 370 to 375. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. Okay. Are you pretty certain that it's going 
to close May 16th? 
A. Okay. Am I certain it's going to close? I'm 
hopeful it's going to close, yes. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. I mean, am I certain? It's a good offer, 
it's a cash offer. The man already has another unit in 
the building. This is an ocean front. He looked at it a 
couple months ago. He has been in the unit. He's from 
24 Florida. He has cash. The unit he has there, he's 
25 selling and he's going to have an ocean front instead of 
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one in the back. The realtor has been very nice and 
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2 everything seems to be going very smooth. There's no 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
contingency. He's accepted it as is and there are 
multiple problems with the unit because it was stripped 
and there was work done in the unit that wasn't 
authorized through the HOA. I'm pretty confident it will 
close, but this is a tricky situation. It could fall 
out. I wouldn't be surprised if it fell out. 
Q. All right. Did you have somebody, either you 
or the mortgage company, appraise the property? Has it 
been appraised recently? 
A. No, that property has not been appraised. 
Q. How did you determine the price for the sale? 
A. Oh, okay, well, we looked at we did a -- I 
have it listed with a real estate agent. We did a CMA. 
First we listed it at 499 and then we had offers in the 
low three, I believe 315 or 310 or 325, and then after a 
month, I dropped the price to 449 and then the only offer 
19 I've had since the 90 days it's been listed was this 
20 
21 
22 
23 
offer of 400. The other offers were three and-a-quarter 
and I think the one before that was 300 or 315, which I 
didn't counter, so that seems to me that's like a fair 
market price, and because it's winter -- it's now April, 
24 and I was just at the unit and it's a ghost town compared J 
25 to being just completely full in the wintertime. Yeah, I 
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think I got the best price I could get for it. 
Q. I'm going to ask you about the Gonzales hard 
money loan. 
you 
A. Okay. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
loan? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Are you familiar with that hard money loan? 
Yes. 
Okay. How much was that for? How much did 
$120,000. 
And did you receive the money back for that? 
He paid that off in about five months, five 
months and a couple days. 
Q. Was that done somewhere around the end of 
April of 2011? 
A. Probably, yeah. Kylee got a notification in 
the mail from the escrow people stating that the fire 
insurance was in place and she called and was irate that 
I bought a place in the area that it was in. It's a very 
low income area. 
Q. Okay, so the -- when do you expect $120,000 
for it? 
A. It came back five months later. 
Q. Oh, so, I'm sorry. I must have 
misunderstood. So you've received that sometime in 
September or October of 2011? 
--,...x-=-•L..... .,. ____ ~--'-' -- ~-~....:-.;._,.,:,.-•----~•--~.c....-_,,..,-~..1,.'E..~-t: •·--· ::,_!.,__•-
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A. Yeah, it was on my tax return. I made I 
think $5,200 on it or whatever else. 
Q. Okay, and, all right, do you know -- do you 
Page 70 
4 know whether or not that loan was made out of funds from 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
that account No. 551555? 
A. I have no idea what loan -- what came out of 
that account. 
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any other hard money 
loans that you have made besides the ones we've just 
discussed? 
A. Okay, there was the ocean front with Rose. 
There was two in Kanaloa. There was -- that's one, two, 
three. There was the Gonzales loan. There is the 
14 Mednick loan. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q. The Bishop loan? 
A. That's two in Kanaloa or Winthrop or whatever 
their name was. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's kind of the same loan to me, you know, 
because the money came in and I had to redo it with 
somebody else, and then there was one on the ocean there 
and the Maui place. 
Q. Which one is the ocean? Is that the one 
24 that's vacant land? 
25 A. Yeah, that was the one with Jeff Rose. That 
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was during -- before the separation. 
Q. Okay. Is there any other hard money loan 
that's been made, that you have made? 
A. Not that -- not right off the top of my head 
I don't have one. 
Q. Do you have any hard money loans outstanding 
at this time? 
A. Let me think. I guess I don't have a loan 
with Medick. I have a court judgment that he owes me 
$180,000, Medick, for a deficiency judgment on the 
foreclosure of their property. 
Q. So in addition to -- you're referring to one 
that is currently in escrow, so that's your expecting net 
of $370,000 and you're saying you have a deficiency 
judgment in addition to that against Mednick; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's how much? How much is the 
19 deficiency? 
I 20 
I 
I 
21 
22 
23 
24 
I 25 
I 
I 
A. When we went -- when it went to the auction, 
I was the only one that bid at the auction for the 
property when it was foreclosed upon. It goes to auction 
just like in Utah. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I bid $200,000, and so I was owed around 
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right around 380 with the attorney's fees and back 
Page 72 
2 interest and everything else, and so I got a deficiency 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
judgment for $180,000. 
Q. Okay. What is the current status of your 
collection efforts for the $180,000? 
A. I'm way down the line. The deficiency --
everything is bad. They've lost their other houses and 
everything else. I haven't pursued it because I have it 
in escrow and I don't exactly know how much my deficiency 
judgment is worth when I can sell it for -- basically 
almost cover the deficiency. I don't know. I'm not an 
expert on that. 
Q. Are you trying to sell the -- are you trying 
to sell the deficiency judgment? 
A. No. No, I'm talking about the deficiency 
judgment now that I've sold the unit for three or 
$400,000 and now my deficiency judgment was that they 
owed me 380, so I don't know exactly how much my 
19 deficiency judgment is still worth. I don't know if --
20 
21 
22 
23 
I'm not a legal expert, so I don't know if I still get 
the $180,000 and I get to the sell the unit and I have 
capital gains or whatever, I haven't figured that out 
because I haven't closed it. The reason I haven't 
24 pursued the people is because I don't know exactly what 
25 the bottom line dollar amount profit or loss. 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
~ 
~-
[fill 
~ 
ffl(l_ 
lliM' 
. 1-
tl 
II 
r~J 
II 
I 
mi 
I 
. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
I 20 
II 
I 
21 
22 
23 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Page 73 
Q. Before the Mednick hard money loan went into 
default, did they periodically make payments or monthly 
make payments? 
A. Yeah, they paid for almost a year I believe 
or maybe a little longer. 
month? 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Do you know how much they were paying per 
They were paying 3,250 a month. 
You're talking about $3,250 a month? 
Wait a minute. I think it's 3,250. Yeah, 
it's 3,250. 
Q. So that's $3,250; right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you know what happened to the proceeds? 
A. What happened to the proceeds? 
Q. Yeah. What account did you put it in? 
A. I put it in cash. 
Q. You put it into cash? 
A. 
Q. 
That's the $40,000 in cash. 
When you say $40,000 in cash, you're talking 
about the $40,000 that's in your safe deposit box? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Okay. Is that -- all right. That $40,000, 
24 is that entirely for Mednick? 
I 
I 
m 
. 
. 
ID 
. 
. 
25 A. I'm not sure. I think it is. There might be 
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some from Gonzales but I'm not sure. 
Q. Okay. Do you still have that $40,000 in 
deposit box? 
Page 74 
the 
A. 
Q. 
The $40,000 is still in the safe deposit box. 
Is there more now or is there more than 
$40,000 cash now? 
A. No, $40,000. 
Q. Okay. Do you have any -- do you have any 
gold? 
A. I listed the gold. The two ounces that I 
bought, I had gold from my grandfather, so there are 
three one-ounce gold pieces that was in the -- I 
mentioned that before, so. 
Q. All right. Have you acquired -- I'm sorry, 
we couldn't hear you on that last statement . 
A. Okay. There is three onces of gold, one gold 
came in 1960 or '62 when my grandfather died, the other 
two gold pieces were bought when gold was I think about 
19 $1,040 or something and I listed them on my sheet 
20 
21 
22 
23 
somewhere. 
Q. You listed them -- when you say sheet, did 
you list it on your financial declaration? 
A. I'm not sure where I listed, but probably 
24 I may not got -- but, anyway, there are two one-ounce 
25 gold pieces. 
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Q. Did you list that in the separation 
agreement? 
A. No, I bought those after the separation 
agreement I think. 
Q. Do you know? 
A. I don't remember. I had a friend that does 
Page 75 
my electrical work. He was hurting for money and he 
asked me if I wanted to buy some gold and I said I'm only 
going to pay for gold for what it is per ounce and he 
brought a bunch of gold and he had some other coins and I 
said I'll buy these for what the -- and I think it was 
$1,040 and I gave him $2,080. 
Q. How much cash did you have at the time of the 
separation agreement? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did you have cash at the time of the 
separation agreement? 
A. I have some cash, yes. I always have some 
cash around the house. 
Q. But you don't know? 
A. No. 
Q. Is the cash listed in the separation 
agreement? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
25 Q. I'm going to refer to you Tab No. 92. 
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A. Okay. 
Q. Did you 
A. 199? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. 
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find it? 
Page 76 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 30 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. Do you know what that $50,000 -- you see 
February 4th, 2011, it says transfer from shares and then 
it gives a No. 591353-90, $50,000. Do you know what that 
is? 
A. Yeah, I'm pretty sure I know what that is, 
but I'm not positive. Would you like me to speculate on 
that? 
Q. Sure. 
A. Okay. I was cashing my pension checks and 
keeping the cash in the house after the separation 
because feeling that's separation property that I could 
keep that money separate from her, and then I had to fill 
out this loan financial declaration, okay, and I had to 
list everything, so I needed to get the money down to my 
sister's account. So we're building the house with my 
23 friend Mike Anderson and he used the cash through his 
1
, 
24 builder to purchase stuff at a different rate and I gave 
25 him $50,000 cash and he gave me the account and I believe · 
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I transferred that money. 
Q. Okay. Now, dropping down to where it says 
No. 639. No, I'm sorry, 640, February 23rd, you see 
where it says $40,000? 
A. February 23rd. 
MS. SHAFFER: What document is that? 
MR. MORKEN: Same one. Same Bates stamp number 
199. 
THE WITNESS: I don't see a February 23rd anywhere. 
MS. SHAFFER: I don't either. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. It's in the bottom third towards the right, 
it's under where it says share drafts posted. 
A. Share draft posted. It says 217? Oh, then 
it says No. 640, $40,000, okay. 
Q. Do you know what that $40,000 was? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Who is Waterhouse and Michael? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Is that the name of a builder? 
A. That's not the builder. The builder's name 
would be Carl Rosen, but I believe that was the account 
that it went into or it came out of, I'm not sure. 
Q. You don't know what -- you don't know what 
the $40,000 was even for? 
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I went to the bank with him. He transferred 
2 the money and then I gave him the cash. The money was 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
transferred and I gave him the cash. 
Q. 
A. 
What do you mean the money was transferred? 
I gave him the cash and he transferred the 
money. I believe this is a check number. Well, I'm 
totally confused then. 
Q. Well, what was that for? Do you recall what 
9 it was for? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
A. 
confused. 
Q. 
I really don't know. I think I'm totally 
Okay. I'm going to make that Exhibit 30, so 
Bates stamp No. 199 is Exhibit 30. 
A. 
Q. 
That was 92? 
Yes, it was. I'm going to refer you back to 
16 Exhibit 24, the separation agreement, that addendum. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. SHAFFER: I want to ask one question on Exhibit 
30. Is that an exhibit we provided to you? 
MR. MORKEN: Yeah, because it has your Bates stamp 
No. 199 . 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay, and was it provided to you with 
the notations on it, the circle on 639 and the circle on 
640? 
MR. MORKEN: No, that's -- that's Kylee's 
handwriting. 
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MS. SHAFFER: Okay, and is that the case because 
Page 79 
2 we've talked about a lot of these documents that I guess 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
we gave to you, I just want the record to reflect that 
we so it's not an actual document that I produced to 
you? 
MR. MORKEN: No, it is the document you produced 
and then she handwrote those particular items on that 
document. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay, and that's the same with the 
10 other exhibits that we've already talked about today? 
11 
12 
13 
MR. MORKEN: No. 
MS. SHAFFER: 28. 
MR. MORKEN: All right. Well, we'll have to go 
14 back over it because I asked him very specifically about 
15 
16 
17 
18 
that and he said it was his handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: No, I think that was -- that was his 
financial declaration. 
THE WITNESS: That was the financial declaration or 
19 separation agreement. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS . 
MR. 
MS. 
numbers. 
MR. 
Kylee and 
SHAFFER: Exhibit 28. 
MORKEN: Exhibit 28. 
SHAFFER: Page 217 has some circles around 
MORKEN: Those were by -- those circles are by 
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George Sandusky 
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MS. SHAFFER: And at the top it has an account 
Page 80 
2 circled and it says Liz, I mean, that isn't information 
3 that was provided on the document that we gave to you; 
4 correct? 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
MR. MORKEN: Yeah, correct. Same with Bates stamp 
No. 209, that is -- that handwriting is Kylee's 
handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: And 212? 
MR. MORKEN: I didn't do the 212. 
MS. SHAFFER: 212 is Page 1 of Exhibit 26? 
MS. SANDUSKY: Exhibit 26 is 212. 
MR. MORKEN: Let's go off the record a minute. 
I've got to check something. 
(Whereupon a discussion was held off record.) 
MR. MORKEN: Back on the record. 212 or Exhibit 
26, Bates 212, that's Kylee's -- those are Kylee's 
circles and handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: And arrow? 
MR. MORKEN: Yes. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
MR. MORKEN: And same with Bates No. 233, the arrow 
22 and the handwriting, that also is Kylee's. 
23 MS. SHAFFER: Okay. I just want to -- there is a 
24 lot of documents you talked about, 209, that may be you 
25 didn't -- you didn't do as an exhibit, but I just want on 
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the record again, that has handwriting, circles, numbers, 
2 that is not the document that we produced to you with 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
that information? 
MR. MORKEN: That's true. That would be what 
Kylee -- any extra stuff would have been from Kylee. The 
handwriting would have been Kylee's, but, yeah, I want to 
clarify in Exhibit 29, Bates stamp No. 994, that's --
that is all George's handwriting. He testified where 
for instance, it says Liz Chambers LAFCU, $90,000, that's 
his handwriting. Where under that, what account, that is 
Kylee's handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: 994, yeah. 
MR. MORKEN: And then where it says given to Liz 
14 the $100,000, he said that's his handwriting. Where it 
15 
16 
17 
18 
says in circles what account, that's Kylee's handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: And the A and Band the line? 
MR. MORKEN: Right, that's Kylee's handwriting. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. Yeah, I think it's 
19 distinguishable. I wanted the record to reflect that. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. 
Q. I'm referring you back to Exhibit 24, the 
separation agreement, Bates stamp No. 714. 
MS. SHAFFER: 24? 
MR. MORKEN: 714. 
MS. SHAFFER: What tab is that? 
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George Sandusky 
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MR. MORKEN: All right. 
THE WITNESS: I have it. It's 714, it's the 
separation agreement. 
MS. SHAFFER: I have it. Okay. 
THE WITNESS: That's the sheet, that's the extra 
sheet with the 400,00 in lieu of alimony. 
MS. SHAFFER: The addendum, yeah. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
$400,000? 
So, George, how did you arrive at the 
A. Oh, we talked about this. We can go over 
this again. Are you there? 
Q. I'm here. 
A. Okay. There is 1.2 million in change in 
play. I took $400,000 that I came into the marriage 
with, which is the proceeds from the Ventura house. 
Page 82 
There was $800,000, I gave her half and I took the land 
that she wanted nothing to do with in Hawaii. I told her 
I would pay for Micah's college. 
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you a question about 
that land you're saying she wanted nothing to do with. 
How much do you think it's worth? 
A. It's worth $336,000 according to the 
24 appraisal. 
25 Q • And you're saying that she wanted nothing to 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
do with that sum of money? 
A. Yeah, you can talk to Mike Anderson. He'll 
verify that. I talked to him already. 
Q. So what you're saying is that Kylee wanted 
nothing to do with having half of that amount of money, 
that's what you're saying? Is that your testimony? 
A. No, that's not what I said. I said she 
Page 83 
wanted nothing to do with the land. When I purchased the 
land, she didn't want to work the land. She didn't care 
about the land. I said you have your job. 2000 to 2007, 
she made more money than I did. She kept her money and I 
12 kept the land. I said the land is mine. You keep your 
13 money, you do what you want, that's fine, and that's the 
14 way it was worked. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Q. How were the family expenses paid during that 
time that she was working? 
A. Well, there was basically no mortgage on 
either of the properties. She paid for her own stuff and 
19 she bought groceries and I paid the utilities and the 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
taxes on the properties. 
Q. So what you're saying is that you -- well, 
what did you do with her money? 
A. 
Q. 
What money? 
That she earned from her employment? What 
happened to that money? 
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A. What money are you talking about? 
you're broken up. 
Q. You said she was employed? 
A. She had jobs. 
Q. She had jobs? 
A. She spent her money. 
Q. She spent her money? 
A. Yeah. 
Page 84 
Sorry, 
Q. And you kept your money, is that what you're 
testifying? 
A. No, I spent all of my income off of my fire 
department. I used that to live on. The money, the 
investment money always went on. That's how I got to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
14 retire at 42 years of age. 
15 
16 
17 
I 10 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
I'm going to refer you to Tab 68. 
Okay. 
Tab well, let's see, I'm labeling Tab 68 
as Exhibit 31. 
19 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 31 was marked for identification.) 
I 20 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. SHAFFER: Can you identify it because there is 
not a Bates stamp? 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. The first three pages is an 
affidavit by Stella Chaidez. Then there is --
MS. SHAFFER: 68? 
MR. MORKEN: No, the first three pages. 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay, 68, I got it. I was on 69. 
MR. MORKEN: Then the second affidavit by Beverly 
Chaidez and that is two pages. No, three pages. And 
then there is an affidavit by Kevin Chaidez and that is 
three pages. All three are going to be an Exhibit 31. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. George, have you read Stella's affidavit? 
A. Not recently, yeah, but I did read it. 
Q. Is it accurate that she's your Godmother? 
A. There is no paperwork on that. That would 
just be that my parents have died and, yeah, she's the 
one that came to the hospital when my son was born and 
Page 85 
14 brought something. I would say that there was no 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
paperwork work on it, there is no registration form, but 
I would call her my Godmother. 
Q. She says that she and George's parents were 
very close for decades; is that accurate? 
A. Well, let me read what it says. They were 
friends for decades, that's true. 
Q. It says on Page 2 up at the top there, it 
say: "It is accurate and fair to say that I know George 
and Kylee extremely well." Is that an accurate 
24 statement? 
25 A. No. 
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George Sandusky 
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Okay. How is it inaccurate? 
She would know George and Kylee through 
Page 86 
Kylee's interpretation of what Kylee told her, not what I 
told her. 
Q. She's your Godmother, not Kylee's Godmother; 
correct? 
A. That's correct. But I don't spend time with 
her. I don't go to lunch with her. I don't go to dinner 
with her. The only time we go to dinner is at Christmas 
or something like that. I have very little personal 
conversation with her. When she said she knew me 
extremely well, I wouldn't agree to that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. She knows Kylee much better. 
Q. Okay. What do you think in that affidavit is 
not accurate? I'm going to rephrase that. Is there 
anything in that affidavit that you have not yet said at 
this point, is there anything that you consider 
19 inaccurate? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Okay. No. 6: "In early 2010 Kylee came to 
me and asked if I was willing to witness her signature to 
a document. She explained to me that George had proposed 
to her this document titled separation agreement as a way 
to solve Micah's financial aid issues when he went to 
college and so that they would not have to pay as much l ! 
·-----~--------=~~~_..~."" ........ ..,..adl 
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for his college costs. At no time did George or Kylee 
Page 87 
2 say to me that the document was for separation or divorce 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
purposes or that that was even being considered by Kylee 
or George. If the document had also been for a 
separation or divorce, Kylee would have told me that too. 
She is straightforward and she would not hesitate to tell 
me that." 
Q • Is that inaccurate? 
A. Where is her signature on the document? 
Q. Well, you know, you can ask that later. But 
I'll just tell you --
A. No, I'm asking what's wrong with this --
where is her signature on the document? I never talked 
14 to her about this. I never asked for her signature. I 
15 
16 
17 
18 
never discussed any of this with her. 
Q. Okay. Just for our purposes of this 
deposition, I'll tell you it has been signed and it's 
already been produced and your attorney has a copy. So 
19 back to Paragraph 6, is there anything in Paragraph 6 
20 
21 
22 
23 
that's inaccurate? 
MS. SHAFFER: I'll just show him. This is the 
exhibit to the petition for divorce that attached a 
signed separation agreement and right next to Kylee's 
24 signature is Chaidez's signature. 
25 MR. MORKEN: No, Liz, you're not looking at the 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
right document. This is an affidavit. 
MS. SHAFFER: It's Bev Chaidez. 
THE WITNESS: Bev Chaidez. 
MS. SHAFFER: And it says -- there 
anything. 
MR. MORKEN: You're not looking at 
is no dates 
the right 
document. This is the affidavit. Anyhow is there 
MS. SHAFFER: I'm looking at the separation 
Page 88 
or 
9 agreement that she's saying she signed. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MR. MORKEN: No, Liz, you're referring to -- you're 
referring to Beverly Chaidez, not Stella. I'm asking the 
question about the affidavit from Stella. Now, is there 
anything 
MS. SHAFFER: So, okay, just so we're clear. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Remember, it says in here 
Kylee came to me. I didn't go to her. I wasn't even 
aware of it until such thing came. So I don't know what 
Kylee said to her. I don't know what Kylee brought up. 
19 I don't know what Kylee's motivation was for all of this. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
She says Kylee is straightforward and she would not have 
hesitated to tell me that. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Is that inaccurate? 
Well, I don't know. I didn't do it. Kylee 
did it. She said Kylee came to me and explained to me 
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George had proposed a document called separation 
Page 89 
2 agreement. Okay, that part is true. As a way to solve 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Micah's financial issues when he went to college, that's 
only partly true. There's a whole lot to the separation 
agreement. She didn't want to move back to Hawaii. She 
would not get a job like she promised she was going to 
work if we needed more money. She had me retire at 20 
years. She has a master's degree and she refused to 
work. There's all kinds of things in that. 
Q. In paragraph 
A. So this isn't an accurate thing. This is 
something between her and whatever Kylee fed her is 
what she got out of her, so you're asking me to comment 
14 on what Kylee told her. I don't know what Kylee told 
15 
16 
17 
18 
her. 
Q. Okay. Paragraph 8, it says: "Kylee said 
that George had explained to her his plan was legal and 
that it would help them solve paying for Micah's 
19 education when he went to college." Is that an accurate 
20 
21 
statement? 
MS. SHAFFER: I believe he just answered your 
22 question. 
23 BY MR. MORKEN: 
24 Q. I'm asking a question. Well, just answer the 
25 question. Is that an accurate sentence? 
I 
I 
I 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
A. I don't know. Kylee said that George 
explained to her that the plan was legal and that would 
help them solve paying for college education. That 
statement is partially true. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Wait, let's go on. It's says: "Based on 
that, because I love George, Kylee and Micah, I was 
willing to sign as a witness." She never signed. 
Page 90 
Q. I know what you're saying. All right, going 
to the next affidavit for Beverly Chaidez, in Paragraph 1 
it says: "I have been friends with and have known Kylee 
Sandusky for over 20 years and George Sandusky for over 
30 years." Is that an accurate statement? 
A. No, not really. 
Q. Well, how is that not accurate? 
A. I've known Bev for over 30 years and for 12 
to 15 years of that she refused to speak to me because 
she was mad at me, so when you say friends for 30 years, 
that's not friends for 30 years. 
Q. Okay. What period of time did you say that 
she wouldn't speak to you? 
A. Before we move to Park City 2007, so probably 
from about the time that Kylee (inaudible) since then. 
Q. 
A • 
We missed that. I didn't hear that. 
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George Sandusky 
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During that period you were friends or not 
Page 91 
A. For most of that time, she didn't -- there is 
a lot of that time she didn't speak to me. 
Q. 
A. 
So from 2007 on, you were friends? 
Yeah, we seemed to have worked it out. It's 
fine. I replaced her hot water heater in her house on 
Thanksgiving when it went out. I picked up her kid from 
elementary school when she wasn't around and the kid was 
sick. Yeah, I would say we're friends. I also worked on 
their rental house in Heber for them when they were on 
vacation. 
Q. Paragraph 6, in the middle or the last 
sentence of Paragraph 6, it says: "However, George and 
Kylee told me that the purpose of the document was to 
separate their funds solely for the purpose of filling 
out their son's college financial aid applications and 
19 that it was legal." Is that an accurate statement? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. No. 
Q. What do you claim that you told her? 
A. I don't remember what I told her, but that's 
not an accurate statement. 
Q. Okay. Shifting to the affidavit of Kevin 
Chaidez. 
........................ - ... ,:: .... u;_-.,:.-""-,1~•-=••• ----•~-~-•• •-= •• • , _____ .., __ ',/_,;... . ..... ~ ... , •. L•~•,-•,• ... ,,,,.._,. Oo '• .. ••••••- ••'"" , ..... •• c, ... .......-•• ••-• .J.-~ 
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George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't hear you. You 
2 broke up. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q • 
A. 
Q. 
Going to the affidavit by Kevin. 
Okay. 
Chaidez. How do you pronounce Chaidez? Is 
that accurate? 
A. It's Chaidez. 
Q. Chaidez. Okay. Going to Kevin Chaidez's 
9 affidavit. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. Okay. 
Q. In Paragraph 7, it says: "At no time did 
George or Kylee mention to me that he or she intended 
that this document was to be used for separation or 
14 divorce purposes or that he or she intended to separate 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
or to divorce." Is that an accurate statement? 
A. 
Q. 
differently? 
A. 
I don't know. 
Do you recall telling him anything 
No. We had very little contact outside of 
I 20 family. I didn't do things with him. I didn't ride 
bikes with him. I didn't go for walks with him. I 
didn't ski with him. I didn't go to lunch with him. I 
didn't do things with him. 
~ 
~ . . . 
rn 
~ 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay. Paragraph 8 says: "On or about 
Thanksgiving 2010, George and I were at a family 
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get-together and he was upset. He told me that his son 
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2 was applying to get into expensive universities and that 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
his son was also applying for financial aid. He then 
said that his plan to use the document to enable him to 
pay less for his son's education was not going to work . 
He complained about how much money he would now have to 
pay because his plan would not work." Is that an 
accurate statement? 
A. Yeah, I will say that's not, no. 
Q. I'm sorry, we couldn't hear that. 
A. No. 
Q. It's not an accurate statement? 
A. No, not entirely, no. 
Q. All right. What part is accurate? 
A. The part that I complete. 
Q. Are you denying that you told him that your 
son was applying to get into expensive universities and 
that his son was also applying for financial aid? Are 
19 you denying that you said that? 
20 
21 
22 
23 
A. No. 
Q. So you agree that you said that to him; is 
that correct? 
A. I'm not sure if I said that to him, but that 
24 would be something I would say. That's possible I would 
25 say that . 
Alpine Court Reporting 
801-691-1000 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
George Sandusky 
April 11, 2013 
Q. And then the next sentence: "He then said 
that his plan to use the document to enable him to pay 
less for his son's college education was not going to 
work." 
A. I never said that. 
Q. 
A. 
What is that? 
I never said that. I said the separation 
agreement was for not as far as financial aid --
Q. You said that --
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A. Just a minute. Let me finish. Okay? All of 
the financial aid that we filled out, separate parents 
didn't matter because they were all considered as one. 
Wherever the money went, whether the money was with me or 
14 whatever, it was taken as one. Some other colleges 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
; 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
around the country, it's the person that he resides with 
fills out the application and the noncustodial parent 
does not. So with that thinking and part of the 
separation agreement was for not. It didn't save us 
anything at all. 
Q. And that's what you told him? 
A. That's what I told him because we were in a 
large discussion about -- he said I should go to work and 
pay for my son's college. Little does he know that my 
wife, when I retired, she said she got her master's 
degree, went back to school and she wanted to teach 
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"What happens when you decide you 
She said: "I'm going to teach. 
How long do I have to teach?" I said: "Probably 18 
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years until he graduates from college.'' She did the math 
and she said: "That's what I want to do." We moved to 
Hawaii. She went looking for a teaching position, which 
she got. She got a nice one working at the Christian 
school. Then she went to --
Q. Okay. I'm going to stop there because you've 
gone beyond what I've asked. Paragraph 9, Paragraph 9 
the last sentence, the last partial sentence on Page 2, 
it says: "At no time did George or Kylee say that either 
of them was planning to separate or divorce." Is that an 
14 accurate statement? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. At no time -- how would I -- I didn't discuss 
personal matters with him. 
Q. So it's an accurate statement? Is that 
accurate? 
A. What at no time? I don't know what she told 
him. I can only say that at no time did I. (Inaudible.) 
COURT REPORTER: I can't understand him. 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. We missed that. Did you just say that at no 
_::~~=::::~p~~~:~:~ t~:e 8 ::_:::~:-~:Yd:_:~:c:_::e.~--of ~ou ___ J 
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A. Okay. I will go back and I will explain it 
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to you. I did not have personal conversations with him 
other than at Thanksgiving time. We did not go to lunch. 
We did not hang out. He said at no time did George or 
Kylee, how could I know what Kylee said to him. 
Q. I understand. I understand. So limit it to 
as to what you said, is it an accurate statement? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I don't remember. They were very aware of 
our trouble in our marriage. I mean, Bev was Kylee's 
best friend. I'm sure they talked. 
Q. Okay. I'm done with Tab 68. I'm going to 
14 Tab 69. This is seven pages and it is going to be 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
labeled Exhibit 32. 
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 32 was marked for identification.) 
BY MR. MORKEN: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Okay. 
I don't have any numbers on those. Okay. 
George, on the first page there is a check 
that is drawn on an account that has your name on it as 
well as Kylee's name on it and it's Check No. 4117; 
correct? 
A. Okay. This is important, sir. Kylee's name 
is in the top and my name is on the bottom, so this would 
, ... .c....... - ••••=-•• I~~ ...... -• ... •·••• •---·•• ••• • •-•••·•-'••••--' ---•••-• '. H _.1: ••• 0 •• ••·•• ••-••--•• -• •• -4-•'· • ·•• • '- •-·-••' ••- ... -•·- •· -·• •--~~ 
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be out of her separate account, correct. 
Q. Well, evidently you're both on this account 
Page 97 
and it's an account that is held at Los Angeles Firemen's 
Credit Union; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. Now, that is written -- the check 
is written out of a joint account; correct? 
A. It's written out of her separate account with 
my name on it. I wouldn't call that a joint account. 
Q. It's written August 27, 2010; correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And that's do you know what that was for? 
Absolutely, I know what that was for. 
What was that for? 
A. Kylee had discussions on how come I wasn't 
paying child support. I said: "I'm paying for all of 
the rent here out of my accounts. I'm paying $1,800 a 
month rent." I said: "I'll call them and pay all the 
rent upfront." I talked to him. (Inaudible.) 
COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, he's breaking up. 
(Lost connection with witness.) 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. Off the record. 
23 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
I 
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correct? It was August 27th, 2010. 
A. Right. 
Q. Wasn't one of the reasons why that $17,000 
lump sum payment was made was so that you didn't have 
that money in your account when you applied for financial 
aid? 
A. Well, that could have been one of the 
reasons, but one of the reasons was she was asking how do 
I know you're going to the keep paying the payment when 
we separate, and I said in lieu of child support, I was 
paying $1,800 a month for Micah to have a place to live 
and for her a place to live. That $1,800 transferred out 
of my account into her account and the $17,100 in August 
14 30th, 2010, and that was used for the rent payment, so 
15 
16 
17 
18 
she had $2,000 a month plus the $1,800 a month, plus I 
gave her $8,000 for her to put into her checking account 
so she could have a savings account. I asked her to try 
to save that for the next 16 months but she went through 
19 it. She went through all that money in 16 months. 
20 Q • Okay. That's at a time when in the 
21 separation agreement you said that there was no child 
22 support and there was no -- there was no minor child; is 
23 that correct? 
24 A. We did not address the minor child in the 
25 separation agreement. 
I 
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You said there wasn't a minor child; correct? 
I didn't list him. 
You what? 
I don't believe I listed him. 
Okay. 
that is marked as Exhibit 32. 
We're done with this exhibit? 
Yeah. That was seven pages. 
Yes. That was 24; right. 
No, that was Tab 69. 
Put it away? 
MS. SHAFFER: Paul, what does your timing look 
MR. MORKEN: Probably done in about 15 minutes. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
MR. MORKEN: I need to take a short break to talk 
client and so we'll be back in five minutes. Okay? 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
MR. MORKEN: That's it, Liz. We're stopping. 
MS. SHAFFER: Okay. Let me just see if I have any 
questions. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MS. SHAFFER: 
Q. George, I have one question on the separation 
agreement. Can you hear me? 
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Can you hear me, Paul? 
MR. MORKEN: Yes. 
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4 BY MS. SHAFFER: 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. The addendum, what was was the intention 
of the addendum to be -- well, let me back up. Was the 
intention of the separation agreement to be a monthly 
payment for life or the present value of that account as 
9 identified in the addendum? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
A. If you go to the last page, it says -- she 
asked me how long will my $2,000 go on and I said forever 
or you can take the $400,000, that's what it says. The 
intent was she could have either one and I haven't been 
14 able to get very good investments. Six percent return 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
for her, so that's -- you understand either party has got 
the right to ask for the $400,000. I'm just trying to 
help her out more than anything else. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. MORKEN: Is that it? 
BY MS. SHAFFER: 
Q. I believe you said -- I wasn't sure, but is 
Bev Chaidez Kylee's best friend? 
MR. MORKEN: Well, I object to the form of the 
question. I don't know how he would know who's best. 
But go ahead . 
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BY MS. SHAFFER: 
Q. 
friend? 
A. 
Q. 
Do you know? Is Bev Chaidez Kylee's best 
Are you asking me? 
Yes. 
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A. Oh, when we were there, she spent more time 
with Bev Chaidez than any other woman. Yes, I would 
assume that would be her best friend. Bev has since 
9 moved to California. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Okay. I just want to clarify for the record, 
when you talked about the hard money loans, I believe --
well, did Kylee know about all of those hard money loans 
at the time that they were happening? 
A. Did she know about all of them? She didn't 
know about Gonzales. That's what made her really upset. 
Q. When was that one? 
A. That was after the separation. She was very 
upset. I told her calm down. I didn't buy anything in 
Royal Poinciana. It's a very depressed area. I loaned 
the guy 120 on a house that he had already finished. It 
was worth probably 250, and he has since resold it, and 
he paid me all back in five months. I told her not to 
worry. I still had her money and she wanted $400,000. 
Q. Was it after she found out about that hard 
money loan that she took the $90,000 out of the bank? 
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A. No. Two weeks before we had an agreement 
Page 102 
that she needed some cash, because she was out of cash, 
and she was going to move out and get her own place and 
she stayed in Park City. I told her I would be back for 
Micah's graduation in two weeks and I would bring her 
plenty of money. How much did she want, she said she 
didn't know, so I brought her $170,000. I was going to 
give her check out of that account and also was going to 
help her go down and buy her a brand-new Honda CRV 
four-wheel drive so she wouldn't have to have two cars, 
like she has now. 
I sent her information from the dealer about that 
Honda CRV. She got mad that I gave her E-mail out about 
14 the Honda CRV. That was my intent to give 170 and pay 
15 
16 
17 
18 
about $30,000 for a Honda CRV. She would have half of 
her money, $200,000. 
Q. And you discuss that with her? 
A. I told her she could have all -- yes, I did. 
19 She could have 100, she could have 200. She thought 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
about maybe buying a cheap condo. I told her that was a 
good idea. She wouldn't have rent payments. She could 
do whatever she wanted. It was up to her. 
Q. And she declined that offer and then --
A. No, she said that -- she said, as I was 
25 leaving, that she would accept the separation agreement 
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and then I said I will be back in two weeks and I would 
bring it, and then when I came back, she didn't talk to 
me. She picked me up at the airport. She dropped me off 
at the house. She had moved out of the house, and the 
house was basically two-thirds empty. Micah was there 
and a place for me to sleep, and then right after I was 
at the house, five minutes later I got served for my 
divorce. 
Q. Did she tell you she was taking $90,000 out 
of the bank account? 
A. 
Q. 
I found out after I got the divorce papers. 
And when did she take the money out of the 
bank account? 
A. The same day, June 6th or June 7th. 
Q. Okay. I don't have any other questions. 
MR. MORKEN: Okay. Do you want to reserve the 
right -- do you want to reserve, George, a right to make 
corrections or do you want to sign off now? Can you hear 
me? Can anybody hear me? 
(Lost connection with witness and counsel.) 
COURT REPORTER: I need on record whether George 
will read and sign or if he is going to waive that right. 
MS. SHAFFER: He's going to read and sign. 
COURT REPORTER: Where would you like it sent? To 
his home in Hawaii or to you, Liz? 
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MS. SHAFFER: You can send to him directly in 
Hawaii. 
(Whereupon the deposition concluded at 3:02 p.m.) 
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I, GEORGE SANDUSKY, HEREBY DECLARE: That I am the 
witness referred to in the foregoing testimony; that I 
have read the transcript and know the contents thereof; 
that with these corrections I have noted this transcript 
truly and accurately reflects my testimony . 
PAGE-LINE CHANGE/CORRECTION REASON 
No corrections were made. 
GEORGE SANDUSKY 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me on this 
I 2013. 
--------
Notary Public 
day of 
---
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5 I , DONNA M. WARD , a Certified Shorthand Reporter , 
Registered Professional Reporter , and Notary Public for 
6 the State of Utah, residing in Utah , certify : 
7 That the deposition of GEORGE SANDUSKY was taken 
before me pursuant to Notice at the time and place 
8 therein set forth , at which time the witness was by me 
duly sworn to testify the truth. 
9 
That the testimony of the witness and a ll 
10 objections made and all proceedings had at t he time of 
the examination were recorded stenographically by me and 
11 were thereafter transcribed . And I hereby c ertify that 
the foregoing deposition transcr i pt is a ful l , true , and 
12 correct record of my stenogr aphic notes so taken . 
13 I further certify that I am neither counsel for or 
related to any party to said action nor in anywise 
14 interested in the outcome thereof . 
15 IN WITNESS WHEREOF , I have hereunto subscribed my 
hand and affixed my official seal this 1 1th day of April , 
1 6 2013 . 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
DO AM . WARD , RPR 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Regis t ered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the 
County of Utah , State of Utah . 
23 My Commission Expires : 
June 30 , 2014 
24 
25 
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Paul J. Morken (10483) 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Telephone: 435.659.1685 
paulmorken@gmail.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 44098) 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER & PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION. 
Case No.:114500103 DA 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Petitioner, Kylee J. Sandusky, through her attorney, Paul J. Morken of Paul J. Morken, 
PLLC, respectfully moves this court for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") and 
Preliminary Injunction, pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
enjoining and mandating that Respondent, George A. Sandusky, refrain from and act as follows 
and based on the following: 
1. Order, restrain and mandate that Respondent cease and desist from listing with a 
realtor or other selling agent or from attempting to sell, transfer or encumber in any way the "Foo 
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House," 76-6230 Ali'i Dr. Kailua-Kona, HI, which is marital property that has an appraised 
value of $775,000 (no debt), pending mutual agreement or final orders in this cause of action. 
2. Order, restrain and mandate that Respondent not list with a realtor or other selling 
agent or attempt to sell, transfer or encumber in any way Lot # (3 )-7-6-016-12 ( the Oceanfront 
lot in front of church at Kailua-Kona, HI), which is marital property that has an appraised value 
I of $153,000 (no debt), pending mutual agreement or final orders in this cause of action. 
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3. Order, restrain and mandate that Respondent not list with a realtor or other selling 
agent or attempt to sell, transfer or encumber in any way lots #(3)-7-6-015-033 (roadway) and 
#(3)-7-6-014-028 (roadway) on He'eNalu Drive, Kailua-Kona, HI, which is marital property, 
pending mutual agreement or final orders in this cause of action. 
4. Order, restrain and mandate that Respondent place in Petitioner Attorney's Trust 
Account pending mutual agreement or final orders in this cause of action all of the proceeds that 
he received or shall receive from his sale of the following property: (i) Lots on He'eNalu Drive, 
Kailua-Kona, HI - #(3)-7-6-014-018; #(3)-7-6-014-019; #(3)-7-6-014-028; #(3)-7-6-0-14-020; 
#(3)-7-6-015-002; and #(3)-7-6-015-003. Such sale proceeds from the "Mueller Family Trust" 
are approximately $285,000; and, (ii) Lots on He'eNalu Drive, Kailua-Kona, HI -
#(3)-7-6-015-001; #(3)-7-6-015-005; #(3)-7-6-015-006. Such sale proceeds from Matthew J.D. 
Cunningham are approximately $100,000. 
[Respondent now claims that the proceeds he received from the sale of the lots are 
currently tied up in property that is in foreclosure. He claims that the sale proceeds were used to 
2 
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pay off a loan on property that he guaranteed. He claims that the loan was in default and that 
the property is currently in foreclosure. Petitioner has repeatedly asked for the closing 
documents for the sale of the lots, and for the alleged guarantee and for the pay off of the loan 
and for the foreclosure documents. To date, Respondent has refused to produce any of these 
documents; and he either refuses or he has failed to support any of his statements.] 
If Respondent has already tied up all of such proceeds ( all done secretly without 
any notice to Petitioner, if done at all) by paying off a loan on property that he guaranteed and 
that property is now in foreclosure, he has secretly put all of such proceeds at grave risk of loss, 
while refusing to provide to Petitioner any documentation. Thus, Petitioner requests a TRO in 
the event that the proceeds are tied up in a property in foreclosure. Respondent should be 
ordered to protect and secure such property interest and proceeds. Respondent should timely 
inform Petitioner through counsel of any future foreclosure proceedings involving such property, 
and neither such property nor any proceeds there from should be transferred or encumbered in 
any way by Respondent absent the mutual consent of the parties or by subsequent court order. 
Also, Respondent should forthwith supply to Petitioner copies of the documents pertaining to his 
sale of the original lots as well as the loan guarantee and foreclosure documents of such property. 
5. Order Respondent to appear before the assigned judge within IO days of the 
issuance of the TRO at the time and date set forth in the TRO, and show cause why the TRO 
should not be continued as a preliminary injunction. 
3 
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This Motion is based upon the factual grounds and arguments stated in Petitioner's 
Memorandum and Declaration in Support of Petitioner's Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order & Preliminary Injunction, and a Rule 65A (b)(l) Certification of Notice. 
WHEREFORE: based upon this Motion, the factual grounds and arguments stated in 
Petitioner's Memorandum and Declaration in Support of Petitioner's Motion for a Temporary 
Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction, and a Rule 65A (b)(l) Certification of Notice, 
Petitioner respectfully moves this Court to enter a Temporary Restraining Order as stated herein. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
4 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
/S/ Paul J. Morken 
Paull.Morken 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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DECLARATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code 70B-5-705, I declare, certify, verify and state under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah the facts set forth herein are true and accurate to the best of my 
personal knowledge. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
ISi Kylee J. Sandusky 
Kylee J. Sandusky 
Signed by Paul J. Morken, 
Attorney for Petitioner, with the 
permission of Kylee J. Sandusky 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day February, 2014, I e-filed and served, via e-filing, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document on Respondent's counsel of record, Elizabeth A. 
Shaffer of Elizabeth A. Shaffer, PLLC. 
5 
/By: ISi Paul J. Morken 
PaulJ.Morken 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Paul J. Morken (10483) 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Telephone: 435.659.1685 
paulmorken@gmail.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 44098) 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM & VERIFIED 
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER & PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION. 
Case No.:114500103 DA 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
PETITIONER, Kylee J. Sandusky, by and through her counsel, hereby respectfully 
submits this Memorandum and Verified Declaration in Support of her Motion for an immediate 
temporary restraining order ("TRO"), and, preliminary injunction after hearing, against 
Respondent pursuant to Rule 65A "Injunctions" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
memorandum is supported by the Verified Declaration of Petitioner, a Rule 65A (b)(l) 
Certification of Notice, and by the following arguments: 
6 
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DECLARATION, MATERIAL FACTS & ARGUMENT 
1. The parties were mmTied November 1, 1986. Petitioner's Petition for Divorce is 
currently pending before this Court. 
2. The residence, lots, roadway and all proceeds of sales were all acquired during the 
parties' marriage and they are all marital prope11y and constitute a majority of the parties' assets 
acquired during the parties· marriage. 
3. Petitioner just learned that Respondent recently has secretly (a secret kept from 
Petitioner) being trying to sell the residence in Hawaii, which the parties commonly refer to as 
the "Foo House." (See Exhibit 1) Based on information and belief Respondent has been trying 
to unilaterally sell the residence for $550,000, although Petitioner's appraiser recently appraised 
the house for $775,000. This marital asset was purchased with marital funds and should be 
preserved pending final orders and for determination and distribution by the court. By 
attempting to secretly and unilaterally sell this residence Respondent is attempting to bypass the 
court. 
4. Regarding the lot that is the subject of 12 of this Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. It too is marital property acquired by marital funds during the parties' 
marriage. Given Respondent's attempt to secretly sell the Foo House and his recent secret sale 
of the Lots that are identified in 14 of the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order it is vital to 
preserving this asset for the court's determination and distribution at final orders. 
7 
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5. Regarding the Lots identified in 14 of the Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, Petitioner has just learned that Respondent has secretly sold these Lots (Exhibit 2). He 
has also sold these lots for considerably less than the lots were appraised for by Petitioner's 
expert appraiser. All of these lots were marital property acquired with marital funds. Based on 
information and belief Respondent was paid $385,000 for these Lots. All of the proceeds from 
the sale of these Lots should be preserved and frozen pending final orders. The proceeds should 
be placed in Petitioner Attorney's Trust Account pending final orders. 
Respondent now claims that the proceeds he received from the sale of the lots is 
cun-ently tied up in property that is in foreclosure; He claims that the sale proceeds were used to 
pay off a loan on property that he guaranteed. He claims that the loan was in default and that 
the property is cun-ently in foreclosure. Petitioner has repeatedly asked for the closing 
documents for the sale of the lots, and for the alleged guarantee and for the pay off of the loan 
and for the foreclosure documents. To date~ Respondent has refused to produce any of these 
documents; and he either refuses or he has failed to support any of his statements. 
If Respondent has already tied up all of such proceeds ( all done secretly without 
any notice to Petitioner, if done at all) by paying off a loan on property that he guaranteed and 
that property is now in foreclosure, he has secretly put all of such proceeds at grave risk of loss, 
while refusing to give Petitioner notice or to provide to Petitioner any documentation. Thus, 
Petitioner requests a TRO in the event that the proceeds are tied up in a property in foreclosure. 
Respondent should be ordered to protect and secure such property interest and proceeds. 
8 
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Respondent should timely inform Petitioner through counsel of any future foreclosure 
proceedings involving such property, and neither such property nor any proceeds there from 
should be transferred or encumbered in any way by Respondent absent the mutual consent of the 
parties or by subsequent court order. Also, Respondent should forthwith supply to Petitioner 
copies of the documents pertaining to his sale of the original lots as well as the loan guarantee 
and foreclosure documents of such property. 
6. Regarding the Lots (roadways) identified in ,3 of the Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. These Lots are also marital property acquired by marital funds during the 
parties' marriage. Based on Petitioner's information and belief, Respondent retained these 
assets and did not sell them with the Lots identified in ,4. Given Respondent's current attempt 
to secretly sell the Foo House and his recent secret sale of the Lots that are identified in ,4 of the 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order it is vital to preserving these assets for the court's 
determination and distribution at final orders. 
7. This Motion for a TRO is submitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 65A 
"Injunctions" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is supported by Petitioner's Verified 
Declaration herein, and by a Rule 65A (b)(l) Certification of Notice. 
8. The court may issue a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction 
under Rule 65A( e) if the following grounds exist: 
I. The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order issues. 
9 
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2. The threatened injury to applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 
order may cause. 
3. The order will not be adverse to the public interest. 
4. There is substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of 
the underlying claim. 
9. Also, in Domestic Relations cases such rule provides in Rule 65A(f): that 
"Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in 
domestic relations cases." 
10. In this domestic relations case, Petitioner can satisfy all of these elements; 
additionally, this rule should not limit the equitable powers of this Court. Regarding the four 
elements, Petitioner avers the facts stated above and the following: 
First, each of the identified assets and the proceeds from the sale of the Lots 
identified in 14 are assets subject to the jurisdiction of this court for equitable distribution as part 
of Petitioner's Petition for Decree of Divorce. They constitute the bulk of the parties· marital 
properties. The residence and roadway lots are not fungible per se. The parties significantly 
disagree as to the value of the assets, Respondent has secretly sold Lots and he has been 
attempting to secretly sell the Foo House without notifying Petitioner. Petitioner now has no 
control at all over the disposition of the sale proceeds or over these non fungible assets. Now 
Respondent claims (without any proof) that the proceeds from the sale of the lots are tied up in a 
property gone into foreclosure. Given Respondent's secret actions Petitioner is completely 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
11 
I 
I 
~ 
Ii 
I 
ll 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
vulnerable and at risk of irreparable loss and harm due to Respondent's misappropriation of the 
sale proceeds and his arbitrary sale or any attempt to encumber such property. This would be 
unconscionable and cause Respondent irreparable damages unless the order issues preserving the 
assets as requested. 
Second, the threatened injury to Petitioner outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order may cause. Respondent will suffer no legally significant harm if the order is 
granted. All assets would be preserved pending the final orders. 
Third, the order would not be adverse to the public interest in any way; in fact it 
would serve the public interest by protecting and preserving assets, protecting Petitioner from 
irreparable harm, protecting the jurisdiction of this Court to make an equitable distribution of 
such assets, and it would protect Petitioner from having Respondent's actions circumvent and 
bypass Petitioner's marital and equitable interests in such assets without court protection and 
preservation, review, detennination, and distribution. 
Fourth, Petitioner's current legal and equitable rights are valid and enforceable. 
Last, in Domestic Relations cases such rule provides in Rule 65A(f): that 
"Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in 
domestic relations cases." It is vital that Petitioner be protected from irreparable harm and that 
the bulk of the parties' marital assets be protected and preserved by the Court for its review, 
determination and distribution. It is also vital that Petitioner be protected by the Court from 
11 
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Respondent's unilateral and secret actions that place Petitioner's marital property interests 
completely at risk of loss. 
WHEREFORE: This Court should issue a TRO, and order Respondent to take 
immediate action as requested and listed in Petitioner's Motion; 
AND, Respondent should be ordered to appear before the assigned judge within 10 days 
of the issuance of the TRO at the time and date set forth in the TRO ( the _ day of 
_____ , 2014, at _: __ .m. ), and show cause why the TRO should not be continued as a 
preliminary injunction during the pendency of this action; 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
ISi Paul J. Morken 
Paul J. Morken 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DECLARATION 
Pursuant to Utah Code 708-5-705, I declare, certify, verify and state under criminal 
penalty of the State of Utah the facts set forth herein are true and accurate to the best of my 
personal knowledge. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
12 
ISi Kylee J. Sandusky 
Kylee J. Sandusky 
Signed by Paul J. Morken, 
Attorney for Petitioner, with the 
permission of Kylee J. Sandusky 
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EXIDBITS 1 & 2 
Submitted in a separate e-filing concurrently with Petitioner's Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order. 
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Paul J. Morken (10483) 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Telephone: 435.659.1685 
paulmorken@.gmail.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 44098) 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
RULE65A 
CERTIFICATION OF NOTICE. 
Case No.:114500103 DA 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
Paul J. Morken, Attorney for Petitioner, certifies to the Court as follows: 
1. Based on the facts set forth in Petitioner's Verified Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction and supporting Memorandum and Verified 
Declaration (which are incorporated herein by reference) immediate and irreparable injury, loss 
or damage will result to Petitioner if such TRO is not immediately ordered. 
2. Petitioner has notified Respondent's counsel by telephone and by email on several 
occasions, the most recently being in a telephone conversation yesterday, February 13, 2014, of 
14 
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this Motion for TRO and Petitioner's request for an expedited and immediate hearing. Given 
the irreparable injury that will result to Petitioner, it is imperative that the TRO be granted. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2014. 
15 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
ISi Paul J. Morken 
PaulJ.Morken 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Im 
~ 
I) . . 
fim ~ 
~ ' ' 
~ ' ' 
I . ' 
I . . 
~ 
~ 
(CTj 
ll' 
I ' ' 
mm 
lit 
I . ' 
~ ' . 
IR\ 
If 
I . . ' 
i . ' 
201~ FEB 18 PH 3: ~8-
FtLEo B v pt)h2 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 44098) 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner, 
v . 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Resoondent. 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
Case No.:114500103 DA 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
This matter comes before the Court by telephone on the 18th day of February, 2014, on 
Petitioner's Verified Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction. 
Petitioner was represented by her attorney, Paul J. Morken. Respondent was represented by his 
attorney, Elizabeth Shaffer. 
The Court, having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Motion for a Temporary Restraining 
Order & Preliminary Injunction, Petitioner's Memorandum and Verified Declaration in Support 
of her Verified Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction, as well as 
t~e arguments of the parties at the telephonic hearing, and for good cause showing, finds and 
orders the following: 
1. Petitioner's Motion for a TRO is submitted to this Court pursuant to Rule 65A 
"Injunctions" of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is supported by Petitioner's Verified 
Declaration herein. 
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2. The court may issue a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction 
under Rule 65A(e) if the following grounds exist: 
A 
B 
The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order issues. 
The threatened injury to applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order may cause. 
C 
D 
The order will not be adverse to the public interest. 
There is substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits 
of the underlying claim or, at a minimum, the case presents serious issues on the merits which 
should be the subject of further litigation. 
3. In this case, Petitioner has satisfied all of these elements, at least with regard to 
that parcel of property, located at 76-6230 Ali'i Dr. Kailua-Kona, HI, known as "the Foo 
House." Regarding the four elements, Petitioner has shown the following: 
First, with regard to the Foo House, at least a threat of irreparable harm has been 
shown, since Respondent has listed the Foo House for sale and made at least preliminary 
attempts to sell it. If the Foo House were to be sold prior to trial without proper safeguards in 
place to protect the proceeds, Petitioner would be at risk of suffering irreparable harm. 
Second, the threatened injury to Petitioner outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order may cause. Respondent will suffer no legally significant harm if the order is 
granted. All assets would be preserved pending the final orders. 
Third, the order would not be adverse to the public interest in any way. 
2 
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Fourth, Petitioner maintains that the Foo House is marital property. Respondent 
disputes this, but the parties apparently have a good faith dispute with regard to whether and to 
what extent the Foo House is marital property. This issue is a serious one and should be the 
subject of further litigation in this case. 
4. With regard to all other issues presented (other than with regard to the Foo 
House), Petitioner has failed to present sufficient competent evidence of a threat of irreparable 
harm, and on that basis the Court, at this time, respectfully declines Petitioner's request for 
temporary injunctive relief on those other issues. 
ORDER 
1. Accordingly, this Court orders and restrains Respondent from selling the Foo 
House prior to trial in this case, unless the following conditions are all met: (1) the property is 
listed with a third-party realtor unaffiliated with either party; (2) the listing price chosen by that 
realtor is approved by both Petitioner and Respondent; (3) both Petitioner and Respondent agree 
in writing to the terms and conditions, including price, of any sale of the Foo House; and (4) that 
any proceeds realized from any sale of the Foo House are escrowed pending trial in this case. 
2. This Temporary Restraining Order shall remain in effect up to and including 
March 14, 2014. This Court has scheduled a Preliminary Injunction hearing ( combined with a 
pretrial scheduling conference) for Friday, March 14, 2014, at 10.30 a.m. in the Silver Summit 
Courthouse, 6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 84098. 
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Dated this 18th day of February, 2014. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 114500103 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
EMAIL: PAUL J MORKEN 
EMAIL: ELIZABETH A SHAFFER 
02/18/2014 
Date: 
Printed: 02/18/14 15:57:59 
fl\\.\\\tV\D'-'¥el/\ ~ ~'V\I\· U\lh 
~9'V\~ ~'"V\IVA~r~\1· (£\Iv\ 
/s/ BRIDGETTE BLONQUIST 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer@lawparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil No. 114500103 DA 
) 
) Judge Ryan Harris 
) 
COMES NOW, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner, George A. Sandusky, ("George") by and 
through his counsel of record hereby moves this court for Summary Judgment against 
Petitioner/Counter Respondent, Kylie J. Sandusky ("Kylee"). The grounds for this motion are 
more fully explained in Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed on March 7th, 2014 .. 
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DATED this 11 th day of March, 2014. 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent/Counter Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 11th day of March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered via electronically and/or 
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer(@lawparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KYLEEJ. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
) FACTS IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil No. 114500103 DA 
) 
) Judge Ryan Harris 
) 
COMES NOW. Respondent/Counter-Petitioner, George A. Sandusky, by and through his 
counsel of record, hereby submits the Undisputed Statement of Facts in Support of Motion to For 
Summary Judgment against Petitioner/Counter Respondent, Kylie J. Sandusky as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The parties, George Sandusky ("George") and Kylee Sandusky ("'Kylee") entered 
into the Separation Agreement and Property Settlement ( the "Agreement") dated February I 0, 
2010. (attached as Exhibit "A"). 
2. George and Ky lee were living separate and apart at the time of entering into the 
Separation Agreement. George lived in Hawaii and Kylee lived in Park City, Utah. 
Agreement ,r I . 
3. The Agreement confirmed the parties' separation and settlement and adjustment 
of their property rights and other rights, responsibilities and obligations growing out of their 
marital relationship. 
4. The parties acted in conformity with the Agreement and performed under the 
tenns of the Agreement from the date of the Agreement forward. 
5. Thereafter, on June 3, 2011, Kylee Sandusky filed a Verified Petition for Decree 
of Divorce, in the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, Case No. 114500103 alleging 
that the marriage was irretrievably broken and that is was impossible for the parties to continue 
in the marriage. 
6. George Sandusky filed his responsive pleading on June 27, 2011 and Counter 
Petition for Divorce and Breach of Contract. 
7. George and Kylee were married in Ventura County, California on November 1, 
1986 (Kylee Sandusky Petition for Divorce ,r 2). 
2 
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8. The parties are parents to one child who is over 18 years of age and attending 
college. (Kylee Sandusky Answer to Respondent's Counter-Petition, 6). 
9. Kylee did not work from the time she arrived in Park City from Hawaii in 2007 
until late in the year 2011. (See K. Sandusky Dep. 8:12, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). 
10. Kylee admitted that the marriage was already broken when the parties moved to 
Park City, Utah from Hawaii in 2007. (K. Sandusky Dep. 72:8.) 
11. Kylee represented that she and George were separated in October, 2010 when she 
filled out the Financial Aid requests for the parties' son to obtain aid for college. (K. Sandusky 
Dep. 118 :9-18) 
12. The parties signed the Agreement and both signatures were notarized attesting to 
the validity that the document being notarized was exactly what it was titled - a Separation 
Agreement. Kylee's signature was witnessed as well. Kylee admits that she signed and had the 
Agreement notarized. (K. Sandusky Dep. 80: 11-12). 
13. Kylee admits that the parties owned no joint real property at the time of entering 
into the Separation Agreement as indicated in Article 3 (A) of the Agreement. (K. Sandusky 
Dep. 82:23-25, 83:1). 
14. Kylee admits that George bought a home solely in his name before they were 
married and that she signed a quitclaim deed as to same. (K. Sandusky Dep. 25:14, 28:16). 
3 
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15. Kylee admits that she knew that George bought ten lots in Hawaii in 2000 valued 
at approximately $300,000. (K. Sandusky Dep. 10:24, 11 :21-24). She further admits that she 
typed in said lots as George's sole property in the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 83). 
16. Kylee admits that George received the property identified in Article 3(0) or the 
Agreement as his separate property. (K. Sandusky Dep. 83:2-5). 
17. Kylee admits that she did not own any real property at the time the parties entered 
into the Agreement as indicated in Article 3(C) of the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 85:4-6). 
18. Kylee admits that she received the property identified in Article 3(F) of the 
Agreement as her separate property. (K. Sandusky Dep. 85:12-21). 
19. Kylee admits that the parties had no debt as indicated I Article 3 (H) and (I) of the 
Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 84:11-12, 103:10-13). 
20. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Agreement, the parties agreed to file separate tax 
returns each year and had filed separately since 2009. (K. Sandusky Dep. 17:22). 
21. In her deposition, Kylie admitted that at the time of signing the Agreement she 
was well informed of all bank accounts and had access to same if she so desired . (K. Sandusky 
Dep. 56:21-23, 88, 113, 102:18.) 
22. Kylee identifies and admits that the parties had the following bank accounts at the 
time they entered into the Agreement: 
Kylee Fireman's Fund Bank Account# 7833401 (K. Sandusky Dep. 87:20-25, 
88: 18-22); 
4 
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George Fireman's Fund Bank Account #7833400 (K. Sandusky Dep. 87:20-
25, 88: 18-22); 
Hawaii Credit Union Bank Account# 551555; (K. Sandusky Dep. 87:20-25, 
88:18-22); 
Vanguard Account (K. Sandusky Dep. 87:20-25, 89:18-19); 
Chase CD's in the amount of $400,000 that had rolled into the Home Savings 
Bank Account (K. Sandusky Dep. 102:18-21, 95:16-25,); and 
Home Savings Bank Account having $400,000 from the chase CD's. (K. 
Sandusky Dep. 96: 1-3). 
23. Kylee admits that she was aware of all existing hard money loans that George 
entered into in his name at the time she signed the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 63) 
24. Kylee admits she knew of the hard money loan to Gonzalez. (K. Sandusky Dep. 
109:10) 
25. Kylee admits that she knew George was negotiating to buy the house at 76-6230 
Ali'i Drive, Kailua Kona, HI 96740-2324 before she signed the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 
108). 
26. After filing her petition for divorce in this case, Kylee Sandusky admits that she 
did withdraw $90,000 in June, 2011 from George Sandusky's HIFCU account. (Answer to 
Counter Petition and K. Sandusky Dep. 59:14). This account was Georg's separate account in 
5 
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which Kyle had had no previous dealings in or with that account until she asked George for its 
balance before withdra\\ing said funds. (K. Sandusky Dep. 59: 17-23). 
27. Kylee admits that she received $2,000 per month for more than a year from 
George as indicated in Article 4 of the Separation Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 67:4). She 
also acknowledged that the rent for the amount of $1,800.00 per month on the home she and the 
parties' son were living in at the time of the Separation Agreement through June 15, 2011 was 
paid for by George. (K. Sandusky Dep.67:4-9) 
28. Kylee admits that she claimed these monies as alimony on her 20 IO tax returns. 
She also admits that subsequently in September, 2001 she amended the tax returns to eliminate 
the alimony claim after speaking with her attorney and prior to filing the petition for divorce to 
void the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 116:9). 
29. Since the separation agreement, Kylee opened up 3 bank accounts herself, MACU 
where she deposited $90,000.00 that she took from the Hawaii Credit Union account; Wells 
Fargo account and a Chase bank account and a safety deposit box. She also purchased a 2004 
Ford Explorer. (K. Sandusky Dep. 110: 16-25; 111: 1-3) 
30. Both parties acknowledged that each was free to carry on as if unmarried and for 
each's own benefit to "engage in any employment, business or profession". Agreement 12. 
31. There was full disclosure between the parties of all of the assets held by the 
parties at the time of the Separation Agreement. Agreement at 18. 
32. No undisclosed assets of the parties existed at the time of the Agreement. 
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33. The parties acknowledged and agreed to such full disclosure. Agreement at 18. 
34. The Agreement provided no financial benefit to George and Kylee with regard to 
any financial aid for their son's college tuition. (G. Sandusky Dep. 94: 7-8, attached as Exhibit 
~'C"). 
DA TED this 7th day of March, 2 014. 
7 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
/s/ Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent/Counter Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 7th day of March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered via electronically and first class mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
PaulJ.Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer@lawparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil No. 114500103 DA 
) 
) Judge Ryan Harris 
) 
COMES NOW, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner, George A. Sandusky, ("George") by and 
through his counsel of record, and submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion to For 
Summary Judgment (the "Motion") against Petitioner/Counter Respondent, Kylie J. Sandusky 
("Kylee") as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION. 
The parties, George and Kylee, entered into a Separation Agreement on February 10, 
2010 (the "Agreement", Exhibit "A"). The parties were living separate and apart at the time of 
entering into the Agreement. They thereafter separated their property per the Agreement, 
continued to live independently and abided by the Agreement. Subsequently, Kylee filed a 
formal Petition for the dissolution of their marriage. The Agreement between the parties is a 
val id and binding contract. 
An examination of the Agreement, clearly and unambiguously outlines the terms of the 
Agreement, to wit: for separation and division of the parties' property. The Agreement also 
clearly reflects formalities in signing. The parties prepared the Agreement together, 
acknowledged the contract was binding, that the document encompassed the parties entire 
agreement, that the settlement was entered into voluntarily and recognized that the Agreement 
shall be incorporated into any Petition for Divorce and thereafter be incorporated in whole in any 
order or judgment of divorce. The Agreement was both witnessed and notarized. The Agreement 
settles terms for alimony, distribution of real and physical property, and was contemplated in the 
context of the parties' financial situations. Kylee's deposition clearly demonstrates her intimate 
knowledge with George's real property holdings and financial dealings at the time of the 
Agreement. The parties do not quarrel regarding the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. 
Kylee is now, for the first time, seeking to void the signed Agreement. Kylee, after 
abiding by the terms of the Agreement for over one year requests the court to void the 
Agreement. The Agreement is unambiguous in its purpose, scope, and consideration, and was 
2 
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signed- with witness- by each party. Kylee does not present any evidence of material non-
disclosure of property or assets at the time of the Agreement. In fact, the evidence is to the 
contrary, Kylee admits knowledge and access to all of the financial accounts and transactions of 
George, at the time of entering into the Agreement. She admits having knowledge of the real 
property owned by George prior to their marriage, during the marriage and at the time she 
entered into the Agreement. Kylee admits to voluntarily preparing the Agreemen~ freely 
entering into the Agreement, knowledge of all the assets and financial conditions between the 
parties. The Agreement is clear and speaks for itself and is a valid and enforceable contract. 
Any other use of the Agreement is not relevant. There exists no dispute as to material fact and 
George should be granted summary judgment as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other submissions show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2005); Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 
(Utah 1980). Summary judgment in not precluded simply because some facts remain in dispute, 
"but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted". Heglar, 619 P.2d at 1391; Wheeler v. 
Mann, 763 P.2d 758,759 (Utah 1988). 
Generally, "the construction and interpretation of a contract is a question of law to be 
decided by the judge." O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Utah 1983); see also Harris v. 
Albrecht, 2004 U 13, 19, 86 P.3d 728, 729; Morris v. Mountain State Tel. and Tel. Co., 658 P.2d 
1199, 1201 (Utah 1983) (holding that the "meaning of a contract remains a question oflaw [and] 
3 
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can appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment."). In this case, there is no 
dispute of material fact. The parties were living separate and apart when they entered into the 
Agreement and continue to do so. It was their intent to do so. The parties lived by the terms of 
the Agreement in separating their property and in paying and receiving monthly alimony 
payments. It was their intent to do so. The Agreement is clear unambiguous in its scope. One 
particular use of an Agreement, if true as Kylee alleges, to obtain financial aid for their son's 
college does not create a dispute of material fact. The contractual nature of the actions between 
the parties is unmistakable. As a result, George Sandusky is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
I. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS 
A VALID AND ENFORCEABL CONTRACT 
Both Kylee and George admit they voluntarily executed the Separation Agreement and 
Property Settlement together. Their signatures were notarized as to the validity of the 
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 9 A. of the Separation Agreement the parties acknowledge and 
agree that the "division and distribution of the marital property set for the herein is just, fair and 
reasonable, is deemed by the parties to be equitable and satisfactory, and that this Agreement 
shall be binding on the parties." Further, Article 9 B. of the Agreement states in part that both 
parties accept the provisions of the Agreement as "full and final settlement and satisfaction". In 
addition, in Article 9 L. of the Agreement, the parties aver that "this Agreement, together with 
any exhibits and schedules attached hereto, contains the entire understanding of the parties with 
respect to the subject matter; and there are not representations, warranties, covenants or 
4 
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undertakings other than those expressly set forth herein. This Agreement supersedes and 
replaces all prior agreements and understandings of the parties". 
In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations entered into 
in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and enforceable. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses to arrange property rights by a 
contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the event of divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999 
UT 75,984 P.2d 987, ,r24. The court affirmed "the general principle that spouses ... may make 
binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fi4 insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith. Id., at 125. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 216, 138 
P.3d 63, the court held that agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property 
owned by them at the time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or 
material non-disclosure. ,r3. 
The Agreement is a valid contract entered into by the parties in contemplation of their 
separation. The parties were living separately when they entered into the Agreement and 
continued to live separate and apart. After executing the Agreement, the parties performed the 
terms of the Agreement: specifically, they separated the property identified, continued in their 
separate financial affairs, George paid Alimony to Kylee and she filed her taxes acknowledging 
the alimony payments. 
There is no evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the formation of the 
Agreement. Both George and Kylee prepared the document together, they signed the Agreement 
and had it notarized as to the validity of being a Separation Agreement and the terms and 
5 
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provisions set forth. There is no reasonable mistake in the execution and acceptance of the 
Agreement; the Agreement clearly and repeatedly articulates its purpose, separation and its 
scope, property settlement. The parties acted in compliance with the Agreement. 
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure, both parties were well 
aware of each other's financial situations, as represented in both the Agreement itself and 
through Kylee's own admission. (K. Sandusky Dep. 56:21-23, 88, 113, 102: 18). Both parties 
were aware of all the marital and non-marital assets at the time the Agreement was executed. 
Therefore, there was no material non-disclosure. There are no articulated instances of coercion; 
allegations related to one particular use of the Agreement, related to their son's financial aid plan 
are irrelevant. Such a purpose is contrary to a plain and ordinary reading of the formally 
witnessed and signed Agreement. 
The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
Postnuptial and Antenuptial Agreements are construed and treated as contracts in general. They 
Hare in no way different from any other ordinary contract." Beerman v. Beerman, 149 P .2d 
1271, 1278 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
In interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties intended 
by what they said. "We do not add, ignore, or discard words in this process; but attempt to render 
certain the meaning of the provision, [sic] in dispute, [sic] by an objective and reasonable 
construction of the whole contract." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 
1976). The ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given effect, Pugh v. Stockdale and 
Co., 570 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1977), and "[e]ffect is to be given the entire agreement without 
6 
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ignoring any part thereof." Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P .2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978). See 
also Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prod. Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). Beerman v. Beerman 
749 P.2d 1271, Utah App (1988), at 12, 
As with any other contract, when interpreting an agreement between spouses we "look[] 
first to the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties." Neilson v. 
Neilson, 780 P .2d 1264, 1267 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Where the agreement is unambiguous on its 
face, we interpret it as a matter of law. See id. "In so doing, a court must attempt to construe the 
contract so as to 'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 
1999 UT 89, 114, 987 P.2d 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 
665 (Utah 1993)). 
A reason for which an agreement may have been used is not material as it relates to the 
validity of the contract. The contractual elements have been established making the Agreement 
valid and binding. Notwithstanding this, the parties continued to act under the Agreement after 
their son began college and applied for any financial aid that was available to him. Such actions 
constitute a ratification of the Agreement. 
The parties in this case, acted in conformity with the Agreement and lived separate and 
independent lives since entering into the Agreement. There are no material disputed facts related 
to the validity of the contract entered into by George and Kylee. As a result, George is entitled 
to judgment that the Agreement is a valid contract as a matter of law. 
7 
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II. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN 
THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Utah courts have held that when the parties intend to incorporate a separation agreement 
or property settlement agreement into a divorce decree, the courts should give it "full faith and 
credit". Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267 (1967). When the parties use the appropriate provisions in 
the agreement contemplating a proceeding of divorce, the agreement should be in force. Id. 
The Agreement in the case before the court provides the following: 
THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOULD A PROCEEDING 
OF LEGAL SEPARATION , DISOLUTION OR DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY 
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICITON, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE 
INCORPARTED INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR DIVORCE, 
DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE 
INCORPORATED IN WHOLE IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF LEGAL 
SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE. 
It is clear from the language, as emphasized in the Agreement, the parties intended for the 
Agreement to be incorporated into any decree of divorce. The parties have been separated and 
living apart since 2009. The marital assets should be divided as set forth in the language of the 
Agreement and finalized in a decree of divorce. 
The Agreement, as the manifest intent and tenns of separation, should be adopted and 
enforced. Final agreements of parties, are not lightly modified. In order to modify an agreement 
the moving party must show a substantial change not contemplated by the parties. Bowers v. 
Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983). Likewise, this court, when considering entering the decree 
should consider the voluntary and comprehensive nature of the Separation Agreement created by 
8 
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the parties. Further, nothing has substantially changed in the parties' circumstances since the 
Agreement was entered into as would effect the substantial fairness of the Agreement. Any 
circwnstances that may have changed were contemplated by the parties in the Agreement by 
providing in Article 2 that from the date of the Agreement, both shall live and conduct 
themselves as if never married and could choose to act for each party's "separate benefit to 
engage in any employment, business or profession." There is no compelling reason to modify 
the fair and reasonable Agreement and the Agreement should be incorporated into the decree. 
While, a stipulation and agreement is advisory and does not constrain the court's 
equitable powers, they are usually adopted unless found to be unfair or unreasonable. Coleman v. 
Coleman, 743 P .2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1987). 
WHEREFORE, George moves the above-entitled Court for an order that the Separation 
Agreement entered into between the parties is valid and binding and that it be incorporated into a 
Decree of Divorce without modification. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 2014 
9 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent/Counter Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 7th day of March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
delivered via electronically and first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
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Paul J. Morken (10483) 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Telephone: 435.659.1685 
paulmorken@gmai I .com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent 
ORDER ON: 
1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; 
2) MOTION TO STRIKE; AND 
3) MOTION TO PERMIT 
PETITIONER TO FILE AN 
AMENDED DECLARATION AND 
RESPONSE. 
Case No.: 114500103 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
This matter came on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Judge Ryan M. Harris 
presiding, on June 27, 2014. Petitioner appeared in person and through her attorney, Paul J. 
Morken of Paul J. Morken, PLLC. Respondent appeared through his attorney, Elizabeth A. 
Shaffer, Esquire. The court having reviewed (I) Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and his Motion to Strike; and Petitioner's Motion to Pern1it Petitioner to File an Amended 
Declaration and Response, and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel on 
these issues, and being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, the Court 
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now makes and enters its findings and Order as follows: 
1. There are genuine issues of material facts on many issues that would preclude 
summary judgment for either party, therefore Respondent's motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
2. Respondent's motion to strike is denied. The Court may rule on evidentiary 
issues pertaining to an exhibit or the particular contents of an exhibit at trial. 
3. Petitioner's motion for permission to file an amended declaration and 
response is granted. 
4. By agreement of the parties, discovery will be completed by August 29, 2014. 
DATED this_ day of ___ , 2014. 
SEEN AND APPROVED BY: 
/S/ Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Signed by Paul J. Morken with the 
permission of Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent 
2 
BY THE COURT: 
RY AN M. HARRIS 
District Court Judge 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshafferc@lawparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
ISSUES OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 114500103 DA 
Judge Ryan Harris 
COMES NOW, George A, Sandusky ("George" or "Respondent", by and through 
his attorney and pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and hereby moves the 
Court for an order to bifurcate the issues of the parties divorce; granting the Respondent a decree 
of divorce based on the parties irreconcilable differences and determine the validity of the parties 
separation agreement. All other issues, including alimony and property distribution to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reserved for trial. This motion is made to promote judicial efficiency and for the purpose of 
promoting the clear and effective presentation of the essential elements of the case. This motion 
is based on the following memorandum. 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties, Kylee J. Sandusky ("Petitioner") and George A. Sandusky ("Respondent") 
entered into a Separation Agreement on February 10, 2010 (the "Agreement"). The parties were 
living separate and apart at the time of entering the Agreement. George was residing in Hawaii 
and Kylee in Park City, Utah. Thereafter, they separated their property per the Agreement and 
continued to live independently and abided by the Agreement with Kylee receiving and 
accepting the sum of $2,000.00 a month in alimony. The Agreement clearly and unambiguously 
outlines the terms of the Agreement for separation and division of the parties' property. The 
Agreement also clearly reflects formalities in signing as both parties admit signing the document 
voluntarily and had it witnessed and notarized. The Agreement between the parties is a valid and 
binding contract. 
Subsequently, Petitioner, Kylee Sandusky filed a petition for divorce on June 3, 2011 and 
for the first time sought to void the signed Agreement. George filed his Response to Petition for 
Divorce and Counter-Petition on June 27, 2011 seeking to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner 
filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial on January 8, 2014 stating that discovery was complete 
and she was ready for the matter to be scheduled for trial. The parties attempted mediation on 
March 13, 2014, but were unsuccessful due to the issue of the validity of the Agreement. 
2 
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George filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 7, 2014, wherein he moved the 
Court for an order that the Agreement entered into between the parties is valid and binding, that 
it be enforce and incorporated into a decree of divorce without modification. At the hearing on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment on June 27, 2014, Petitioner's position was the Agreement 
was not valid or enforceable as she was "fraudulently induced" into signing the Agreement for 
the sole purpose of obtaining financial aid assistance for their son's college education and not for 
the purpose for which it was titled. The Court denied George's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the grounds that there was a material fact dispute as to Petitioner's claim of fraudulent 
I inducement. The Court further recommended the parties make another attempt at mediation. 
~ George now hereby requests an order from the Court to bifurcate the divorce 
I ' . 
; ' . 
I . ' 
I . ' ' 
; 
' 
' 
proceedings, grant him a decree of divorce based on the parties' irreconcilable differences and 
bifurcate proceedings related to the validity and enforceability of the parties' Separation 
Agreement and set the issue of the separation agreement for an evidentiary hearing. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The parties, George and Kylee J. Sandusky ("Kylee" or "Petitioner") entered into 
the Separation Agreement and Property Settlement (the "Agreement") dated February 10, 2010 . 
2. George and Kylee were living separate and apart at the time of entering the 
Agreement. George lived in Hawaii and Kylee lived in Park City, Utah. (K. Sandusky Dep. 
72:8, G. Sandusky Dep. 108:18-20). 
3 
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3. The Agreement expresses the parties' separation and settlement and adjustment of 
their property rights and other rights, responsibilities and obligations growing out of their marital 
relationship. (The Agreement). 
4. The parties separated their property per the Agreement, continued to live 
independently and abided by the Agreement. (K. Sandusky Dep. 67:4). 
5. Subsequently, Kylee filed a Verified Petition for Decree of Divorce on June 3, 
2011 alleging that the marriage was irretrievably broken and that it was impossible for the parties 
to continue in the marriage. (Verified Petition for Divorce). 
6. George filed his responsive pleading on June 27, 2011 and Counter Petition for 
Divorce and Breach of Contract. (Respondent's Response to Divorce Petition and Counter-
Petition). 
7. George and Kylee were married in Ventura County, California on November 1, 
1986. (Petitioner's Verified Petition for Divorce ,r 2). 
8. The parties have no minor children. (Petitioner's Answer to Respondent's 
Counter-Petition ,r 6). 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial court discretion to bifurcate 
proceedings in appropriate situations. See Olympus Hills Ctr., Ltd. V Smith's Food & Drugs 
4 
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Ctrs., Inc., 889 P .2d 445, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994 ), cert. denied, 889 P .2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
The Rule states that "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a 
separate trial of any claim," or "of any separate issue." Utah R. Civ. P. 42 (b). Such bifurcation 
will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah 
1988) 
Bifurcation is both permissible and advisable where it promotes efficiency for the Court 
and imposes no prejudice on the parties. United States v. Amante 418 F.3d 220, 222-223 (2nd 
Cir. 2005), A court may order a separate trial of any issue if it will be conducive to expedition 
and economy. Mandeville v. Quinstar, Corp. 109 Fed. App'x 191 (10th Cir. 2004). As 
mentioned herein above, this Court recommended the parties attempt mediation, however, until 
the issue of the validity of the Agreement has been determine, further mediation would be futile. 
Mediation was attempted on March 13, 2014 and the case not resolved because of the issue of 
the validity of the Separation Agreement lies at the core of the parties' impass. The validity of 
the Agreement is the central issue in this case and an evidentiary hearing on the issue would take 
a half a day of the Court's time to decide. The validity and enforceability of the Agreement is a 
legal issue for determination by the Court outside of the legal proceedings related to the 
determination of marital and separate property and the distribution of same. 
Once the issue of the validity of the Agreement is decided, there is a greater likelihood 
the other issues of determining marital or separate property and the division of same would be 
able to be mediated without the need for litigation. It is believed that litigation of these issues 
5 
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would take a lengthy trial, from three (3) to five (5) day of the Court's time. Bifurcation of the 
issue of the validity of the Agreement would serve both the interests of convenience and judicial 
economy and impose no prejudice to either party. 
For these reasons the Respondent requests an order from the Court to bifurcate the 
divorce proceedings grant the Respondent, George Sandusky a decree of divorce based on the 
parties' irreconcilable differences and bifurcate proceedings related to the validity and 
enforceability of the parties Separation Agreement. Respondent requests that the Court schedule 
an evidentiary hearing as to the validity of the Separation Agreement, and reserve all other issues 
for trial. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 2014 
6 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer(digitallv signed) 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 16th day of December 2014, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES OF DIVORCE was filed via the Court's electronic filing 
system which automatically delivered service to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl Rankin Peny 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer@,lawparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(6300 Justice Center Road, Park City, Utah 84098) 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE ISSUES OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 114500103 DA 
Judge Ryan Harris 
COMES NOW, George A, Sandusky ("George" or '"Respondent"), by and through his 
attorney and hereby submits this REPLY TO PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE ISSUES OF DIVORCE as follows: 
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MEMORANDUM 
Respondent's motion to bifurcate the divorce proceedings asks this Court clearly to 
separate the pending issues: I) determination of the validity of the parties separation agreement; 
2) determination of nature of the parties property as to individual/separate property and marital 
property; 3) equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets; 4) alimony and 5) dissolution of 
the marital union. Only those issues, #2, #3 and #4, dealing with the assets of the parties and 
alimony are intertwined. The property of the parties involves real estate, investments, bank 
accounts and pension benefits. The property is nothing complex or unusual involving a value of 
approximately $1.5 million. The parties were married for more than 20 years. George Sandusky 
was 32 years old and he had significant investments and half of his career with the Los Angeles 
Fire Department at the time of the parties' marriage. As a result, issue No. 2 is required. 
The validity of the parties' agreement entitled "Separation Agreement" is a separate and 
distinct issue. A determination of the validity of the Agreement is a question of law that is 
proper to separate from the property and alimony issues. The Petitioner raises the defense to the 
validation and enforceability of the Separation Agreement on the grounds that she was 
"fraudulently induced" into signing the Agreement for the sole purpose of obtaining financial aid 
assistance for their son's college education. 1 Petitioner attempts to also argue nondisclosure in 
an attempt to invalidate the agreement. However, there exists no evidence that there were any 
assets not disclosed. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary; Petitioner admits in her deposition 
that she knew of all the assets she describes in her amended declaration and opposition before 
1
• See Memo in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate Issues of Divorce p.619; Petitioner's Response 
and Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for summary Judgment p.416. 
2 
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she signed the Separation Agreement. 2 Petitioner argues that the joint accounts and the house to 
be purchased in Hawaii and the Bishop loan were not mentioned in the Separation Agreement 
and thus there was "non-disclosure". Failure to include these items in the Agreement does not 
equal material "non-disclosure". Failure to identify these assets specifically in the Agreement is 
not evidence of fraudulent conduct. Also, failure to mention these items is not "material" 
because the "FOO house" purchased in Hawaii and the Bishop loan and the joint accounts were 
all funds that were included in the $1.3 million in assets that Petitioner mentions they came to 
Park City with for retirement in 2007 (Petitioner's Amended Declaration p.4 ,r 1 .4). The 
proceeds used to purchase the Foo House and the proceeds used for the Bishop loan were all 
proceeds from the lump sum cash amount that Petitioner was aware of prior to entering into the 
agreement. Petitioner's lack of knowledge of the value of each asset also does not equate to 
"material nondisclosure" supporting Petitioner's allegation of intentional misconduct on the part 
of George in "hiding marital assets". 
The validity of the parties' agreement is a narrow issue. A question oflaw that is proper 
to separate from the distribution of property and other issues. A determination of this separate 
issue can be made without getting into a determination of the characterization of the property 
involved, valuation of property, equitable distribution of that property and those issues 
surrounding whether or not alimony is warranted. Many of these issues involving the property 
2 See K. Sandusky Dep. 11: 21-24 (Separate lots purchased by George), 22: 5-8 (Amount of George's monthly 
pension), 56: 15-16, 21-23, 87: 20-25 (Joint and Separate Bank Accounts), 62: 23-25, 63: 20-25 (Hard Money 
Loans), 107: 3-7, 21-23, 108: 9-14 ( George's purchase of house in Hawaii), I 04: 12-17 (there were no other bank 
accounts that Kylee didn't know about when she signed the Separation Agreement), Petitioner's Amended 
Declaration p. 4 ,r 1.4 ("When we moved to par City in August 2007, we were bringing with us $1.3 million dollars 
in cash and no debt''). 
3 
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and alimony are dealt with in the parties' agreement and therefore will likely be resolved based 
on a final determination of the validity and enforceability of the agreement. 
Petitioner's argument that there are too many witnesses and exhibits to present at a 
hearing and therefore a half day evidentiary hearing is not sufficient and would be prejudicial to 
Petitioner is not convincing. The determination of a narrow legal issue by the court prior to trial 
will clearly promote judicial economy and efficiency. A determination of the validity of the 
parties' agreement, as a result of fraudulent inducement, centers round the intent and 
understanding of the parties. They themselves are the only evidence that is required. This 
testimony does not require or involve a detailed determination and valuation of the assets of the 
marital estate. Petitioner indicates that she will have 5 witnesses; presumably the parties 
themselves as 2 witnesses, which are also the same 2 witnesses that George would call to testify; 
and the 3 persons who executed affidavits attached to Petitioner's Declaration; Kevin, Beverly 
and Stella Chaidez. The potential testimony of these witnesses is outlined in their affidavits, and 
to the extent that such testimony is competent and admissible testimony, it is short. 
Bifurcation of the issue of the validity and enforceability of the parties' agreement would 
serve both the interests of convenience and judicial economy and impose no prejudice to either 
party. A determination of the validity of the parties agreement would resolve many of the issues 
surrounding the determination and equitable division of marital assets and alimony and thus 
substantially reduce the time for trial of the remaining issues and/or promote the facilitation of a 
final resolution of all the issues in this case, negating the need for a trial at all. The alternative 
decision would move the case forward as planned and the parties are in no different position. 
4 
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CONCLUSION 
Bifurcation of the validity of the parties' agreement promotes the most efficient 
resolution of the case at minimal time and expense. Bifurcation of this issue provides the 
opportunity to promote a potential settlement and final resolution of this case, for the benefit of 
the parties and the Court alike. In a half day hearing, the court could potentially avoid altogether 
or substantially shorten a 3-4 day trial without any inconvenience or prejudice to either party . 
Last, the parties are in agreement that the marriage is irretrievably broken and both ask the Court 
to enter a decree of divorce. As such, there is no just reason for delay on this issue. 
Based on the foregoing, George Sandusky asks the Court to separate the issue of the 
validity of the parties' separation agreement and set the matter for evidentiary hearing as soon as 
practical. And, to grant George Sandusky a decree of divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences and, to reserve all other issues, #2, #3 and #4 for trial beginning April 28, 2015. 
DATED this 16th day of January 2015. 
5 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally signed) 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PETITIONER'S 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES OF DIVORCE was filed via the Court's 
electronic e-filing service this 16th day of January, 2015 which electronically delivered a copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl Rankin Perry 
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Paul J. Morken (10483) 
PAUL J. MORKEN, PLLC 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Telephone: 435.659.1685 
paulmorkenl@gmail.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
--i~~\:: .. :.-.. :~{~;~..:. 
The Order of Court is stated below: / .>":~: ~\ \ 
Dated: April 17, 2015 Isl Ryan }la' ·., ) -1 
0 I :31 :45 PM Districf-.c·· ' ,~ / 
~{~:~1Ehii'•!· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent 
ORDERS ON: RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
TO BIFURCATE ISSUES IN CASE; AND, 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDGE 
HARRIS TO RETAIN CASE FOR FINAL 
TRIAL 
Case No.: 114500103 
Judge: Ryan M. Harris 
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey 
This matter came on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Judge Ryan M. Harris 
presiding, on January 26, 2015. Petitioner entered her appearance by and through her attorney, 
Paul J. Morken of Paul J. Morken, PLLC. Respondent entered his appearance by and through his 
attorney, Elizabeth A. Shaffer, Esquire. The court having reviewed (1) Respondent's Motion to 
Bifurcate Issues of Divorce, and (2) Petitioner's Motion for Judge Harris to Retain Case for Final 
Trial, and having reviewed the responsive pleadings and having heard the arguments and 
representations of counsel on both of these motions, and being fully advised in the premises and 
for good cause appearing, the Court now makes and enters its Orders as follows: 
1. Respondent's motion to bifurcate issues in this case is hereby denied. The pretrial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I scheduling order shall remain in place. 
I 
• 
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2. While the parties are not required to file a trial brief with the Court, the parties 
may file a trial brief with the Court on or before April 17, 2015, at 5:00 pm. 
3. Petitioner's motion for Judge Ryan M. Harris to retain this case for the final trial 
is hereby denied. 
DATED this_ day of ___ , 2015. 
SEEN AND APPROVED BY: 
IS/Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Signed by Paul J. Morken with the 
permission of Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent 
BY THE COURT: 
RY AN M. HARRIS 
District Court Judge 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone (435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer(aJla\vparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, UT 84098 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 114500103 DA 
Judge Kara L. Pettit 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner, George A. Sandusky, ("George") by and 
through his counsel of record, and submits PETRIAL MEMORANDUM to this Court in the 
matter against Petitioner/Counter Respondent, Kylie J. Sandusky ("Kylee") as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
George and Kylee were married in Ventura County, California on November 10, 1986. 
The parties moved to Park City, Utah in August, 2007. The parties are parents of one child, 
Micah Sandusky born on October 27, 1992. Micah is now over the age of 18 and is currently 
attending University of Pennsylvania for his senior year of college. 
The parties, George and Kylee, entered into a Separation Agreement on February 10, 
2010 (the "Agreement", Exhibit "A"). The parties were living separate and apart at the time of 
entering into the Agreement. They thereafter separated their property per the Agreement, 
continued to live independently and abided by the Agreement. Subsequently, Kylee filed a 
formal Petition for the dissolution of their marriage on June 3, 2011, serving George with a copy 
of said Petition upon his arrival back to Utah from Hawaii on the day of the parties' son's 
graduation from Park City High School. In the Petition, Kylee stated that the Agreement should 
be void and unenforceable. 
ISSUES FOR TRIAL 
The issues for this Court at trial are the following: 
1. The validity of the Separation Agreement; 
2. The Determination of Separate Property; 
3. The Determination of Marital Property; 
4. The Distribution of Separate Property; and 
5. The Equitable Distribution of Marital Property. 
2 
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I. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS 
A VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
The Agreement between the parties is a valid and binding contract. An examination of 
the Agreement, clearly and unambiguously outlines the terms of the Agreement, to wit: for 
separation and division of the parties' property. The Agreement also clearly reflects formalities 
in signing. The parties prepared the Agreement together, acknowledged, by their signatures and 
notarization, that the contract was binding, that the document encompassed the parties entire 
agreement, that the settlement was entered into voluntarily and recognized that the Agreement 
shall be incorporated into any Petition for Divorce and thereafter be incorporated in whole in any 
order or judgment of divorce. The Agreement was both witnessed and notarized. The Agreement 
settles terms for alimony, distribution of real and physical property, and was contemplated in the 
context of the parties' financial situations. Kylee's deposition clearly demonstrates her intimate 
knowledge with George's real property holdings and financial dealings at the time of the 
Agreement. The parties do not quarrel regarding the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. 
Kylee is seeking to void the signed Agreement. Kylee, after abiding by the terms of the 
Agreement for over one year and by holding out the Agreement as a valid document in obtaining 
financial aid for the parties' son's college tuition for four (4) years. Kylee is now asking this 
Court to void the Agreement. The Agreement is unambiguous in its purpose, scope, and 
consideration, and was signed- with witness- by each party. Kylee does not present any evidence 
of material non-disclosure of property or assets at the time of the Agreement. In fact, the 
evidence is to the contrary, Kylee admits knowledge and access to all of the financial accounts 
3 
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and transactions of George, at the time of entering into the Agreement. She admits having 
knowledge of the real property owned by George prior to their marriage, during the marriage and 
at the time she entered into the Agreement. Kylee admits to voluntarily preparing the 
Agreement, freely entering into the Agreement, knowledge of all the assets and financial 
conditions between the parties. The Agreement is clear and speaks for itself and is a valid and 
enforceable contract. 
Both Kylee and George admit they voluntarily executed the Separation Agreement and 
Property Settlement together. Their signatures were notarized as to the validity of the 
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 9 A. of the Separation Agreement the parties acknowledge and 
agree that the "division and distribution of the marital property set for the herein is just, fair and 
reasonable, is deemed by the parties to be equitable and satisfactory, and that this Agreement 
shall be binding on the parties." Further, Article 9 B. of the Agreement states in part that both 
parties accept the provisions of the Agreement as "full and final settlement and satisfaction". In 
addition, in Article 9 L. of the Agreement, the parties aver that "this Agreement, together with 
any exhibits and schedules attached hereto, contains the entire understanding of the parties with 
respect to the subject matter; and there are not representations, warranties, covenants or 
undertakings other than those expressly set forth herein. This Agreement supersedes and 
replaces all prior agreements and understandings of the parties". 
In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations entered into 
in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and enforceable. The Supreme 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ .• 
i . . 
rITT! 
I 
w 
. 
' 
I . . . 
Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses to arrange property rights by a 
contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the event of divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999 
UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, 124. The court affirn1ed "the general principle that spouses ... may make 
binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith. Id., at 125. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 216, 138 
P.3d 63, the court held that agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property 
owned by them at the time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or 
material non-disclosure, 13. 
The Agreement is a valid contract entered into by the parties in contemplation of their 
separation and divorce. The parties were living separately when they entered into the 
Agreement and continued to live separate and apart. After executing the Agreement, the parties 
performed the terms of the Agreement: specifically, they separated the property identified, 
continued in their separate financial affairs, George paid Alimony to Kylee and she filed her 
taxes in 2010, acknowledging the alimony payments. Subsequently, Kylee amended here 2010 
Taxes to omit the word alimony after consulting with an attorney. 1 
There is no evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the formation of the 
Agreement. Both George and Kylee prepared the document together, they signed the Agreement 
and had it notarized as to the validity of being a Separation Agreement and the terms and 
provisions set forth. There is no reasonable mistake in the execution and acceptance of the 
1 K. Sandusky Dep. I 16:3-9. 
5 
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Agreement; the Agreement clearly and repeatedly articulates its purpose, separation and its 
scope, property settlement. The parties acted in compliance with the Agreement. 
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure, both parties were well 
aware of each other's financial situations, as represented in both the Agreement itself and 
through Kylee's own admission. (K. Sandusky Dep. 56:21-23, 88, 113, 102:18). Both parties 
were aware of all the marital and non-marital assets at the time the Agreement was executed. 
Therefore, there was no material non-disclosure. There are no articulated instances of coercion; 
allegations related to one particular use of the Agreement, related to their son's financial aid plan 
are irrelevant. Such a purpose is contrary to a plain and ordinary reading of the formally 
witnessed and signed Agreement and the facts in this case. 
The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
Postnuptial and Ante nuptial Agreements are construed and treated as contracts in general. They 
"are in no way different from any other ordinary contract." Beerman v. Beerman, 749 P.2d 
1271, 1278 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
In interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties intended 
by what they said. "We do not add, ignore, or discard words in this process; but attempt to render 
certain the meaning of the provision, [sic] in dispute, [sic] by an objective and reasonable 
construction of the whole contract." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 
1976). The ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given effect, Pugh v. Stockdale and 
Co., 570 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1977), and "[e]ffect is to be given the entire agreement without 
ignoring any part thereof." Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978). See 
6 
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also Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prod. Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). Beerman v. Beerman 
749 P.2d 1271, Utah App (1988), at ,2. 
As with any other contract, when interpreting an agreement between spouses we "look 
first to the four corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties." Neilson v. 
Neilson, 780 P .2d 1264, 1267 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Where the agreement is unambiguous on its 
face, we interpret it as a matter of law. See id. "In so doing, a court must attempt to construe the 
contract so as to 'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.' "Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 
1999 UT 89, ,14, 987 P.2d 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 
665 (Utah 1993)). 
A reason for which an agreement may have been used is not material as it relates to the 
validity of the contract. The contractual elements have been established making the Agreement 
valid and binding. Notwithstanding this, the parties continued to act under the Agreement after 
their son began college and applied for any financial aid that was available to him. Kylee held 
out the Agreement as a valid and true contract when attempting and obtaining from the United 
States government, financial aid towards the parties' son's college tuition. Such actions 
constitute a ratification of the Agreement. 
The parties in this case, acted in conformity with the Agreement and lived separate and 
independent lives since entering into the Agreement. There are no material disputed facts related 
to the validity of the contract entered into by George and Kylee. As a result, George is entitled 
to judgment that the Agreement is a valid contract as a matter of law. 
7 
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II. PETITIONER IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY HER CONDUCT 
FROM ARGUING THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID 
Kylee abided by the terms of the Agreement for over a year, even posting the funds 
George gave her monthly as "alimony" on her 2010 tax returns until she consulted with her 
attorney. (K. Sandusky Dep. 116: 3-9). Further, Kylee admits using the information contained in 
the Agreement as true and accurate for four (4) years when filling out the financial aid 
documents in attempting to receive aid for the parties' sons. Kylee admits "Kylee fills out 
FAFSA and CSS Profile, her income was $16,696, her 401K had $35,000, and her bank accounts 
held $28,332. Further, Kylee admits to using the Agreement to successfully obtain financial aid 
monies from the United States government. "The legal Sep. Document worked partially. Micah 
received Pell grants because Kylee showed little money and assets on the F AFSA, which is the 
only doc the government uses." 2 
Kylee used the Agreement as a valid and enforceable contract to her benefit when she 
obtained funds from the U.S. government for her son's financial aid for college tuition. Now, 
Kylee wishes to have the Agreement invalidated because she feels it works to her disadvantage 
and to George's advantage in the division of assets. "The doctrine of quasi-estoppel precludes a 
part from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position it has 
previously taken". Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 330 P.3d 762 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). The right to 
challenge the validity and enforceability of the Agreement was waived by Kylee's conduct. A 
party "may waive such right either expressly or by his conduct, and the right.. .. may be lost by 
2 (Petitioner's Amended Verified Declaration and Statement of Disputed Issues of Fact; and Amended Response to 
Respondent's Statement of Undisputed facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 14). 
8 
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estoppel." ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 2010 WL 2425986, 6 (D. Utah 2010), 
citing Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1959). 
III. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN 
THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Utah courts have held that when the parties intend to incorporate a separation agreement 
or property settlement agreement into a divorce decree, the courts should give it "full faith and 
credit". Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267 (1967). When the parties use the appropriate provisions in 
the agreement contemplating a proceeding of divorce, the agreement should be in force. Id. 
The Agreement in the case before the court provides the following: 
THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOULD A PROCEEDING 
OF LEGAL SEPARATION , DISOLUTION OR DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY 
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICITON, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE 
IN CORP ARTED INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR DIVORCE, 
DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE 
INCORPORATED IN WHOLE IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF LEGAL 
SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE. 
It is clear from the language, as emphasized in the Agreement, the parties intended for the 
Agreement to be incorporated into any decree of divorce. The parties have been separated and 
living apart since 2009. The marital assets should be divided as set forth in the language of the 
Agreement and finalized in a decree of divorce. 
The Agreement, as the manifest intent and terms of separation, should be adopted and 
enforced. Final agreements of parties, are not lightly modified. In order to modify an agreement 
the moving party must show a substantial change not contemplated by the parties. Bowers v. 
9 
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Bowers, 658 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1983). Likewise, this court, when considering entering the decree 
should consider the voluntary and comprehensive nature of the Separation Agreement created by 
the parties. Further, nothing has substantially changed in the parties' circumstances since the 
Agreement was entered into as would affect the substantial fairness of the Agreement. Any 
circumstances that may have changed were contemplated by the parties in the Agreement by 
providing in Article 2 that from the date of the Agreement, both shall live and conduct 
themselves as if never married and could choose to act for each party's "separate benefit to 
engage in any employment, business or profession." There is no compelling reason to modify 
the fair and reasonable Agreement and the Agreement should be incorporated into the decree. 
While, a stipulation and agreement is advisory and does not constrain the court's 
equitable powers, they are usually adopted unless found to be unfair or unreasonable. Coleman v. 
Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1987). The Agreement was fair and equitable. "In 
Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate 
property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to 
the acquiring spouse." Stonehocker v.Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11 ,r 13, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah Ct 
App. 2008), citing Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App. 296 ,r 23, 169 P.3d 765. The breakdown of the 
assets is as follows: 
• The parties came to Park City, Utah in August 2007 with $1.3 million dollars and no 
debt.3 This amount was amassed from a real estate deal where George invested 
3 See Petitioner's Amended Verified declaration ,i 1.4 
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approximately $400,000 of his separate property that he had been investing prior to 
the marriage and continuing into the marriage. 
• After costs of living, the amount at the time of the Agreement was approximately 
$1.2 million dollars. In the Agreement, George was to keep the lots he invested in as 
his separate property as well as his pension. 
• After removing George's $400,000 separate property from the 1.2 million dollars that 
left $800,000 to be divided. The Agreement provides for George to provide Kylee 
with $2,000 for life or a lump sum $400,000 which is half of the $800,000 remaining. 
Kylee chose the $2,000 for life which could potentially exceed her equal amount in 
the $800,000.4 
• Per the Agreement, George has continued investing his separate property in the 
ordinary course of business. 5 
Further, by her actions and conduct, Kylee is collaterally estopped form now challenging 
the validation and enforceability of the Agreement. For the past years she has held out the 
Agreement as a true and valid document which correctly outlines the division of assets. She 
cannot now allege the Agreement is invalid, to George's disadvantage, by asserting a position 
completely inconsistent with her prior position taken for the past years. 
4 Since the parties separated, George has paid four (4) years of Micah's tuition at University of Pennsylvania which 
was approximately $ I 67,000. 
s See, Separation Agreement, Article 2 
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DATED this 17th day of April, 2015 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally) 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent/Counter Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 17th day of April, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which 
automatically delivered service to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl Rankin H Perry 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (453) 655-3033 
Fax: (435) 655-3233 
Email: e. baffer(a), lawparkcity.com 
Attorney.for Respondent, George Sandusky 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STAT): OF UT AH 
(6300 Justice court Road, Park City Utah 84098) 
KYLEEJ. SANDUSKY, 
V. 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo. 114500103 
Judge Kara L. Pettit 
The Court has pending before it the final disposition of the issues in the case 
following trial on the merits on April 28-30, 2015. Based on the evidence and the 
arguments presented and the record as a whole, the Court now enters the following: 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE 
1. The pai1ies, George A. Sandusky and Kylee J. Sandusky were rnanied in 
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Ventura County, California on November 10, 1986. 
2. On June 3, 20 11 , Petitioner, Kylee J. Sandusky filed a verified petition for 
a Decree of Divorce pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§30-3-1 on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. Petitioner is a resident of Park City, Summit County, Utah and she has 
been a resident there for more than three months immediately prior to fi ling this action. 
4. Respondent is a resident of Hawaii. 
5. Respondent filed a counter petition for Decree of Divorce and Breach of 
Contract based on a Separation Agreement entered into by the parties. 
6. The Com1 has subject matter jurisdiction of this action and personal 
jurisdiction over each of the parties. Venue is proper. 
7. At the conclusion of the trial, Respondent made a motion for bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce. Petitioner did not oppose the motion and said motion was granted. The 
Decree of Divorce was final and effective on April 30, 2015. 
8. All other issues related to this cause of action were reserved for determination 
by this Court at a later date. 
9. The parties are the parents of one child, over the age of 18. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the fol lowing facts have been established in regard to the issues 
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presented in the trial of this matter: 
a) Separation Agreement 
10. On or about February 10, 2010, George and Kylee s igned a Separation 
Agreement (the "Agreement") effective March I, 2010. 
11. Each of the patties were over the age of 18 when they entered into the 
Agreement. 
12.. The parties were li ving separate and apart at the time the Separation 
Agreement was entered into, with Kylee living in Park City and George living in Hawaii. 
13. The Separation agreement sets forth in the preamble " WHEREAS, each of 
the parties is more than 18 years o · age, and they desire to confirm their separation and to 
make arrangements in connection therewith, including the settlement and adjustment of 
their prope1ty rights and other rights, responsibilities, and obligations growing out of their 
marital relationship''. 
14. The Agreement further sets forth "WHEREAS after careful consideration, 
each party believes it is in his or her own respective best interest to enter into this 
Separation Agreement and Property Settlement and each party considers thi s Agreement 
to be fair, reasonable and equitable". 
I 5. The Separation Agreement states "WHEREAS, each party has read thi s 
Agreement, fully understands the tenns, conditions and provisions hereof and deems such 
to be fair, just, and equitable". 
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16. The Separation Agreement was a standard form obtained from the internet 
that was discussed by the parties and filled out together. Petitioner typed in the 
Agreement for the parties. 
17. Both, Kylee and George Sandusky dated and signed the Separation 
Agreement. The signatures of both parties were notarized. The signature of Petitioner 
was witnessed by friend Beverly Chaidez. 
18. The parties entered into an Addendum to the Agreement, dated February 8, 
2010, stating: "At any time either one of the parties may terminate the monthly alimony 
payments of$2000 with a lump sum cash payment of $400,000". 
19. The Addendum to the Separation Agreement became effective March 1, 
2010. Both Petitioner afid Respondent signed the Addendum. 
20. entered into the Separation Agreement knowingly and 
voluntarily. Paragraph M of the Agreement states: "Each of the parties acknowledge that 
he or she has read this Agreement and understands its contents and provisions; that it is a 
fair and reasonable agreement to each of them, having due regard to the conditional and 
circumstances of the parties hereto on the date hereof; that each has signed and executed 
the Agreement freely and voluntarily and without fear, compulsion, duress, coercion, 
persuasion or undue influence exercised by either pa1ty upon the other or by any other 
person or persons upon either." 
21. The Separation Agreement further states above the parties signatures: 
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THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT 
SHOULD A PROCEEDING OF LEGAL SEPARATION, 
DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY COURT OF 
COMOPETENT JURISDICA TIO, THIS AGREEEMNT SHALL 
BE INCORPORATED INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR 
PETITION FOR DIVORCE, DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL 
SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE INCORPORATED IN 
WHOLD IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF LEGAL 
SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE. 
22. The Agreement is clear on its face describing the document as a 
Separation Agreement having as its purpose a desire to confirm separation of the 
parties and settlement of their property rights and other rights, responsibilities and 
obligations growing out of their marital relationship. 
?" 
--'· The paities entered into the Addendum to the Separation 
Agreement knowingly and willingly. 
24. The paities complied with the terms of the Separation Agreement 
for approximately 16 months after entering into the Agreement. 
25. Begi1ming March, 2010, Respondent began monthly payments of 
$2000 to Petitioner per the terms of the Agreement. Petitioner accepted these 
payments and reported the amount of $20,000 in alimony on her 2010 tax forms. 
Petitioner later amended her 20 IO tax forms to omit the word "alimony" after 
filing her petition for divorce. 
26. On or about February of 20 11 , Petitioner used the property division under 
the terms of the Separation Agreement when reporting her assets on F AFSA forms to 
obtain financial aid for college fo r the pai·ties' son. 
27. On June 3, 20 11 , Petitioner filed her Verified Petition for Decree of 
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Divorce, citing irreconcilable differences. Petitioner asked that the Separation Agreement 
be declared null and void and claims all property of the pa11ies is marital property. 
28. The assets of the parties when they moved to Park City, Utah in the fall of 
2007, consisted of $1.3 million dollars in cash and 10 undeveloped lots in Hawaii. The 
assets consisted of Separate property of George Sandusky and marital property of the 
parties. The pa11ies owned no joint real property. The cash money was invested in 
ce1iificates of deposits, interest bearing bank accounts and a one point private money 
loans or " hard money" loans carrying a higher than normal interest rate. 
29. Petitioner presented no evidence of material non-disclosure regarding the 
assets of the paiiies during the marriage or at the time the pa11ies entered into the 
Separation Agreement. 
30. Petitioner continued to repo1i her assets on the Federal (F AFSA) and 
college financial aid (CSS) forms as reflected in the terms of the Separation Agreement 
each of the 4 years the pm-ties' son attended college, beginning 2011 through 2014. 
Respondent filed only the college finai1cial aid (CSS) forms. 
31. The parties' son received financial aid in the form of Pell grants from the 
federal government based on the information Petitioner reported in her Federal financial 
aid forms (F AFSA). 
32. Petitioner reported her assets as reflected in the tem1s of the Separation 
Agreement on government forms in order to obtain subsidized housing. Petitioner 
currently resides in govenrn1ent subsidized housing. 
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b. Separate Property 
33. On February 28, 1977, Respondent began working for the Los Angeles, 
California Fire Department. He retired from the Los Angeles Fire Department after 20 
years and has received a pension since 1997. 
34. In 1977 Respondent purchased his first house when single and sold it in 
1979 for a profit of $ 17,000. Respondent used these proceeds to purchase other property 
that returned a profit to Respondent. In 1986 he sold property he purchased with partners 
for a profit of approximately $70,000. 
35. In October, 1986, before marrying Petitioner, Respondent bought a ½ 
interest in a property on Dover Lane the "Dover House"). To purchase the ½ interest in 
the property, Respondentpaid $50,000 cash from his separate account and assumed ½ of 
a $300,000 mortgage. 
36. On November 1, 1986, Petitioner and Respondent were married in Ventura 
County, California. The pa1ties lived in the Dover property part time, moving out for the 
summer months for approximately 2 years. 
37. In July 1987, Respondent bought the other½ interest in the Dover house 
adding equity in the amount of $55,000, through transfer to Seller (nan1e??) of his interest 
in a lot owned by Respondent in Hollywood Beach, CA. and assumed the entire $300,000 
mortgage on the Dover house. ConcuJTently, on July 24, 1987, Petitioner signed a 
Quitclaim Deed divesting her of any interest in the Dover house. 
38. In 1990, Respondent sold the Dover house for a profit of $391,000. 
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39. In 1991 , Respondent purchased a 4-plex in San Clemente, Califo rnia for 
$535,000 putting down the profit of $400,000 from the Dover house, $39 1,000 plus a 
commissions credit as his sister was the realtor and a loan of $ 135,000. 
40. In 1992, Respondent bought a 5-plex in San Clemente for approximately 
$585,000 vvith $200,000 credit li ne from the 4-plex property. 
41. In 1996, Respondent sold both the 4-plex and the 5-plex and then moved 
to Hawaii with Petitioner, and their 3 year old son. He sold the 5-plex for $700,880 and 
the 4-plex for $350,000. The purchase and sale of these properties did not result in a 
profit to Respondent but he did retain his original investment of $400,000. Respondent' s 
separate property when they left California for Hawaii was $400,000 cash. 
42. In 1997 after, moving to Hawaii, Respondent purchase a lot with cash in 
the amount of $ 160,000. He buj lt a home for approximately $90,000 in material and sold 
the house in 1998 before it was completely fin ished for $425,000 and a profit of 
$ 175,000. 
43 . Respondent purchased a condominium referred to as the White Sands 
condo for $ 170,000 and later sold it for $220,000, and a profit of $50,000. The total 
an1ount of return on Respondent's separate property was $625,000. 
44. In 2000, Respondent then purchased 10 undeveloped lots in Hawaii for 
205,000 cash as his sole and separate property. Respondent had left $400,000 of his 
separate property after purchasing the undeveloped lots. 
45 . In 2002, Respondent purchased the Lyman property, a large estate having 
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several houses on it, with his sister and her husband each putting $400,000 cash as a 
down payment. Respondent used his separate property of $400,000 as his portion of the 
cash down payment. A loan for I million dollars was also obtained. The loan was paid 
down within a year from the sale of one of the houses on the property. The property was 
in disrepair when purchased and some work was done to make the property more 
habitable. Another house on the property was rented to help cover the reduced mortgage. 
Kylee and George lived in the property until it sold in 2002. The property was sold for 
3.4 million dollars. George and his sister split 3 million dollars after paying off the 
mortgage and real estate fees. 
46. The money from the sale of the Lyman property is the cash money that the 
parties brought with them when they moved to Park City, Utah. 
47. The Respondent has met his burden and adequately shown his separate 
prope1ty of $391,000 and increasing in value up to and including the appreciation from 
the return on the tyman property in the an1ount of$ I ,500,000.00. 
48. The Respondent has met his burden and adequately shown his separate 
property having a value of $625,000. ($400,000 brought to Hawaii; $ I 75,000 profit from 
the first house built in Hawaii and $50,000 in profit from the White Sands condominium). 
49. Petitioner has not shown that she contributed significantly to the 
apprec iation and/or increase in the value of the properties purchased and sold by 
Respondent with his separate property to change Respondent's separate property to 
marital property. 
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50. The Separation Agreement was a fair distribution of the assets of the 
parties when entered. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Separation Agreement is a Valid and Binding Contract. 
In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations 
entered into in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and 
enforceable. The Supreme Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses 
to arrange property rights by a contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the 
event of divorce. " Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, i124. The court affi1med 
"the general principle that spouses . .. may make binding contracts with each other and 
arrange their affairs as they see :fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in good faith. 
Id. , at ,r 25. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 2 16, 138 P.3d 63, the court held that 
agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property owned by them at the 
time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or material non-
disclosure. ,r3. 
Kylee is highly educated, having a masters degree in Education and George is a 
highly sophisticated business man, so to attribute lack of knowledge is not consistent with 
who they are. "In the context of contract formation, the Utah appellate courts have held 
that 'each party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or 
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she affixes his or her signature to it"' Burningham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at, 24, citing 
McC!eve Props. , LLC v. D.Ray Hult Family Ltd. P 'shi, 2013 UT App 185, at , 12, 307 
P.3d 650 (affirming summary judgment because affidavit of party' s intent was 
insufficient to create fact question in light of unambiguous writings to the contra1y). 
"Furthermore, sophisticated business pai1ies are charged with knowledge of the tenns of 
the contracts they enter into." ASC Utah, Inc. V Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC 2010 UT 65, 
,28, 245 P.3d 184. Given these principals and the clear language contained in the 
Agreement, there is no question that the pai1ies reached a meeting of the minds when they 
executed the Agreement. " If the language within the four comers of the contract is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual .language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." 
Burningham v. Westgate Resorts, Ltd. at, 25 citing generally Nolin v. S & S Constr. , Inc. 
2013 UT App 94,, 12,301 P. 3d 1026. 
In light of the plain language of the agreement, Petitioner' s alternative 
interpretation contrary is not reasonable. There is no ai11biguity in the agreement. Any 
contended for interpretation must be "reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract" Ward v. lntermountain Farmers Ass 's, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). 
B. Petitioner has not established fraud in the inducement of her signing the 
Agreement by clear and convincing evidence. 
The defense of fraudulent indecent requires proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. Anderson v. Kriser, 266P.3d 819 (Utah 20 11 ). Petitioner has not established 
by clear and convincing evidence that the she was fraudulently induced into signing the 
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Agreement. There is no evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the 
formation of the Agreement. Both Petitioner and Respondent prepared the document 
together, with Petitioner typing the terms herself. The parties signed the Agreement and 
had it notarized as to the validity of the document being a Separation Agreement and the 
terms and provisions set forth therein. There is no reasonable mistake in the execution 
and acceptance of the Agreement; the Agreement clearly and repeatedly articulates its 
purpose, separation and its scope, prope1ty settlement. The parties acted in compliance 
with the Agreement for more than 16 months after entering into the Agreement. As this 
is Petitioner' s defense to the validity of the Agreement, the burden of proof was on her to 
show the fraud by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Kriser. Petitioner did 
not present evidence to support her claim of fraudulent inducement in entering into the 
Separation Agreement that would rise to the level of clear and convincing proof to 
suppo1t voiding the Agreement. 
C. Petitioner has not Proven that there was material non-disclosure when 
signing the Agreement. 
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure, both parties were 
well aware of the financial situations throughout the man-iage. Both parties were aware 
of all the marital and non-marital assets at the time the Agreement was executed. Kylee 
testified as to having knowledge of all bank accounts and all estate assets at trial. 
Therefore, there was no material non-disclosure. There are no articulated instances of 
coercion; allegations related to one pruticular use of the Agreement, related to their son's 
financial aid plan are iITelevant. Such a purpose is contrary to a plain and ordinary 
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reading of the formally witnessed and signed Agreement and the facts in this case. 
Petitioner produced no clear and convincing evidence of coercion. Again, 
Petitioner typed the Agreement and abided by its terms for over a year until she decided 
to file for divorce. Further, she admits to using the tern1s of the Agreement for four years 
to obtain financial aid for her son. At trial, Petitioner admitted using the terms of the 
Agreement to obtain government subsidized housing for herself. Kylee is still living 
under the terms of the Agreement as she cmTently resides in that government housing that 
the terms of the Agreement supported. 
D. By her conduct, Petitioner has ratified the agreement and is now 
collaterally estopped from claiming the Agreement is null and void. 
Kylee abided by the te1ms of the Agreement for over a year, even reporting the 
funds George gave.. her monthly as "alimony" on her 2010 tax returns. Fmther, Kylee 
admits using the information contained in the Agreement as true and accurate for four (4) 
years when filling q_ut the financial aid documents in attempting to receive aid for the 
parties' sons. Petitioner testified at trial that she also used the terms of the Agreement 
when she needed to obtain government subsidized housing for herself. Kylee used the 
Agreement as a valid and enforceable contract when it was beneficial to her for her son's 
financial aid for college tuition and when she obtained government subsidized housing 
for herself. Petitioner continues to use the terms of the Agreement for her benefit. 
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's 
disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position it has previously taken". Wohnoutka v. 
Kelley, 330 P.3d 762 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). Petitioner is stopped from the right to 
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challenge the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. By her conduct she has 
waived her ability to assert such a challenge. A patty "may waive such right either 
expressly or by his conduct, and the right.. .. may be lost by estoppel." ASC Utah, Inc. v. 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 2010 WL 2425986 1 6 (D. Utah 2010), citing Brazeal v. 
Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1959). 
E. Respondent Has Proven His Separate Property. 
1. Respondent has proven that the Dover House and the proceeds therefrom 
were his separate property. 
Separate prope11y is exempt from the marital estate and equitable distribution. 
The Court must first categorize the parties' assets into marital and separate property. 
Each party is entitled to all of that parties' separate prope11y including its appreciation 
during the marriage. Thompson v. Thompson, 208 P.3d 539 (Ct. of App. 2009). 
Premarital prol?erty · iewed as separate prope1 y and "when appropriate, equity will 
require that each party retain the separate property brought to the matTiage". Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.3d 133 (Utah 1987). Any appreciation of the separate property brought into 
the maniage should not become part of the mat·ital estate, especially when the receiving 
spouse has made the contributions which led to the increase in value to the separate 
assets. Id. at 11 4, 5. Even if the separate property has substantially changed in form, it 
still maintains its separate character. 
Both patties testified that George owned ½ of an interest in a home (the "Dover" 
house) as well as interest in other properties before they got married. Both patties agree 
that shortly after the maniage George acquired the second half of the interest in the satne 
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property. Both parties agree that at the time of the acquisition of the entire interest in the 
Dover home, Kylee signed a Quitclaim deed to George absolving any interest or potential 
interest in the whole Dover prope1iy. When George sold the Dover house, he made a 
profit of $391 ,000.00. 
2. Respondent has shown that his separate property remained his separate 
property. 
The Findings of Facts show it was this separate profit that was continuously rolled 
over to buy and sell real estate assets throughout the paii ies' marriage and beyond. All 
the properties were purchased and paid for by George' s separate account. The separate 
character was maintained throughout the marriage When the separate property character 
is maintained in segregated accounts, any conversion of the separate property [into other 
properties] does not "destroy he integrity of segregation." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 ~3 
(Utah 1990). 
The Separation Agreement takes this into account when giving George $400,000 
and the lots he purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the properties and dividing 
the remaining assets equally between the parties. Even, if the Separation Agreement is 
held invalid, George would still be entitled to his separate property, even though it has 
chai1ged its form throughout the years, plus all appreciation. 
Although Petitioner provided testimony of efforts put into the property, these 
efforts mostly consisted of housekeeping, sweeping, cleaning, painting, etc. During the 
Dover house years and subsequently, Kylee was working full time and George was doing 
the work enhancing the properties values. Increase in valuation of the property was due 
more to the fact that property values appeared to be rising rapidly at the time. In addition, 
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there was no evidence that Petitioner contributed any any monies towards the properties 
from her separately. Where one spouse contribution to the separate property does not 
materially affect its value, then appreciation is not included in the marital estate. Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, ~ 5 (Utah 1987). 
F. The Separation Agreement is an equitable distribution of the separate 
and marital property. 
While, a stipulation and agreement is advisory and does not constrain the court's 
equitable powers, they are usually adopted unless found to be unfair or unreasonable. 
Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1987). The Agreement was fair and 
equitable. "In Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing 
spouses and separate property, which may jnc1ude premarital assets, inheritances, or 
similar assets, will be awarded to the acquiring spouse." Stonehocker v.Stonehocker, 
2008 UT App 11 ~ 13, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah Ct App. 2008), citing Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 
UT App. 296 ~ 23, 169 P.3d 765. 
The breakdown of the assets of the parties is as follows: 
• The parties came to Park City, Utah in August 2007 with $1.3 million dollars 
and no debt. This amount was amassed from a real estate deal where George 
invested approximately $400,000 of his separate property that he had been 
investing prior to the marriage and continuing into the marriage. 
• After costs ofliving, the amount at the time of the Agreement was 
approximately$ 1.2 million dollars. In the Agreement, George was to keep the 
lots he invested in as his separate property as well as his pension. 
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• After removing George's $400,000 separate property from the 1.2 million 
dollars that left $800,000 to be divided. The Agreement provides for George 
to provide Kylee with $2,000 for life or a lump sum $400,000 which is half of 
the $800,000 remaining. Kylee chose the $2,000 for life which could 
potentially exceed her equal amount in the $800,000. 
• Per the Agreement, George has continued investing his separate property in 
the ordinary course of business. 
G. The Court divides the separate property and the marital property as 
follows. 
The marital assets are valued as of the time of the divorce decree. Morgan v. 
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The decree of divorce was entered on 
the last day of trial on April 30, 2015. At that time the assets were as follows: 
Cash in bank accounts: $523, 914.22 
Cash in escrow account: $310,000.00 
Foo house: $400,000.00 
Church lot: $128,500.00 
Roadway lot: $0- $100,000 
Judgment lien $187,000.00 
Based on the assets of the parties, the Comt awards the following: 
I) Valid and Enforceable Separation Agreement: 
George's Separate Property: Foo House (purchased with his $400,000 
separate property 
100% of his Pension 
Cash proceeds from lots $335,000 
Kylee' s Separate prope1ty: 100% of her 40 I (k) 
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Ky lee's Separate property: $310,000 ($400,000 lump sum payment per 
the addendum less $90,000 previously taken 
* Any cash over these amounts to be split equally between the parties. 
2) Separation Agreement is Not Valid Separate property and minimum 
appreciation. 
George's separate property: $625,000 credit P, us appreciation ($400,000 
+ 175,000 Hawaii'house build + 50,000 
White Sands condo) which has been 
converted to the following property: 
Foo House and church Lot 
Cash from lot sale $335,000 
Roadway lot 
75% (approx.) of George pension 
George's maritalproperty: 50% of Kylee's 401(k) 
50% of Bank accounts in George's name 
50% of bank account in Kylee name 
Ky lee's marital property: 25% (approx.) of George's pension 
50% of Bank Accounts in Kylee name 
50% of bank accounts in George's name 
50% of Kylee 401(k) 
3) Separation Agreement Not Valid and full appreciation. 
George's separate property: $1.5 Million proceeds from Lyman's 
converted to the following: 
$335,000.00 from lots 
Foo house (& Church lot) and Roadway lot 
Cash in George's bank accounts 
Cash in Attorney trust account 
75% George pension 
George's marital property: 50% Kylee's pension 
50% Kylee Bank Accounts 
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Kylee's marital property: 25% of George's pension 
50% of her pension 
Personal property in the possession of the parties to remain with the 
parties. 
Attorney fees awarded to Respondent upon finding the Separation 
Agreement is valid. Each party to pay their own attorney fees u on finding the 
Separation Agreement is not enforceable. 
DA TE this 26th day of May, 2015 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
i sl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally) 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 26th day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OFF ACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was filed via the Court's 
electronic filing system which automatically delivered service to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl Rankin H Perry 
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Elizabeth A. Shaffer #06796 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer PLLC 
2041 Sidewinder Drive, Suite 2 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone ( 435) 655-3033 
Fax (435) 655-3233 
eshaffer<mla\vparkcity.com 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
6300 Justice Court Road, Park City, UT 84098 
KYLEE J. SANDUSKY, 
Petitioner 
vs. 
GEORGE A. SANDUSKY, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
POSTTRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Civil No. 114500103 DA 
Judge Kara L. Pettit 
COMES NOW, Respondent/Counter-Petitioner, George A. Sandusky, ("George") by and 
through his counsel ofrecord, and submits POSTTRIAL MEMORANDUM to this Court in the 
matter against Petitioner/Counter Respondent, Kylie J. Sandusky ("Kylee") as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
George and Kylee were married in Ventura County, California on November 10, 1986. 
The parties moved to Park City, Utah in August, 2007. The parties are parents of one child, 
Micah Sandusky born on October 27, 1992. Micah is now over the age of 18 and graduated from 
the University of Pennsylvania on May 18, 2015. 
The parties, George and Kylee, entered into a Separation Agreement on February 10, 
2010 (the "Agreement", Exhibit "A"). The parties were living separate and apart at the time of 
entering into the Agreement. They thereafter separated their property per the Agreement, 
continued to live independently and abided by the Agreement. Subsequently, Kylee filed a 
formal Petition for the dissolution of their marriage on June 3, 2011. In the Petition, Kylee stated 
that the Agreement should be void and unenforceable. The parties have argued their positions in 
oral arguments before this Court on May 28th, 29th and 30th, 2015. 
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
The issues to be determined by this Court are the following: 
1. The Validity of the Separation Agreement; 
2. The Determination of Separate Property and Remove said Separate Property from the 
Marital Estate; 
3. The Determination of Marital Estate; and 
4. The Equitable Distribution of Marital Property. 
2 
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I. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS 
AV ALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT 
A. THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT 
VOLUNTARILY. 
The Agreement between the parties is a valid and binding contract. An examination of 
the Agreement, clearly and unambiguously outlines the terms of the Agreement, to wit: for 
separation and division of the parties' property. The Agreement also clearly reflects formalities 
in signing. The parties prepared the Agreement together with Petitioner testifying that she was 
the party who actually typed up the agreement. The parties acknowledged, by their signatures 
and notarization, that the contract was binding, that the document encompassed the parties entire 
agreement, that the settlement was entered into voluntarily and recognized that the Agreement 
shall be incorporated into any Petition for Divorce and thereafter be incorporated in whole in any 
order or judgment of divorce. The Agreement was both witnessed and notarized. The Agreement 
settles terms for alimony, distribution of real and physical property, and was contemplated in the 
context of the parties' financial situations. Kylee's testimony at trial clearly demonstrates her 
intimate knowledge with George's real property holdings and financial dealings at the time of the 
Agreement. 1 
Kylee is seeking to void the signed Agreement after abiding by the terms of the 
Agreement for over one year and by holding out the Agreement as a valid document in obtaining 
financial aid for the parties' son's college tuition for four (4) years.2 Kylee testified that she also 
1 K. Sandusky Tr. 9:33;05 - 13:37:13, April 28, 2015; 13:16:00-10, April 29, 2015. 
2 K. Sandusky Tr. 12:54:48-13:04:01, April 29, 2015 
3 
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used the terms of the Agreement in order to qualify for government subsidized housing. 3 
Therefore, she is still living under the terms of the Agreement as she remains in the subsidized 
housing procured by the terms of the Agreement. Kylee is now asking this Court to void the 
Agreement. The Agreement is unambiguous in its purpose, scope, and consideration, and was 
signed and notarized by each party. Kylee did not present any evidence of material non-
disclosure of property or assets at the time of the Agreement. In fact, the evidence is to the 
contrary, Kylee testified as to having knowledge and access to all of the financial accounts and 
transactions of George, at the time of entering into the Agreement. She admits having knowledge 
of the real property owned by George prior to their marriage, during the marriage and at the time 
she entered into the Agreement. Kylee admits to voluntarily preparing the Agreement, freely 
entering into the Agreement, with knowledge of all the assets and financial conditions between 
the parties. The Agreement is clear and speaks for itself and is a valid and enforceable contract. 
Both Kylee and George admit they voluntarily executed the Separation Agreement and 
Property Settlement together.4 Their signatures were notarized as to the validity of the 
Agreement. Pursuant to Article 9 A. of the Separation Agreement the parties acknowledge and 
agree that the "division and distribution of the marital property set for the herein is just, fair and 
reasonable, is deemed by the parties to be equitable and satisfactory, and that this Agreement 
shall be binding on the parties." 
3 K. Sandusky Tr. 13:56:32-50 
4 K. Sandusky Tr. 14:26:10, April 28, 2015. 
4 
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In Utah, both premarital and post marital agreements, as well as stipulations entered into 
in contemplation of separation and divorce are valid, binding and enforceable. The Supreme 
Court of Utah has affirmed the "general authority of spouses to arrange property rights by a 
contract that is recognized and enforced by a court in the event of divorce." Reese v. Reese, l 999 
UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, ,24. The court affirmed "the general principle that spouses ... may make 
binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith. Id., at, 25. In Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App. 216, 138 
P.3d 63, the court held that agreements between spouses concerning the disposition of property 
owned by them at the time of marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, coercion or 
material non-disclosure. ,3. 
The Agreement is a valid contract entered into by the parties in contemplation of their 
separation and divorce. The parties were living separately when they entered into the 
Agreement and continued to live separate and apart.5 After executing the Agreement, the parties 
performed the terms of the Agreement: specifically, they separated the property identified, 
continued in their separate financial affairs, George paid Alimony to Kylee and she filed her 
taxes in 2010, acknowledging the alimony payments. Subsequently, Kylee amended here 2010 
Taxes to omit the word alimony after consulting with an attomey.6 At trial, Kylee testified that 
she did not know why she called the monies that George put into her account "alimony", but 
5 M. Sandusky Tr. 10:28:57- 10:31;06, April 30, 2015. 
6 K. Sandusky Dep. 116:3-9. 
5 
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after speaking to her counsel, she was told she had been "deceived" and it needed to be amended 
to "get it off the record".7 However, Kylee presented no evidence at trial of such deception. 
A. PETITIONER PRESENTED NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF 
FRAUD, COERCION, OR MATERIAL NON-DISCLOSURE. 
There is no evidence of fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure in the formation of the 
Agreement. Both George and Kylee prepared the document together, with Kylee typing the 
terms herself. 8 They signed the Agreement and had it notarized as to the validity of being a 
Separation Agreement and the terms and provisions set forth. There is no reasonable mistake in 
the execution and acceptance of the Agreement; the Agreement clearly and repeatedly articulates 
its purpose, separation and its scope, property settlement. The parties acted in compliance with 
the Agreement and Kylee As this is Petitioner's defense to the validity of the Agreement, the 
burden of proof was on her to show the fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Anderson v. 
Kriser, 266P .3d 819 (Utah 2011 ). Petitioner did not present evidence to support this defense that 
would rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner testified that George never 
mentioned the word "divorce" when the parties were executing the Agreement. 9 George testified 
that the Agreement spoke for itself and was executed in contemplation of separation. 
Additionally, there are no instances of material non-disclosure, both parties were well 
aware of each other's financial situations. Both parties were aware of all the marital and non-
marital assets at the time the Agreement was executed. Kylee testified as to having knowledge 
7 K. Sandusky Tr. 14:15:20-57, April 29, 2015. 
8 K. Sandusky Tr. 14:33:59, April 28, 2015; 13: 11 :08, April 29, 2015. 
9 K. Sandusky Tr. 14:21 :34, April 28, 2015 
6 
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of all bank accounts and all estate assets at trial. Therefore, there was no material non-disclosure. 
There are no articulated instances of coercion; allegations related to one particular use of the 
Agreement, related to their son's financial aid plan are irrelevant. Such a purpose is contrary to a 
plain and ordinary reading of the formally witnessed and signed Agreement and the facts in this 
case. Petitioner produced no clear and convincing evidence of coercion. Again, Petitioner typed 
the Agreement and abided by its terms for over a year until speaking with an attorney once she 
decided to file for divorce. Further, she admits to using the terms of the Agreement for four 
years to obtain financial aid for her son. At trial, Petitioner admitted using the terms of the 
Agreement to obtain government subsidized housing for herself. Kylee is still living under the 
terms of the Agreement as she currently resides in that government housing that the terms of the 
Agreement supported. 
The Separation and Property Settlement Agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
Postnuptial and Ante nuptial Agreements are construed and treated as contracts in general. They 
"are in no way different from any other ordinary contract." Beerman v. Beerman, 7 49 P .2d 
1271, 1278 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
In interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties intended 
by what they said. "We do not add, ignore, or discard words in this process; but attempt to render 
certain the meaning of the provision, [sic] in dispute, [sic] by an objective and reasonable 
construction of the whole contract." Mark Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp., 548 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah 
1976). The ordinary and usual meaning of the words used is given effect, Pugh v. Stockdale and 
Co., 570 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1977), and "[e]ffect is to be given the entire agreement without 
7 
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I ignoring any part thereof." Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P .2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978). See 
also Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prod. Co., 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). Beerman v. Beerman 
749 P.2d 1271, Utah App (1988), at ,2. 
As with any other contract, when interpreting an agreement between spouses we "look 
first to the four comers of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties." Neilson v. 
Neilson, 780 P .2d 1264, 1267 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Where the agreement is unambiguous on its 
face, we interpret it as a matter of law. See id. "In so doing, a court must attempt to construe the 
contract so as to 'harmonize and give effect to all of [its] provisions.' "Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 
1999 UT 89, ,14, 987 P.2d 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 
665 (Utah 1993)). 
A reason for which an agreement may have been used is not material as it relates to the 
validity of the contract. The contractual elements have been established making the Agreement 
valid and binding. Notwithstanding this, the parties continued to act under the Agreement after 
their son began college and applied for any financial aid that was available to him. Kylee held 
out the Agreement as a valid and true contract when attempting and obtaining from the United 
States government, financial aid towards the parties' son's college tuition. 10 Such actions 
constitute a ratification of the Agreement. Further, Petitioner also held out the Agreement as 
true and valid when she needed it when obtaining federally subsidized housing for herself. 
The parties in this case, acted in conformity with the Agreement and lived separate and 
independent lives since entering into the Agreement. Kylee is still acting under the terms of the 
10 K. Sandusky Tr. 13: 12:36-39, April 29, 2015. 
8 
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Agreement as she is still living in the government subsidized housing that the terms of the 
Agreement helped obtain. There are no material disputed facts related to the validity of the 
contract entered into by George and Kylee. As a result, George is entitled to judgment that the 
Agreement is a valid contract as a matter of law. 
B. PETITIONER IS COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY HER CONDUCT FROM 
ARGUING THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID. 
Kylee abided by the terms of the Agreement for over a year, even reporting the funds 
George gave her monthly as "alimony" on her 2010 tax returns until she consulted with her 
attorney. Kylee admitted at trial that she only amended her taxes because her attorney told her 
that she had been "deceived" when she was in the process of filing for divorce from George. 
Further, Kylee admits using the information contained in the Agreement as true and accurate for 
four ( 4) years when filling out the financial aid documents in attempting to receive aid for the 
parties' sons. Kylee testified at trial that not only did she use the terms of the Agreement to 
obtain funds from the Federal government for her son, she also used the terms of the Agreement 
when she needed to obtain government subsidized housing for herself. Once again holding out 
the terms of the Agreement to be true when attempting to get a form of compensation from the 
Government. 
Kylee used the Agreement as a valid and enforceable contract to her benefit when she 
obtained funds from the U.S. government for her son's financial aid for college tuition and when 
she obtained government subsidized housing for herself. Kylee is still living under the terms of 
9 
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the Agreement. To date, Kylee is living in government subsidized housing that was obtained by 
the terms of the Agreement. Now, Kylee wishes to have the Agreement invalidated because she 
feels it works to her disadvantage and to George's advantage in the division of assets. "The 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right 
inconsistent with a position it has previously taken". Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 330 P.3d 762 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2014). The right to challenge the validity and enforceability of the Agreement was 
waived by Kylee's conduct. A party "may waive such right either expressly or by his conduct, 
and the right.. .. may be lost by estoppel." ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 2010 
WL 2425986 ,r 6 (D. Utah 2010), citing Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943,947 (8th Cir. 1959). 
II. RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
Premarital property is viewed as separate property and "when appropriate, equity will 
require that each party retain the separate property brought to the marriage". 11 Any appreciation 
of the separate property brought into the marriage should not become part of the marital estate, 
especially when the receiving spouse has made the contributions which led to the increase in 
value to the separate assets. Id. at ,r,r 4, 5. Even if the separate property has substantially 
changed in form, it still maintains its separate character. 12 
Both parties testified that George owned½ of an interest in a home (the "Dover" house) 
as well as interest in other properties before they got married. 13 Both parties agree that shortly 
11 Burke v. Burke, 733 P.3d 133 (Utah 1987). 
12 Burt v. Burt, 700 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
13 K. Sandusky Tr. 9:40:30, April 28, 2015; G. Sandusky Tr. 14:21:35 -59, April 29, 2015. 
10 
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after the marriage George acquired the second half of the interest in the same property. 14 Both 
parties agree that at the time of the acquisition of the entire interest in the Dover home, Kylee 
signed a Quitclaim deed to George absolving any interest or potential interest in the whole Dover 
property_lS When George sold the Dover house, he made a profit of $391,000.00. 16 The 
Findings of Facts show it was this separate profit that was continuously rolled over to buy and 
sell real estate assets throughout the parties' marriage and beyond. All the properties were 
purchased and paid for by George's separate account. The separate character was maintained 
throughout the marriage When the separate property character is maintained in segregated 
accounts, any conversion of the separate property [into other properties] does not "destroy the 
integrity of segregation." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 i!3 (Utah 1990). The Separation 
Agreement takes this into account when giving George $400,000 and the lots he purchased with 
proceeds and dividing the remaining assets equally between the parties. If the Agreement is held 
invalid, George would still be entitled to the separate profit, even though it has changed its form 
throughout the years, plus all appreciation. 
Kylee did minimal work at the various properties throughout the marriage. Most of what 
she testified to doing was housekeeping, sweeping, cleaning, painting, etc. During the Dover 
house years and subsequently, Kylee was working full time 17 and George was doing the work of 
enhancing the properties. That coupled with inflation on land values caused the appreciation in 
the properties and allowed George to make a profit. Kylee never contributed any monies 
14 K. Sandusky Tr. 9:48:15, April 28, 2015; G. Sandusky Tr. 14:29:53, April29, 2015. 
15 K. Sandusky Tr. 9:51 :32 - 9:53: 15. G. Sandusky Tr. 14:38:30, April 29, 2015. 
16 G. Sandusky Tr. 14:42:08, April 29, 2015 
17 K. Sandusky Tr. 13:23:09 0 34, April 29, 2015. 
11 
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towards the properties from her separate account. Where one spouse contribution to the separate 
property does not materially affect its value, then appreciation is not included in the marital 
estate. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 15 (Utah 1987) 
III. PETITIONER'S CREDIBILITY IS QUESTIONABLE. 
Petitioner's testimony lacked credibility. "Clearly the fact finder is in the best position to 
judge the credibility of witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony. Even where testimony 
is uncontroverted, a trial court is free to disregard such testimony if it finds the evidence self-
serving and not credible". Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App. 57, citing Glauser Storage, LLC v. 
Smedley, 2001 UT App. 141124, 27 P.3d 565 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Petitioner testified that she has a Masters degree in education that she obtained in 1995 or 
1996, 18 and yet she testified that she does not understand the documents she obtained including 
deeds, mortgages and quitclaim deeds. Further, when questioned why on her 2010 taxes, she 
originally classified the $20,000 from George as alimony before she spoke with an attorney, she 
testified that she doesn't even know what alimony means. 19 During that same line of questioning 
she said she didn't know why she classified the monies as alimony20 and she was just following 
the Agreement at that time. 21 Now Petitioner is attempting to declare the Agreement she 
followed as void. 
Regarding the form Kylee filled out for her son's financial aid, she testified that she could 
18 K. Sandusky Tr. 13:25:30, April 29, 2015. 
19 K. Sandusky Tr. 14: 13:31. April 29, 2015. 
2° K. Sandusky Tr. 14: 12:14, April29. 2015. 
21 K. Sandusky Tr. 14: 12:29. April 29.2015 
12 
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only fill out what she knew which was what was in her bank accounts. 22 She testified that when 
she filled out the first FAFSA form in February 2011 that she was not contemplating divorce at 
all;23 she was just using the terms of the Agreement for financial benefit and yet she filed for 
divorce four (4) months later. Petitioner would like for the Court to believe that when she filled 
out the subsequent F AFSA forms and CSS Profiles, she could only report what she had in her 
bank accounts as George was not communicating. However, Petitioner had sufficient knowledge 
of the other bank accounts to know she could withdraw $90,000 in June of 2011. Further, as of 
December, 2011, Petitioner had knowledge of all bank accounts and real estate assets when she 
received Respondent's responses to her first set of interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents. Yet, Kylee continued to report only her bank accounts for three more years of 
student financial aid forms and to the U.S. government when obtaining her government 
subsidized housing. 
Petitioner testified that she remembers distinctly that she did not have a conversation 
almost thirty years ago in 1986 about not touching George's pension, but can't remember or 
doesn't know if she was audited by the IRS in 2011. Petitioner's testimony is self-serving, 
inconsistent, and not credible. This Court should disregard much of her testimony. 
22 K. Sandusky Tr. 14:04:00, April 29, 2015 
23 K. Sandusky Tr. 13:59:50, April 29, 2015 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. I 
I ' . 
I ' ' 
I ' ' ' 
mm 
1i 
lwrt 
lit 
I 
I 
I . ' 
I 
I ' . 
I . . 
mTI 
Ii 
ma 
i 
I . ' 
mn 
Iii 
lm1 
llj 
I . ' 
: I 
mTI 
ii 
IV. THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT IS EQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE 
INCORPORATED IN THE DIVORCE DECREE 
Utah courts have held that when the parties intend to incorporate a separation agreement 
or property settlement agreement into a divorce decree, the courts should give it "full faith and 
credit". Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267 (1967). When the parties use the appropriate provisions in 
the agreement contemplating a proceeding of divorce, the agreement should be in force. Id. 
The Agreement in the case before the court provides the following: 
THE PARTIES AGREE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SHOULD A PROCEEDING 
OF LEGAL SEPARATION, DISOLUTION OR DIVORCE BE FILED IN ANY 
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICITON, THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE 
INCORP ARTED INTO ANY SUCH COMPLAINT OR PETITION FOR DIVORCE, 
DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION, AND THEREAFTER BE 
IN CORPORA TED IN WHOLE IN ANY ORDER OR JUDGEMENT OF LEGAL 
SEPARATION, DISSOLUTION OR DIVORCE. 
It is clear from the language, as emphasized in the Agreement, the parties intended for the 
Agreement to be incorporated into any decree of divorce. The parties have been separated and 
living apart since 2009. The marital assets should be divided as set forth in the language of the 
Agreement and finalized in a decree of divorce. 
The Agreement, as the manifest intent and terms of separation, should be adopted and 
enforced. Final agreements of parties, are not lightly modified. In order to modify an agreement 
the moving party must show a substantial change not contemplated by the parties. Bowers v. 
Bowers, 65 8 P .2d 1213 (Utah 1983 ). Likewise, this court, when considering entering the decree 
should consider the voluntary and comprehensive nature of the Separation Agreement created by 
14 
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the parties. Further, nothing has substantially changed in the parties' circumstances since the 
Agreement was entered into as would affect the substantial fairness of the Agreement. Any 
circumstances that may have changed were contemplated by the parties in the Agreement by 
providing in Article 2 that from the date of the Agreement, both shall live and conduct 
themselves as if never married and could choose to act for each party's "separate benefit to 
engage in any employment, business or profession." There is no compelling reason to modify 
the fair and reasonable Agreement and the Agreement should be incorporated into the decree. 
While, a stipulation and agreement is advisory and does not constrain the court's 
equitable powers, they are usually adopted unless found to be unfair or unreasonable. Coleman v. 
Coleman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1987). The Agreement was fair and equitable. "In 
Utah, marital property is ordinarily divided equally between the divorcing spouses and separate 
property, which may include premarital assets, inheritances, or similar assets, will be awarded to 
the acquiring spouse." Stonehocker v.Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11 ,r 13, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah Ct 
App. 2008), citing Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App. 296 ,r 23, 169 P.3d 765. The breakdown of the 
assets is as follows: 
• The parties came to Park City, Utah in August 2007 with $1.3 million dollars and no 
debt. 24 This amount was amassed from a real estate deal where George invested 
approximately $400,000 of his separate property that he had been investing prior to 
the marriage and continuing into the marriage. 
24 See Petitioner's Amended Verified declaration~ 1.4 
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• After costs ofliving, the amount at the time of the Agreement was approximately 
$1.2 million dollars. In the Agreement, George was to keep the lots he invested in as 
his separate property as well as his pension. 
• After removing George's $400,000 separate property from the 1.2 million dollars that 
left $800,000 to be divided. The Agreement provides for George to provide Kylee 
with $2,000 for life or a lump sum $400,000 which is half of the $800,000 remaining. 
Kylee chose the $2,000 for life which could potentially exceed her equal amount in 
the $800,000.25 
• Per the Agreement, George has continued investing his separate property in the 
ordinary course of business.26 
Further, by her actions and conduct, Kylee is collaterally estopped form now challenging 
the validation and enforceability of the Agreement. For the past years she has held out the 
Agreement as a true and valid document which correctly outlines the division of assets. She 
cannot now allege the Agreement is invalid, to George's disadvantage, by asserting a position 
completely inconsistent with her prior position taken for the past years . 
25 Since the parties separated, George has paid four ( 4) years of Micah's tuition at University of Pennsylvania which 
was approximately $167,000. 
26 See, Separation Agreement, Article 2 
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DATED this 26th day of May, 2015 
ELIZABETH A. SHAFFER, PLLC 
Isl Elizabeth A. Shaffer (digitally) 
Elizabeth A. Shaffer 
Attorney for Respondent/Counter Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 26th day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
POSTTRIAL MEMORANDUM was filed via the Court's electronic filing system which 
automatically delivered service to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P.O. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl Rankin H. Perry 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this the 18th day of July, 20 l 6, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S APPENDIX B was filed via the Court's electronic filing system 
which automatically delivered service to the following: 
Paul J. Morken 
P .0. Box 980691 
Park City, UT 84098 
Isl C.Kramer 
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